THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF LANGUAGE

SAYYED MOHSEN FATEMI

ROUTLEDGE

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF LANGUAGE

This volume shows how the psychology and power of language can create realities. It examines the psychological implications of language as a way of being and not just as an instrument of communication. It discusses how a shift in language gives rise to an existential transformation, and shows how creative modes of expression lead to a radical transformation of beings. Throughout, both the theoretical and practical implications of the psychological power of language are presented, particularly how language may result in a healthier inter- and intrapersonal world. It will interest upper-level students and researchers of language in Psychology, Linguistics, Philosophy and Education, as well as professional counselors.

Sayyed Mohsen Fatemi, Ph.D., completed his postdoctoral studies in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University where he has also served as a Teaching Fellow, an Associate, and a Fellow. He works on mindfulness and its psychological implications for cross cultural, clinical, and social psychology. He is the author of numerous books and has published articles in journals such as the American Psychological Association (APA) *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*. He is also the recipient of the Ellen Langer International Mindfulness Award.


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FOREWORD

This book introduces, discusses, and presents the psychology of language and its implications within new and different contexts. It differs from other books in the field as it chooses a different tone in expressing both the content and form of language, and their psychological applications. The book steps into the most obvious layers of expressiveness and extends its inquiry to the most rigorous parts of language, from the simplest conversations of our lives to the most complicated layers of international and interpersonal relations.

This book highlights the ontological role of language: language is not just a tool to conduct daily transactions, but a mode of living and being. The book examines the ways that the psychology of language is interconnected with a wide variety of contexts, including education and therapy. Change, education, therapy and language are intertwined dialectically. The language of education and the language of therapy would espouse instructions and prescriptions on what to do and what not to do.

Deep inside this structural approach, the question of epistemology, knowing, knowledge and modes of knowing unfold themselves. An emphasis on linear modes of knowing, for example, would exclude other epistemic modes which may have their validity in their own realms. The integration of language, would thus purport an epistemological standpoint through which policies, planning, curriculum development and pedagogy operate. Along with the epistemological layer, there lies a more significant leading foundation: namely, the ontology, and its influentially massive impact on thinking about language. If existence is to be recognized and sought by virtue of an exclusive concentration on the domain of the visible, the generative educational and therapeutic approaches and programs cannot do anything except confirming and vindicating the ontologically prescriptive frameworks. A change in education or therapy, therefore, would require a

comprehensive understanding of the ontological and epistemological foundations of any educational or therapeutic system.

Educators and therapists who fail to question the ontological and epistemological constituents of their system would be unavoidably embedded in the confirmatory discourse of the same education; they would abide by *oughts* and *ought nots* that come out of the ontological and epistemological discourses of representation.

This book is an invitation to look deeper into the underlying foundational components of our relationship in language and its psychological implications. The positivist interpretation of the psychology of language and its infatuation with empirical psychology highlighted linear forms of thinking, and generated approaches and practices with exclusive presentations of ratiocination as the most reliable way of knowing and understanding. This interpretation was deeply rooted in a discourse of signification where the relationship between signifiers and signifieds focused on the visibility, obviousness, consciousness, accessibility, availability and sensibility within the realm of the known by enlightenment-led reasoning and rational thinking. The book moves out of the positivist referential context and seeks an innovative, creative and novel approach within the psychology of language. It presents and examines alternatives that may have been concealed to oblivion because of heavily promoted discourses of thinking based on positivist paradigms in the psychology of language.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

Language is quintessentially tied to our life. From the early stages of cognitive, emotional and behavioral development, one can see the interplay of language in creating, shaping and changing our life.

One may recall the sweetest or the bitterest moments of his/her life interwoven with language in either its explicit verbal manifestation and locutionary acts, or through the non-verbal appearance of language in its broadest sense.

Negotiations, interactions, communications, raptures and ruptures, celebrations and farewells, promises and breaches, love and hate, literacy and ignorance are all linked to the sundry yet comprehensive presence of language.

Oppressions and encroachments, victimization and manipulations, loyalties and betrayals, devotion and emancipation have been embedded within language.

The romantic and dramatic tintinnabulation of feelings and emotions, the revolution of inner thoughts and their manifestos in scribing philosophies, policies, regulations, laws and doctrines have transpired within language and by language.

Language has been illuminating in pouring light, perspicacity, sagacity and erudition into people's minds and hearts, and yet it has been misleading in misrepresenting, misinforming, distorting and destroying lives.

It has been through the power of language that affection, connectedness, understanding, appreciation, togetherness, consummation, belonging and longing have substantiated their sensibility within human life. Language has been silently or vociferously lingering deep down through the reverberation of agonies, deprivations, calamities and tragedies of human existence.

Language has been powerful in shifting attention in politics and political games, and yet has acted so innocently in revelatory experiences of childlike worlds.

Language has been suppressed, silenced and suffocated through language, and it has been language that has displayed its domineering power in certain discursive modes.

Language has enlivened, resuscitated, revitalized and exhilarated people whilst it has saddened, depressed, demoralized and annihilated people.

Language has served as a panacea in decoding secrets, in giving rise to liveliness, vivacity and fervor, and yet it has mischievously operated in covering, concealing, hiding and deviating, and erasing enthusiasm, authenticity, ebullience and truth.

Language has turned out to be rigorous and vital, while paradoxically weak, feeble and paralyzed.

Language has led to reconciliation, compassion and peace, and it has also brought war, conflicts and animosity.

Storms of human emotional upheavals, cyclones of human confusion and discombobulation, the barren land of misunderstanding, and the quagmire of loneliness may demonstrate the presence of specificity of language and its continued sovereignty.

The apogee of sacrifice, the celebration of synergy, the apex of values, the sunrise of awareness and the glory of perceptiveness have also displayed the presence of language.

Language's expressiveness and receptiveness have had consequential implications.

When you and I have not expressed our language and have found no body to find our language and our language has been denied, deplored, decried, depreciated, derided and diminished, this lack of expressiveness and lack of receptiveness have been with us and will remain with us until we find empowerment to voice our language.

Deep down among psychological symptoms, emotional disturbances, emotional pandemonium, cognitive estrangement, disillusioned predilections and proclivities, there lies a language unspoken to the world.

The ability to receive voices, to be sensitive towards them, to empathize with them, to recognize them, to help them be heard and to legitimize them, to give them their own privilege, to be receptive towards them calmly, amicably and openly would develop a community of souls that feel connected, nourished, taken care of, loved and accepted.

Our era is shrouded with a pretentious, supercilious, ostentatious parade of silencing voices by the name of languages that appear to be conspicuously right, saliently beautiful and remarkably piercing. The parade flows through our life sometimes quietly, and sometimes so fast that we don't recognize it for years until the hammering of its effects would echo with our bewilderment, our perplexity and our behaviors. The hypocrisy ensnared through language subtly and clandestinely creates a world where our attachments to simulacrum have brought us the intellectually somnambulating dance in the mirage of our given simulation of our own languages.

Our voices have been mechanically, artistically, cognitively, emotionally and intellectually replaced by pseudo-voices that categorize our modes of being and becoming in a dogmatic compartmentalization of possibilities.

The language of possibility, given and promoted by dominant languages of our era, encapsulates the possibility of voicing alternative ways of voicing our life and our experiences.

Possibility, itself, is bound by the language of possibility in the pre-marked language that would endorse the degree, the intensity, the scope and the measure of possibilities.

Our voices may be lost through the hum-drum of the bombastic flurry of voices that are meant to be highlighted to distract us from our own voices. This may have its own roots in the childhood experiences of life associated with abuse, or it might as well be perceptible in the hue and cry of the manipulative, deceptive political and economic configuration.

Therapy and its multifarious forms, including psychoanalysis, may help people to discover how their own voices have been left behind in the backyard of their early experiences, and their detachment from the abandoned voices have unfolded themselves in their seemingly non-sensible behaviors. Nonetheless, the process may not be that easy in the macro levels where people may find themselves heavily sleeping in the long dreams that only portray voices other than their authentic ones.

To bring mindfulness to language and to help language become mindful may be one of the crucial tasks of our era. The tyranny of our mindlessness in our languages may be so long-standing and strenuously penetrating that questioning its legitimacy and challenging its sustainability may seem to be absurd, impossible and irrational.

Language has served as a prison where it has limited our movement, our views and our conversation. Yet, it has brought us freedom from the manacles of our enslavement imposed through the limiting languages which divested us of looking for our languages.

Voices have, then, helped us breathe and find our own voice, or have monopolized the use of certain voices to be acceptable, approvable and admirable.

Helping people find their own voice and celebrate its uniqueness may be at the top of the list for any educational, pedagogical and therapeutic programs that aim to dissipate psychological and emotional malaise.

Our era is steeped in fabrication of multilayered voices that may be the byproduct of an intricate interplay of complex political and economic factors.

In the massiveness of all types of emergent, albeit artificial, voices, there may lie the multiplicities of voices that may prompt an accelerated entanglement in recognizing the appealable modes of expressiveness.

Living through acceleration, massiveness and multiplicity has brought an absence from finding and locating one's own voice. Languages have been preoccupying in that they have espoused fragmentation, so much so that one would need to see himself/herself through the taxonomy of voices.

When absent, one lives far from a coherent and solidified articulation of self-expressiveness through his/her authentic voice; he/she is in quest of a template seen as the sensibility of voicing out voices. In the cul-de-sac of single voices, one may not be encouraged to make a turn to look for other avenues of belonging where one's voice may be nested.

Once presence goes away and absence resides, fragmentation and multiplicities move along: they impose their caricaturist image of expressiveness.

Once you are absent as in the case of a conversation with your spouse or a friend, the interlocutory relationship is frozen in cliché, stereotyped and superficial communication. The absence is embroiled in detachment and fragmentation so wholeness is replaced by disengagement. The increased absence would go against closeness and connectedness, only bringing distance and disconnection.

Once one's voice is lost, he/she is more susceptible to multiplicities in the hopes of getting recognized through identification with the extensions of the absence-oriented fragmentation.

Mindfulness would facilitate the process of getting in touch with your own voice while recognizing the socially, politically, economically and culturally constructed voices.

The journey may be cumbersome, as it requires perseverance and courage: two gems that are often missing in the structural pattern of mindlessly encouraged multiplicities of our era.

Mindfulness of language and language use and mindful listening to one's own language and choosing the language away from absence would commence the prelude to creating a creative path of life.

This would potentially require an understanding of the nature of language, its psychological rhythms, its powerful power to empower and disempower voices, its meanders and its perlocutionary impacts.

The simplicity of language may not have often been an indication of its emptiness, as there are innumerable examples of language oppressiveness in the seemingly rich texture of expressiveness.

Our orthodox, conventional and rule-guided modes of learning to voice our voices and to language our experiences have phenomenologically left us a language heritage that almost dictates our ontological modes of recognition: it moves us in line with categories whereby stop signs may not allow us to go further or fathom alternative modes of finding our voices. This has a lot to do with our upbringing, education, schooling, associations and peer groups but also the structural societal, political and economic contexts. In the pages to follow, you see examples of moving in line or beyond the architecturally promoted context of language.

Change may begin with a change of language: a language that we have been subscribed to or others have chosen for us. This in either case may have been a mindless choice, where our voices have been intermingled with those artificial ones that we may not want to associate with.

Our mindlessly induced voices have kept us away from self-discovery where the power of our voices would have given rise to drastically different modes of realities both for our own and others. Language is, therefore, creational and creative. It may shape, create, engender and offer novel status in one's existential bearings. Language is then ontologically transformative, revolutionizing and changing.

As to a social revolution that brings its own language and is inspired by a special language of its own, one's radical transformation of consciousness would transpire through language. If not changed, there would be no grammar of understanding, no reciprocal perceptiveness and no brain-to brain coupling.

To bring the change in language, one may need to facilitate the psychological preparation of expressiveness and receptiveness through both attunement and inter-subjectivity. The former may require a simultaneous connectedness in the emotional level with the interlocutor, whereas the latter would require a concurrent link to the cognitive repertoire of the illocutionary and locutionary framework.

The psychological preparation of both functions would help facilitate the process of a parallel or almost similar process of responsiveness, expressiveness and receptiveness.

When talking to a ten-year-old child, the use of jargon and technical terms would work against establishing inter-subjectivity as inattention towards his/her emotional position such as anger or sadness would impede the process of putting into effect the right mode of attunement.

Our world today is suffering both from lack of inter-subjectivity and attunement. The raging conflicts in different parts of the world, the familial violence and its expansion in our daily life, the political crises in a wide variety of contexts, the increasing list of alumni that may see increasing gaps between what they were told in classes and the social realities of their lived experiences, the increasingly huge psychological distance among family members, labeling people on a daily basis in our mediated world through mass media, may all bring numerous levels of disconnection where language is somehow missing, absent, distorted, limited, constricted, filtered and minimized.

It may be good enough to explore or even have a quick peek through Donald Trump's daily barrage of modes of expressiveness to examine how language determines our construction of our realities with impacts on people's lives.

The mapping feature of language may often be mindlessly wrapped in the midst of our daily engagements and its routinized constriction. Language provides us with "is" and "ought" through the socially constructed imperatives that may determine the indexes of our sensibility, the magnitude of our progress and the extent to which we may be articulate and may be tacit in voicing ourselves and others.

Just as modern transportation has had an impact on our viewing of the world and creating a perspective way different from that of the horse-carriages, the prevalence of languages through which we are encouraged to voice our beings and

oneness may have an impact on our ontological modes: the mapping's instructions would determine the whereabouts of exploration, the realms of examinations and the domains of our sensibility.

This might be in line with the inner nature of language and its leading frameworks that may appear to allow specific transformation in the syntactical configuration of language and its structural adaptability. But the leap is immeasurably immense and infinite in the semantics level with its own generative pragmatics implications.

Yet, here what I have in mind is neither of those, but the psychological buoyance and its vast manifestations. The psychological aspect may explain how the mapping instructed and prescribed through the dominant language, whether on the individual or collective level, may create dormant domains of thinking while gushing out highly promoted sleuths. The psychological mapping may help us find the emergent of associative, affective and marginal meanings in the midst of our encounter with the core meanings.

The psychological connection to our voices may reveal how our reconciliation to exploring and scrutinizing our lost voices would raise freshness and newness to our minds and our hearts.

This might open up the question as to a search within multiple voices to discern a single unified and coherent voice that may have been surreptitiously forgotten or have been left unnoticed in the midst of tenaciousness, disturbances or disequilibrium imposed on the emotional and affective levels.

For an examination one may look into Karl Marx's writings or Schopenhauer's to see how their voicing of their voices has been influenced by their psychological positions: Look at Marx's writings after and before his being denied marriage with the German girl whom he loved and the religious authorities' opposition to the marriage because of Karl's ideas. The same might be examined in Schopenhauer's diction of describing the fair sex for women and the trail of the emotional underpinnings in his tumultuous experience with his conflict-ridden parents.

This is not to say that one should always suffice to merely look for the psychological underpinnings of one's voice. But it iterates that modes of expressiveness, their sitting places, their landing impact, their unfolding format, their tone down or vibrant appearances, their smoothness or roughness would help us go back and see how the psychological interplay of intricate conscious and unconscious factors both on the individual and collective levels would have contributed to creating specific produced verbatim. We would see the expansion of more of this in the following chapters of the book.

Programs like Linguistic Word Inquiry may help us understand some of the aforementioned features as it claims that the mere use of passive verbs might be suggestive of the possibility of lying more than telling the truth, or analysis of couple's conversation with the absence of pronoun "we" and the frequent use of "I" might suggest a high degree of conflict with the possibility of divorce.

In the meantime, persuasive models such Elaboration Likelihood Model, Yale Model, Cognitive Response, etc. might also display how the right or the wrong

recourse to the web of language in its broadest sense may generate a different impact for the audience.

Likewise, psychoanalytical inquiry may demonstrate its fervor in identifying the deep layers of meanings shrouded underneath the perfunctory stages of expressiveness. This might be also true of other psychotherapeutic systems such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), or even some others such as Narrative Therapy, Existential Therapy, Gestalt Therapy and Feminist Therapy.

Along with all these selective approaches to excavate the psychological presence of language one might see how the psychology of language itself can be exposed to paying attention to certain voices in understanding the psychological dynamics (see Fatemi, 2016).

The compartmentalization of psychology in understanding language may explicitly or implicitly invite us to select certain recommended windows through which we study the performance and functionality of the psychology of language. This may tacitly and yet politically induce passing through certain avenues of epistemological taxonomy to enable scholarly engagements in discussing and examining the psychology of language.

As much as the taxonomy presented in the literature work of the predecessors may find its apposite placement ipso facto, it may not be the only way to fathom and ponder the psychology of language and the special language of the psychological context of language as it unfolds itself in social and political, educational, cultural and economic structures.

The psychological walls associated with creating and directing psychological stimuli and responses may deprive one of going beyond the cognitive and emotional ceilings contrived through the proxemics of walls. Thus one may find himself/herself paralyzed in moving beyond the space- and time-bound dimension of the psychological walls.

The stronger the walls, the less psychological air may be found in the interactive psychological locution of one's voice. The walls may be interpersonal or intrapersonal and hence may limit the perspective of interlocutors whether one speaks with himself/herself or is in communication with the other. In both cases, the other is interconnected to the locutionary act.

The psychological walls may go back to fears, anxiety, or psychological malfunction or dysfunction in the past and learned patterns of dysfunctional thinking or distorted thinking. On a macro level, they may be enmeshed within political agendas where the scope of exploration needs to be determined both in forms and contents. The deterministic tendency of the political psychology of language may be overwhelmed through subtle, clandestine and calculatedly ulterior intentions and objectives that may not be visibly found in the construction of language.

It may often be forbidden to question the psychological structures of the leading walls so people might themselves get stuck in their helplessness to attempt to remove the walls in intrapersonal levels. The same may be true for succumbing to

the socio-political walls as they have often been psychologically associated with an undeniable fact of life without which life ceases to operate.

This may be historically more tangible in the time of slavery where some were meant to be slaves and were not entitled to voice their objection since voicing their protest was not psychologically possible through the psychology of the domineering language of the time.

Our modern slavery is not easily detectable although it might, at first glance, be discernible in the sovereignty of technology, industrialization, utilitarianism, consumerism and materialism and reductionist epistemologies.

In a deeper level of analysis, our embeddedness within the psychologically created language would uncover our enmeshment in abiding by the given frames of language.

Our cognitive priming, our emotional association and our behavioral cultivation and socialization would lead us choose or adopt specific modes of expressiveness as they may have an impact on receiving others' modes of expressiveness.

To bring psychological mindfulness to our embeddedness in language may help us rewrite our positions and recreate our ontological belongings. This mindfulness may happen on different levels and bring about different modes of connectedness or disconnectedness. It may help us see how our language use has positioned us in certain adherence to specific perspectives of expressiveness as it may reveal our inner challenges in experiencing our encounter with our language.

A rigorous and mindful encounter with the language that we use or have been compelled to use or have been subscribed to use may help us understand how the psychology of language may illustrate a new world beyond what we have constructed so far or have been agreed upon on its construction.

Grandparents' stories and fairytales during bed time may allow us to recall and reconnect to a world created through the power of inventive and creative imagination where its parameters did not necessarily comply with the realities around ourselves.

Irrespective of the substance of truth, practicality, verification or reason-based sensibility in the context of our language of what reason is all about, those stories opened up a horizon of meaningfulness by pointing to a new paradigmatic analysis: a new paradigm which may help us see how our psychological flight would entail further excavation of our psychological languages and their obvious or cryptic embodiment in our articulated words. The following chapters would each let us walk through the ontological expansion of the psychology of language.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SIGNS AND SYMBOLS

As soon as you start thinking about language, whether you engage in a contemplative mode or begin analyzing a proposition or even visualization of a concept, you see yourself surrounded by signs and symbols.

The Western epistemological and ontological understanding of pedagogical interactions and educational communications is considerably influenced by the suppositions that focus on signs and their implications. The emphasis tends to propound the facilitating role of signs in educational projects, pedagogical planning, curriculum development, educational policies and their etiological implications.

A sign reveals the correlation between the signified and signifier (de Saussure, 1966, p. 66). A sign is not the signifier. The signifier is the sound-image which transports the signified and the signified is a concept which refers to something. What the sign refers to is the referent.

In line with the first serious work on the sovereignty of the signs by the Swiss semiologist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) expanded on the realm of signs and discussed their three different systems: icons, indexes and symbols, with their respective focus on resemblance, cause and effect and convention.

According to Italian semiotician Umberto Eco (1976), there are often cases and examples where the referent of a sign is not a real object or a subject, but the signified or signifier of another sign. Thus, the signified or the signifier of a sign correlation can, in turn, be either the signifier or the signified of another sign correlation. It is in the juxtaposition of signs that signification occurs.

The sovereignty of signs and its discursive implications came to rise by virtue of the intellectual enlightenment and its outcry for rationality, positivism, control, prediction and certitude. The rationality as defined by the intellectual enlightenment concentrated on the world of the visible and prescribed modes of knowing

that are strictly embedded within the borders and constituents of the visible. Logical positivism, empiricism and their expansionist clamor grew in the midst of such parades.

Study of signs was thus inspired by the recursive patterns of rationality and its explicit prescriptive implications. Neither the semiotics nor the semiology of signs were given a chance to leap beyond the prescribed forms of rationality and sensibility and therefore they constructed their rational-oriented approaches and celebrated their certitude of signs without deconstructing their own underlying ontological and epistemological constituents.

Along with the overarching power of the signs, "I" descended to be identical to "body" and "body" served as the main source of the interpretive inquiry. The idolization of the body and its tyrannical multiplicities ushered in the hollowness of "I" and the alienation of the self.

Johnston (2001, p. xvii) writes,

> From Marilyn Monroe to the Spice Girls, from Arnold Schwarzenegger to O. J. Simpson, from William Taft to Bill Clinton, to your own naked form reflected in the mirror each morning, we are taught to read bodies as symbols displaying and revealing hidden "truths" about the individual and his or her behaviors. Any discussion of the body becomes complex and muddled as one tries to analyze how and why certain body types are attributed certain meanings.

The despotism of signs contained the definition of intelligibility and circumscribed the approaches to knowing. The subscription to sign-oriented patterns and paradigms became the criteria for sensibility, competence, and superiority.

Critiquing the authoritative presence of such sensibility, Shotter explains this well by saying, "In fulfilling our responsibilities as competent and professional academics, we must write systematic texts; we run the risk of being accounted incompetent if we do not. Until recently, we have taken such texts for granted as a neutral means to use how we please. This, I now want to claim, is a mistake, and now we must study their influence" (Shotter, 1993, p. 25).

The government of signs promoted exclusive interpretation for thinking, learning and education and thus elbowed aside numerous other possible forms of understanding. The executive powers of such exclusion gave rise to a discourse of power where sensibility had to be ratified by specific channels.

The cultivation and socialization of the most available perspective on signs generated numerous forms of reliance on the established modes of knowing. Education, like other social sciences, tried hard to bring forth and lead out the clandestine yet constructive forces of the learner from within on the strength of the discourse of rationality and sensibility as prescribed by the intellectual enlightenment.

This, in turn, highlighted the establishment of a language and a generative metalanguage where the paradigmatic and syntagmatic analysis and assessment of pedagogical approaches and practices borrowed their sensibility from the binding source of intellectuality based on the rational understanding of signs. The imperial power of signs and their inducing command of rationality turned out to be inexorably linked to the community of both educators and learners. Michal Oakeshott had a notion of such implications when he writes that:

> Flattered by circumstance and linked with ancient heresy, an attempt was made to promote 'science' as itself a 'culture' in which human beings identified themselves in relation to 'things' and to their 'empire over things,' but it now deceives nobody; boys do not elect for the 'science sixth' expecting to achieve self-knowledge, but for vocational reasons.
>
> *(Quoted in Barrow & Woods, 1993, p. 35)*

The idolization of signs and its emphasis on linear thinking generated a utilitarian objective within the field of education and it focused on packaging everything within the so-called standardization of learning and teaching; it changed education into a business plan where the agenda was to sell the right form of thinking and the proper way of learning. Development, improvement, growth and thinking were strongly assessed based on their adaptability to the ontology of signs. An obsession with techniques was highly consecrated. Thus, education, as actualized in conventional practices and institutions, enacted the criteria of sense-making by virtue of its own signs. Education indoctrinated, blocking alternatives of seeing, perceiving and knowing, monopolizing its own as the first and the foremost reflection of reality as submitted in its own sign(s).

It is in line with the hazards of such obsessions that Habermas (1973a, p. 255) discusses the modern society's failure to distinguish between the practical and technical.

> The real difficulty in the relation of theory to praxis does not arise from this new function of science as technological force, but rather from the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish between practical and technical power. Yet, even a civilization that has been rendered scientific is not granted dispensation from practical questions: therefore a particular danger arises when the process of scientification transgresses the limit of reflection of rationality confined to the technological horizon. For then no attempt at all is made to attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerned with the practical control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical.

Questioning our taken-for-granted assumptions in the realm of signs, Herda (1999, p. 24) indicates that, "Most typically, we take for granted our social actions, structured or patterned by language, and we fail to see them." She revisits our thinking of thinking and calls for deconstructing the assumptions governed by the system of signs. Herda (1999, p. 18) notes that,

> The lack of depth of the current usage of the term "thinking" in the critical thinking bandwagon undermines the potential of adult or young leaders to reflect, learn, and act in meaningful ways.

Looking for a critical curriculum development that can observe its own imposition of assumptions, Snyder (2002, p. 181) puts the courage into words:

> we need to develop pedagogical and curriculum frameworks that seek to endow students with a sense of their place in the new global system, but also with the capacity to view that system critically. At the very least, we can help our students to engage in local forms of cultural critique.

To do so, we might turn to Carl Jung (1875–1961) who departs from the sign-stricken domain and highlights the significance of symbols along the path of signs. Jung indicates that our life and above all, our health, is in dire need of symbols. He indicates that a life where symbols are concealed into oblivion generates neurosis, alienation, parochialism, estrangement, superficiality, and entanglement.

He begins discussing the significance of symbols by comparing them with the signs where signs constantly focus on the known, on the obvious, on the rational, on the visible, on the accessible and on the available, whereas symbols concentrate on the unknown, the mysterious, the ambiguous and the unconscious.

On such preliminary discussions, Jung suggests,

> A word or an image is symbolic when it implies something more than its obvious an immediate meaning. It has a wider unconscious aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. Nor can anyone hope to define or explain it. As the mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason.
>
> *(Jung & Von Franz, 1964, pp. 20–21)*

Jung questions the containment of reality within the prescriptive modes of signs and argues that reality is not to be bound by the visible; the sphere of existence cannot be limited to the domain of the visible signs and the rationality that seeks the sensibility within the visible world would be inadequate to reflect and represent the magnitude of reality. Existence, according to Jung, can be explored and understood within the domain of signs, but cannot be restricted and contained within signs.

The layers of existence are far too extensive to be circumscribed within the territorial integrity of signs. Jung goes beyond the limitations of the reading of our perceived reality through signs and highlights the significance of understanding a new and yet independent realm of existence, meaning making and sensibility, i.e., the realm of symbols.

Illustrating the unreality of our reality, Tacey (2006) writes,

> Our minds are conditioned to think that only what we can see and touch is real, but Jung questioned this view, and his psychology is a challenge to our understanding of reality. Jung was an unsettling thinker, because he introduced the notion that the evidence of our sense is illusory, and that common sense is nothing more than a construct of external conditioning.
>
> *(p. 12)*

Revolutionizing the modes of thinking, Jung challenges the absolutism of the scientific discourse and their monarchical manifestations in endorsing the validity of the truth through logical positivism and linear forms of thinking. He yearns for a genuine search for knowledge and wisdom and opens up the possibility of exploring the genius of inspiration and intuition as real modes of knowing and learning.

> We have become rich in knowledge, but poor in wisdom. The centre of gravity of our interest has switched over to the materialistic side, whereas the ancients preferred a mode of thought nearer to the fantastic type. To the classical mind, everything was still saturated with mythology.
>
> *(quoted in Tacey, 2006, p. 15)*

On Jung's vital message, Tacey (2006) writes:

> We tend to think of myths and religions as 'untrue' and of dreams as 'distortions' of reality. But for Jung they are expressions of a truth that is truer than literal truth.
>
> This is Jung's vital message, linking him to the 'perennial philosophy' and to wisdom traditions that originate from Heraclitus, Socrates and Plato. Socrates said truth is not self evident, and Jung would agree. What we see, and what we seem, is not the whole truth. Our knowledge is not reliable; it is partial and undermined by the fact that the unconscious has a separate truth dimension, of which we are mostly oblivious. Ironically, deeper truth resides in what we habitually dismiss as illusion, fantasy, myth and distortion. This may be one reason why, in an age governed by science and logic, our entertainment is saturated with fantasy, mythic stories and legends: a compensatory process has risen in popular culture.

> The reason we have lost access to the deeper truth, for Jung, is that we have lost access to the symbolic language that discloses it. Our world-blinded consciousness has made a successful adaptation to external reality, but the cost has been an atrophy of our symbolic life.
>
> *(p. 15)*

A Jungian understanding of education leaps beyond the monosemy and univocity and searches for multiplicities of meaning while celebrating multiple ways of knowing. This understanding can be embedded in lesson planning, instructional materials, curriculum development, policy making and teaching strategies. For this, Jung's project of symbols complies with Ricoeur's understanding of language where inventiveness, novelty, creativity, and innovation unfold their creational power through a language that goes beyond the sign and sign-oriented limitations.

On the power of such sign-escapist language, Ricoeur writes,

> My philosophical project is to show how human language is inventive despite the objective limits and codes which govern it, to reveal the diversity and potentiality of language which the erosion of the everyday, conditioned by technocratic and political interests, never ceases to obscure. To become aware of the metaphorical and narrative resources of language is to recognize that its flattened or diminished powers can always be rejuvenated for the benefit of all forms of language usage.
>
> *(Ricoeur, 1991a, p. 465)*

A Jungian understanding of symbols helps the educators understand the power of intuition and inspiration in enriching the modes of expressiveness; it is through these powers that creativity unfolds itself. Jung (1971, p. 63) pinpoints the significance of such powers:

> Every creative individual whatsoever owes all that is greatest in his life to fantasy. The dynamic principle of fantasy is play, a characteristic also of the child, and as such it appears inconsistent with the principle of serious work. But without this playing with fantasy no creative work has ever come to birth. The debt we owe to the play of imagination is incalculable.

Bruner (1986) presented the narrative metaphor in sociology and focused on the interpretation of text in its broadest sense; culture, itself, was considered a text with multifarious layers of meaning. On the relationship between experience, narrative and meaning, Bruner (1991, p. 4) indicates that "we organize our experience and our memory of human happening mainly in the form of narrative-stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on."

Jungian presentation of symbols protests against the overarching idolization of science in its linear and empirical exclusive version and vociferously challenges the unquestionably established paradigms that foster nothing but the transformation of learners into objects of control and conditioning. As Jung states, any approach "that satisfies the intellect alone can never be practical, for the totality of the psyche can never be grasped by the intellect alone" (1953, p. 76). He explains,

> It cannot be the aim of education, to turn out rationalists, materialists, specialists, technicians and others of the kind who, unconscious of their origins, are precipitated abruptly into the present and contribute to the disorientation and fragmentation of society.
>
> *(as quoted in Frey-Rohn, 1974, p. 182)*

A challenge against the subjugation of signs and its reductionism can be tracked down in and among the voices that break the reliance on the signs' enchainment.

Bellah, Madison, and Sullivan (1991, p. 44), for instance, refer to a wide gap between technical reason, the knowledge with which we design computers or analyze the structure of DNA, and practical or moral reason, the ways we understand how we should live . . . What we need to know is not simply how to build a powerful computer or how to redesign DNA but precisely and above all how to do with that knowledge.

A Jungian understanding of symbols would facilitate the process of teaching and learning with more depth and vigilance; it would help educators and learners to openly examine and explore the taken-for-granted assumptions and critically look at the construction of knowledge. This understanding becomes sensitive to how language creates constructs, transforms and positions.

Ha'iri (1992) questions the ubiquitous implications of signs and challenges the entrenchment of the sign-oriented interpretation of knowing and its concentrated mobilization for searching the sensibility within the fences of linear forms of thinking and logical positivism. He highlights the sensibility of mysticism as a way of understanding while substantiating and corroborating a wide spectrum of knowing. Ha'iri (1992, p. 5) revolts against the modern Western philosophy's exclusion of "claims of awareness from the domain of human knowledge" and substantiates the meaningfulness of what the Modern way of knowing brands "mere expressions of fervor or as leaps of imagination."

When knowing is not just a gerund in the air, when knowing turns out to be, in the words of Ha'iri Yazdi (1992), "being," and language becomes an "action" in the words of Habermas (1979), we may better understand the ontological aspect of signs in terms of their creation. With a focus on knowing as being, Ha'iri (1992, p. 1) indicates,

> . . . the inquiry into the nature of the relationship between knowledge and the knower can lead to the very foundation of human intellect where the

> word knowing does not mean anything other than being. In this ontological state of human consciousness the constitutive dualism of the subject-object relationship is overcome and submerged into a unitary simplex of the reality of the self that is nothing other than self-object knowledge. From this unitary simplex, the nature of self-object consciousness can, in turn, be derived.

According to Jung, with the expansion of signs and dissipation of symbols, the fragmentation and disorientation grew with the ever-increasing emergence of self-alienation. The disappearance of symbols from human life took away the wholeness and thus the fragmentation was associated with illness. Jung states,

> It seems to me that, side by side with the decline of religious life, the neuroses grow noticeably more frequent. We are living undeniably in a period of greatest restlessness, nervous tension, confusion, and disorientation of outlook.
>
> *(Quoted in Tacey, 2006, p. 97)*

On the spiritual dimension of healing and its connectedness to understanding the role of symbols, Jung says,

> During the past thirty years, people from all the civilized countries of the earth have consulted me. Many hundreds of patients have passed through my hands, the greater number being Protestants, a lesser number Jews, and not more than five or six believing Catholics. Among all my patients in the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life.
>
> It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill, because he had lost what the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook. This of course has nothing to do with a particular creed or membership of a church.
>
> *(Psychotherapists or the Clergy, CW, 11, 490–509, quoted in Tacey, 2006, pp. 85–86)*

According to Jung, an education without attention towards the role and the implications of symbols, would lead to reductionism, parochialism and consumerism. An understanding of the Jungian discourse of symbols would enhance the power of creativity and the gift of reflexivity. Jungian discourse of symbols would invite both the learner and the teacher to go beyond the mastery of signs and celebrate the mystery of symbols; it is a promising preamble to vivify the enthusiasm of searching for multiple ways of knowing and understanding.

How can educators promote thinking if they are already enmeshed in limiting packages of signification? How can learners explore new horizons of thinking if they are extensively and frequently exposed to the availability and accessibility of the sign-promoting discourses? How can the educational practices offer any depth if their layers of constitution are heavily ensconced in linear forms of engagement and positivist-oriented approaches? And how might learners learn to mindfully reconsider the correlation of the signifier and signified within the induced signification? If the learners are consistently influenced by the socially and politically imposed signified, can they search for the analysis of correlation between signifier and signified without being mindfully active?

On the description of some of these engagements, Lasn (1999) writes,

> Advertisements are the most prevalent and toxic of the mental pollutants. From the moment your radio alarm sounds in the morning to the wee hours of late-night TV, microjolts of commercial pollution flood into your brain at the rate of about three thousand marketing messages per day. Every day, an estimated 12 billion display ads, 3 million radio commercials, and more than 200,000 TV commercials are dumped into North America's collective unconscious.
>
> *(pp. 18–19)*

How can learners reflect on their positions and reexamine their connectedness socially, culturally and politically if they are bound to think through the sign-inducing forms and orders?

A Jungian understanding of symbols brings awareness against the privatization of individuals, their placement into a universe of simulacra and their entrapment into the flamboyant spectacles which present themselves by the name of science.

Just as much as signs lead us to the ordinary transactions, recognition and understanding of symbols would provide profound reflexivity, deep contemplation and sensitivity towards the examination of modes of being. In the words of Tacey (2006, p. 11), "The study of signs leads to semiotics, linguistics and discourse analysis. The study of symbols leads to mythology, religion and philosophy."

Jung's discourse of symbols illustrates the vitality of poetry and poetic understanding; it illuminates the merit of intuition, inspiration and mythical understanding. An understanding of Jung's symbols would explicate how a concentration on sign-driven programs and their focus on linear thinking may divest the learners of voicing themselves and recognizing the value of their narratives, their "hills and valleys." It brings to life the inherent creativity that dwells within each individual, each child.

Political and utilitarian policy making seem to prefer and design sign-driven educational programs where engagements in deep critical thinking and creative examination of the assumptions are not encouraged or marginalized.

Warning against sign-inducing programs, Morgan (2002, p. 156) argues,

> As students start to question "texts in the world," they also begin to question "texts in the mind." They come to recognize that they are not necessarily the sole authors of "commonsense" beliefs but are instead subjects produced through language and discourse. Such forms of understanding, from a post-structural perspective, are necessary to imitate attention and action on social inequalities whose persistence is sustained by their seeming naturalness.

Jungian understanding of signs would offer the promise inherent when understanding, interpretation, is driven not by reading signs, but engaging in symbols which are metonymic, mysterious, generative and polysemic.

To Ricoeur, "it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much as they can and not as little as they can" (Ricoeur, 1991a, p. 449). In and through poetry, one may say, language can be liberated from the constrictions of sign-driven discourse, and new layers of reality can be revealed. Ricoeur (1991a, p. 462) argues that "through this recovery of the capacity of language to create and re-create, we discover reality itself in the process of being created. So we are connected with this dimension of reality which is unfinished."

Speaking on the role of metaphor and the process of becoming for language, Ricoeur (1991a, p. 462) describes the language of poetry and its significant role: "language in the making celebrates reality in the making." Making a distinction between the language of ordinary speech where the signs have established their authority and the language of poetry in dealing with reality, he remarkably presents a very striking characteristic of ordinary language versus the language of poetry:

> And the rest of our language in ordinary speech and so on has to do with reality as it is already done, as it is finished, as it is there in the sense of the closedness of what is, with its meaning which is already asserted by the consensus of wise people.
>
> *(Ricoeur, 1991b, p. 462)*

Elaborating on the role of metaphor and its capacity for changing and shattering reality, Ricoeur (1991b, p. 85) propounds that "with metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language and reality." He does not submit to the pervasive discourse of signs and its clamorous quest for defining the reality in sign-inducing exegesis.

> We could say that in scientific language there is an attempt to reduce as much as possible this polysemy, this plurivocity to univocity: one word-one

> sense. But it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much as they can and not as little as they can. Therefore, not to elude or exclude this plurivocity, but to cultivate it, to make it meaningful, powerful, and therefore to bring back to language all its capacity of meaningfulness.
>
> *(Ricoeur, 1991b, p. 449)*

Eyes gazed and fixed at the flamboyant and bombastic discourse of signs and its political monolithic glasses of validity may not be able to question the nakedness of the signs away from their disguising masks of admiration; the platitude is masquerading as the sine qua non of reality and the truth.

Ricoeur (1991b, p. 85) identifies the nudity of the emperor and the imperialism of the discourse of signs:

> If it is true that poetry gives no information in terms of empirical knowledge, it may change our way of looking at things, a change which is no less real than empirical knowledge. What is changed by poetic language is our way of dwelling in the world. From poetry we receive a new way of being in the world, of orienting ourselves in the world. Even if we say with Northrop Frye that poetic discourse gives articulation only to our moods, it is also true that moods as well as feelings have an ontological bearing. Through feelings we find ourselves already located in the world. In this way, by articulating a mood, each poem projects a new way of dwelling. It opens up a new way of being for us.

In *The Heart and Soul of Change: What Works in Therapy*, Hubble, Duncan, and Miller (1999) brought together research that indicates that 85% of client change is due to nonspecific counseling or psychotherapeutic factors. They discuss issues such spiritual faith and community membership and their role as 40% for client change, relationship factors as 30% and hope and expectancy with 15% that account for the change in the client.

A symbol-oriented educational program would immensely appreciate the invaluable presence of art and literature while sign-oriented pedagogy would cunningly ignore them. In support for the presence of such symbol-promoting programs and their implications, Jung (1966, p. 82) indicates,

> The great secret of art and the creative process consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into the finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present, and so makes it possible for us to find the way back to the deepest springs of life.

The mastery of signs produces an education where *techne* replaces *phronesis* and the questions of ethics and values become superannuated except for the flirtations

that can cuddle the leisure time of the sign players. The mastery of signs dehumanizes the individual and promotes consumerism, utilitarianism, intellectualism, absence, fragmentation and reductionism.

The mystery of symbols would celebrate the power of inspiration, heart and spirit, imagination and intuition, mysticism and unconsciousness. Symbols link the earth to the sky and the mind to the heart. The mystery of symbols echoes the tintinnabulation of connectedness, wholeness, belonging and togetherness, it calls for transcendence, it moves toward above and is brimming with awe.

The hegemony of the sign and its underlying quest for power tends to sustain and reproduce voices that support the hegemonic predominance; voicing against the constituent rules of this hegemony would be considered one of the most supercilious acts; the subtle slavery of signs silences the questioning of the mastery of signs.

A symbolic understanding of symbols would follow the avenues of mysticism, the meanders of wonder, the wild meadows of reflective imagination and the dialectic of mindfulness and heartfulness. A symbolic understanding of symbols would promise an act of creativity.

The act of creativity is not searching for sameness, is not in pursuit of congruence or compatibility, and is not moving towards convergence. Creativity is not bound to coherence, cohesiveness, conformity, correspondence or consistency in a sign-oriented paradigm. Creativity may represent an act of revelation where things are revealed in light of creativity and unconsciousness as it can be an act of disclosure where things are cryptically and yet creatively presented. Creativity is not dutifully at the service of the recognized order as it is not respectful of the relationships and their establishment within the government of signs. Creativity may bring chaos and disorder but this chaotic situation is only as a result of a comparison between the act of creativity and the previously identified system of order within the plane of signs.

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3

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OUR STORIES

Our language and our stories are deeply connected. We create stories through language and are created by stories that we have been told. We may have been repeating stories and languages within those stories so much that alternative ways of stories may turn out to be thoroughly unnoticed. Our voices are visibly or invisibly traceable within our stories and each story may reveal how voices have been marginalized or supported through the creation of stories.

The significance of narratology in today's psychology and its application in therapeutic works pinpoint the vital role of expressiveness in the everyday activities of our lives. The idea of catharsis, which goes back to Aristotle, moves in line with the emergence of empowerment within the grace of expressiveness.

The world of sentences which are opened through the assortment and arrangement of words, their specific selection and their placement in a wide variety of forms would usher in the potential creativity within the language.

Industrialization, political interests, and the growth of artificial languages, along with the flurry of mass media in various forms, tend to keep the use of language within enclosed axes, which ultimately diminish or flatten the power of language and its creativity. A failure to acknowledge urban/rural differences, political side takings, utilitarian objectives and goals, materialistic aspirations and numerous shapes of parochialism encourage the detention of language and its containment so meanings and language use would be channeled into limited conduits. What would happen if people, if the language user, if the speech community can be exposed to the socialization and cultivation of only specific limited ways of looking at things and into things? It is noteworthy at this juncture to refer to cultivation and socialization "theories." The cultivation theory, developed by George Gerbner and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania, looks at how extensive exposure to media over time gradually shapes our view of the world and

of social reality (see Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1994). Socialization theories (see Heath & Bryant, 1992, for discussion) emphasize how prolonged exposure to media teaches us about the world and our role in it. To put the argument in another perspective, the limited number of stimuli would develop a limited number of responses; so the more varied the stimuli be, the more variegated the responses would become. If, for instance, a child is exposed only to certain limited visual stimuli, say a monotonous ambiance in a small apartment, he/she would most likely fail to discern the variety of stimuli that may be available for another child growing up in a place where multicolored stimuli with their manifold compounds appear in the coruscating field of a hand-woven carpet. What if the people in rural areas are subscribed to certain modes of expressiveness in order to gain worth, power and prestige?

What if certain modes of expressiveness and thinking are highly promoted for people in rural areas as the indications of development, urbanization, progress, improvement and success so those who fall behind may find themselves underdeveloped, powerless, weak and helpless? What if identification with certain modes of narratives are endorsed as the key to making sense in rural areas so people constantly look for modes of identification with the prescribed others so they can make sense in the view of others?

If people are so overwhelmed by what they should already think about in view of the pre-packaged ways of thinking, can they express anything except those engagements? If the sources and ways of thinking are already available to stuff particular modes of thinking and special ways of expressiveness, then how could thinking and languaging open up infinite ways of self-realization, and self-growth? What do creativity and critique mean if the borders are predetermined, precontrived and prescribed?

The use of narratives and stories in their broadest sense can indicate the significance of language as a way of being. It is often through writing narratives that we come to a better understanding of our social, political and cultural identity. Our expressiveness within narratives can depict the choices we have made, the choices that others have made for us, and the positions we have found or we have chosen in terms of our psychological state and our cultural, social and political status. Whether we hail from urban or rural places is embedded within our narratives; it is through the manifestation of our expressivity in narratives that we may find out our being and its sense making within special contexts and framework. How our being translates itself, how our positions define themselves, and how they describe our acts and our behaviors may be well understood through the specificity of our expressiveness. Our stories show what exists and what does not exist and what ought to come out of those parts and pieces of existence and this is mediated through the expressiveness. So narratives can well reveal the status of language and its educational implications in light of this understanding of language, namely, language as a way of life, as a mode of being. Promotion of this understanding among the people in rural areas and encouraging them to explore their voices without

merely and passively following the pervasive discourses of expressiveness would appreciate the gift of self-empowerment for those living in rural areas. Those in rural areas who may have been noxiously entrapped in the illusive mirages of discourses that bring paralysis instead of empowerment may greatly benefit from discovering their own voices through questioning the mindsets of the so-called developed discourses.

Social sciences have recognized the powerful role of stories in constituting, organizing, and shaping our lives, "We organize our experience and our memory of human happening mainly in the form of narrative—stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on" (Bruner, 1991, p. 4). The role of stories is also well recognized in psychotherapy, so "therapists came to recognize how much stories affected clients' perceptions and their interpretations of those perceptions" (Nichols & Schwartz, 1998, p. 401). Stories developed within our urban and rural places also affect our perceptions and interpretations of the world. This interest has been well intensified among social scientists and psychologists on the strength of Foucault's work on the relation between the discourses of power and their dehumanizing role in oppressing those who do not fit those discourses, i.e., the narratives that shape and justify the distribution of power in all levels (Foucault, 1980, 1984).

On the other hand, postmodernism, in its defiance against the positivism and certainty of modernism, eschews any grand narratives and any kind of generalization in an interpretation of narratives and stories, while laying emphasis on the vitally significant influence of language in affecting perceptions of reality. This has generated a keen interest in reconsidering even the assessment techniques most commonly used by social scientists, psychologists, counsellors, social practitioners, etc. The corollary of this attention towards language and its pervasive influence has led to revisiting the variegated manifestations of language in numerous cultural contexts. According to Whiston,

> An insensitive counsellor may perceive the client's reticence as resistant rather than due to cultural differences, which could encourage misunderstandings and problems in the relationship. The counseling process is predominantly a verbal process and the subtle influences on language need to be considered by a multicultural competent practitioner.
>
> *(Whiston, 2000, p. 315)*

George Bush's comment after September 11, 2001, "you are either with us or against us," can illustrate how language can create and can construct things, relationships, states, positions, etc. Through his words, Bush categorizes existence through a reference to the objective pronoun "us," thus indicating an either/or relationship with this pronoun. His expressivity can demonstrate that based on his ontological taxonomy and in accordance with his way of creation, there will not and there cannot be a third way. Now he decides the existence of choices not

only for himself (through saying what he said) but also for the rest of the people in the world, hence displaying how creation through language can purport the emergence of authority too. His use of the prepositions "with" and "against" can also bespeak the impossibility of any other relationship with the pronoun "us." He chooses to make choices through his either/or, thus establishing a position of authority for himself, on the one hand, and a position of subjugation for the addressee. Interestingly enough, he brings the pronoun "you" at the beginning which in the English language does not have a distinguishable form in both the objective and subjective form compared to other anaphors and pronouns (e.g., he, him), and then he brings the existential verb "are" to proceed with his command of ontological illustration, i.e., knowing what exists and what does not and their degrees, ranks and capacities. The repetition of the pronoun "us" in two places may attest what is that should exist first or what is the priority of existence in his view of ontology. One may notice how language here defines realities, positions, state of affairs, etc., and this characteristic of language, i.e., the extra-linguistic component, is what can be translated into other languages but the infra-linguistic component of his words belongs merely to the English language. Likewise, you may think of the word "bad" and its slang usage with the implication of

"excellent," "good" and "admirable" as opposed to bad in the sense of real bad. The former, which originally issues from Black English or Ebonics and Black slang and is pronounced with a falling tone and a lengthened vowel, defines and describes realities in an entirely different way than the latter, which stigmatizes things in a thoroughly derogatory manner.

An understanding of language with these characterizations, capabilities, potentials and magnitude can shift the practices, areas of emphasis, methodology and syllabus in language education. Should language be understood as a way of living, then the grammar does not solely bring an intense engagement in detecting linguistic categories of "noun," "verb," "clause," and the like, but it instigates a consciously punctilious engagement on both the intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic constituents. Language learners reflect on the intricacies and relationships within the existing system of language. They also explore the "what" and "how" and "why" of relationships in an extra-linguistic way. The goal of language education here is to make the language learners not only competent and skillful in uttering language, but also effective and qualified in thinking and examination of patterns of thinking. For example, there is a need to identify language that assumes an urban lifestyle and to identify rural alternatives. Just as language learning on the surface makes one quite sensitive in identifying errors and mistakes within the system of signifiers and their assortment on a linguistic level, this understanding of language allows one to contemplate on the profound layers of intelligibility within the signified, signifiers and the sign. "Language educator" here does not merely focus on the rectification of forms and apparition as the utterances unfold themselves but calls for a participatory excavation of meaning and meaning creation within the social, cultural and political contexts. This

excavation of extra-linguistic constituents would allow the language excavators to find out how they have been positioned through the language that they use or they have been subscribed to use. It also expounds on the question of identity, selfhood and personhood and elucidates how one may be shaped through the layers of language in terms of social, political, and cultural construction. Above all, it makes the language user and language learner become aware of the potential of language in changing the constructions, constrictions and restraints that have emerged through the language. This understanding of language lets the language educator and language learners participate in swimming within the realms of language and thinking simultaneously while observing the ties and links and connections between the two. It also empowers both to seek a range of possibilities within the language to re-define and re-describe things, positions, states, etc. Thus, language education can consider its task to pinpoint the affirmative sentences versus negative sentences *by* exemplifying "He is here," vs. "He is not here" which demonstrates the use of "not" after the auxiliary "is" as an indication and a guide to change the affirmative sentence into negative ones. Here the task is conducted within the existing system of a particular language, i.e., English and its specific capabilities, namely, if you say "he is here not," you have made a statement that does not correspond to the rules of syntax in the English language, so the proper placement of the fragments and their viability and variety within the language would constitute significant goals of learning.

Nonetheless, language education can expand its focus through reflecting on questions such as: What does it mean when we change an affirmative sentence to a negative one? What kind of relationship are we changing here? What are the implications of this change? How can the power of a change of affirmative into a negative change our perspective towards the thing which goes through the change? How do we see the thing when it shows itself in an affirmative sentence and how do we change to see the thing while it reveals itself in a negative sentence? How can this change of appearance change our perspective towards our personal interpersonal and social decisions? One may here refer to the huge attempts of cognitive psychologists who argue that, through cognitive changes, one can overcome a large group of psychological problems including anxiety, depression, and particularly eating disorders and panic disorders (see for instance, Fariburn & Wilson, 1993). So understanding the differences between a sentence with "not" and without "not" would be tantamount to discovering two immensely distinguished worlds that can induce two enormously striking spheres of action. How significantly vital can this realization be for reconnoitering one's position in personal interpersonal, social and political contexts? If people who accepted slavery as a rule of nature had found out the power of changing the affirmative sentence of "slavery must exist" into "slavery must not exist" and their empowerment to bring verb replacement such as "slavery should not and cannot exist," what would their world have looked like? How much could their styles of life have been changed *on* the strength of this verbal change? If people find out their abilities to change the

affirmative sentences into negative ones or vice versa, how significantly hugely can this realization contribute to changes in their lives? What does it mean for rural people when "rural" is simply defined as "not urban"?

Language education not only educates learners on language and thinking, but also educates learners to find out the degree of control they can have on their choices. In other words, when I understand how powerfully and consciously I can be involved *in* creating and changing the language for myself, I will be able to discern how much control I can have over my own creation through my choices in social, political and cultural contexts.

Grammar can teach a surface where people may apprehend the use and misuse of fragments of sentences and their proper and improper applications based on what grammar describes, prescribes and proscribes. Practitioners of grammar and grammaticality may insist on strict obedience to rules of syntax and apposite assortment of divisions and subdivisions of the words in light of prescriptive grammar. Better yet, they may proceed with the promotion of what Wittgenstein (1974) calls "grammar of understanding" where the knower leaps beyond the surface of linguistic grammaticality and searches horizons of apprehension within the intelligible, psychological and philosophical strata of what is uttered. Regardless of how impeccable or imperfect this understanding may turn out to be, it incorporates an invitation to explore the layers of thinking, its impact on our lives, its crystallization in our languages and its ties with our emotionality,

Through pinpointing and focusing on these areas, language education may reveal the mysterious, wonderful, enlightening and illuminating potentiality of language for re-creating worlds, meanings, stories, possibilities and actions. Language learners who receive instruction and training on the use of words, diction and vocabulary, and get acquainted with modes of appropriate grammaticality, and become cautious to avoid inadmissible placement, here will come to realize how language practically can lead or mislead thinking and how ferociously it can induce action or silence, how cunningly it can manipulate and direct, and how artistically it can trigger the initiation of mirages or help construct the mansion of assurance. Understanding the power, the vitality, the significance and the practicality of language for the language learner can also demonstrate how our choices of language can alter our positions in the social, political and cultural construction. The point here, therefore, is not just to teach language and its prescriptive linguistic instructions within multifarious facets of listening comprehension, written composition, vocabulary learning, etc., but it is inciting thinking on the enigmatic and obvious aspects of the utterance ranging from form, content, constituents and structure, to modes and manners of the utterance (for example, linguistic, social, psychological, philosophical and cognitive dimensions). The search for meaning is not bound here solely to the core meaning but it entails an investigation of associative, expressive, affective, social or stylistic meaning.

In order to understand a story, we need to go beyond the intra-linguistic components and explore the extra-linguistic reality of story and its discourse which

opens a new world. This understanding belongs to inward factors which should search for the meaning beyond the level of semiotics. In the book *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein (1974) introduces such a *deep* understanding. He describes a situation in which you receive a card from a loved one that says, "I arrive in Vienna on the 24th of December!" Wittgenstein describes the phenomena in this way:

> They aren't mere words! Of course not: when I read them various things happen inside me in addition to the perception of the words: maybe I feel joy, I have images, and so on. But I don't just mean that various more or less inessential concomitant phenomena occur in conjunction with the sentence; I mean that the sentence has a definite sense and I perceive it. But then what is this definite sense? Well, that this particular person, whom I know, arrives at such and such a place, etc. Precisely; when you are giving the sense, you are moving around in the grammatical background of the sentence. You're looking at the various transformations and consequences of the sentence as laid out in advance; and so they are [laid out in advance], in so far as they are embodied in the grammar.
>
> *(Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 153)*

This understanding which is embodied in the "grammatical background" does not consist in the intra-linguistic or linguistic understanding. Nor does Wittgenstein suggest that. This understanding (in *our* case, of narratives and stories) partially depends *on* the linguistic environment in the intra-linguistic level so the hearer or reader must be able to have essential familiarity with the assortment and configuration of semiotic signs in a particular language. More important than that, the understanding should occur in the grammatical background, namely, the conceptual background that provides the integration of the meaning with our own experience so it would enable to us *to* get connected to the semantics profoundly. This understanding is not a solipsistic and subjectivist understanding, nor is it a Romanticist one.

Strikingly interesting, in both levels of intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic constituents of narratives and stories, language is ubiquitously present with variegated modes of presentation. Language in narratives, both for the reader and the teller, presents ways of being in the world, ways which are fundamentally tied to weaving and constructing ourselves in the process of our narratives. So we are inseparably interwoven with our narratives through the language or discourses which employ and construct our identity. Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1991) propound their claim in this connection that we discover and create ourselves in relation to a world.

One of the salient constituents of each narrative is its possibility of opening a world for the reader or the hearer of that narrative. Stories, in this sense, present not only multifaceted ways of expressing the courses of action, but also

they offer stimuli for further stories to be shaped. This prompting and immanent characteristic of stories is substantially related to the function of memory and its implications in the process of narration. The hearer or reader of a story can find potential stimuli and incentives inside the story, which can generate actual manifestation of images, impressions, recollections, inferences, affects, emotions, etc. Therefore, the receiver of a story or the one to whom the narrative is narrated is not merely taking in the reality of a story as it is or as it tends to be, but he/she is led towards an act of narrating and story telling for himself or herself too. This should not superficially and deceptively purport that the receiver of the story would be equally placed in the status of the narrator in the intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic levels. It, however, suggests that *the* receiver of the story is not only getting but will be making his or her own narrative(s) in light of the stories he/she is subjected to. Thus, narratives bring narratives within themselves and by themselves. They do not solely narrate but they invent or open the possibility of further narration within themselves.

This narration making inside the stories reveals the conspicuously powerful role of stories in thinking. The prevalent assumption in the Western way of thinking has been that rationality and thinking rationally do not have congruity with narrative thought. Narrative thought is not promoted as a preferred way of thinking in analytic and logical ways. Challenging this way of thinking, works by Havelock (1976, 1982) and Bruner (1986) are examples of the attempts to demonstrate that rationality cannot be circumscribed and circumvented in one form of discourse, and narratives can be as effective as other modes of discourse in revealing the reflective and critical form of discourse.

Stories' influence on thinking and their own demonstration of thinking can be discussed in light of the discourse of stories. The first thing stories reveal is their outstanding role in determining what we notice and what we remember. They highlight things that are distinctly defined and emphasized. They magnify and yet minimize things. They euphemistically and euphoniously portray things while they derogatorily and deprecatorily expose other things. They bestow ways to explain things and through this they shape our behavior on the strength of their impact on our experiences. The rural or urban context in which we live our lives is an example. The patterns of happenings (if any can be found), the diachronic and synchronic thematic elements, the fusion of emotional and psychological constituents and their sporadic or harmonious distribution in the varying streaks of the plot, etc. in a story propose modes of thinking which may not have a necessarily compatible agreement with our understanding of thinking, but entail worldviews, perspectives and affirmations of negations which can even boil down to an analytical way of thinking. Let's look at the following piece from Jane Austen's novel *Pride and Prejudice*:

> She was a woman of mean understanding, little information, and uncertain temper. When she was discontented she fancied herself nervous. The

> business of her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news.

Apart from the direct method of revealing characters in a story being quite common in prescribed methods of literary analysis and diagnosis, this piece, on its extra-linguistic level, incorporates various representations of reality through language. Let's look at some potentially polemical questions that can be unraveled in our first glance:

1. What is the relationship between getting the state of discontentment and the state of nervousness? Is this an etiological relationship? Or *purely* accidental? How can a feeling of discontentment be compromised through a subjective occurrence of fancying with nervousness? Is this not a demonstration of how mind can escape from one thing through resorting to something else?
2. There are four recursive uses of "was" in the above-cited piece. What does this recursive conjugation or inflection of the verb suggest? Is this conjugation not an indication of the relation between two things on an existential level?
3. How come the descriptive adjectives are all cited in a negative way? (Little information, mean understanding, uncertain temper.) What do these adjectives imply in a thinking process? Do they not at least display that there are contrastive modes or oppositive units beside these adjectives that have been the subject of juxtaposition upon the exteriorized enunciation of their diametrically opposing counterparts?
4. The piece suggests, at least implicitly, that the business of one's life should not be limited to only getting the daughters married. Is this not a perspective on life? is this not one way of thinking about how life should be versus how life is? Is this not a worldview determining the enactment of "should" in a process of life?

The piece also suggests that some, at least one person to the knowledge of the storyteller, find visiting and news as the source of peace and solace. Does the emphasis on the anaphor "it" and its relation to life not suggest that there are or there can be other solaces in life? Is this not a way of thinking and differentiating some ways from others in the Aristotelian taxonomy of the particular and general?

Any story inescapably uses verbs and accordingly tenses. Aside from what the content of the verb is and what action or what happening it reports of, the inflection of a verb on different levels indicates that something gets actualized in a way or is created at least in light of a certain embodiment. It follows that the narrator or storyteller considers that way of actualization as the way that could be descriptive of a particular objectified or even subjectified entity at different levels of appearance. As the organizers of our life, stories can, in this stage, translate what exists and what does not exist and can present interpretations on what exists and

what does not, thus influencing our ways of looking at everything including ourselves.

This way of understanding narratives would go beyond the perfunctory analysis of stories in a short-sighted way which is only confined to some specific books of literature and some special abodes of instruction and education. On this way of understanding narratives and stories, Bruner (1986) says:

> By the mid 1970s the social sciences had moved toward a more interpretive posture; meaning became the central focus—how the world was interpreted, by what codes meaning was regulated, in what sense culture itself could be treated as text that participants read for their own guidance.
>
> *(p. 8)*

If we go beyond the description of Hume in introducing image as the residue of an impression, we shall not be sufficing to explore the sensory fields, namely, sight, hearing, touch, etc. So imagination will not merely act in a passive way. Rather, we exceed the definition of imagination as the place of fading impressions. Parallel with this understanding, we can notice Kant's theory of schematism where the imagination acts in a productive way so we can see the generation of meanings from this place of imagination. Here, imagination and creativity move together. This also indicates the crucially vital role of stories in expressing not only the familiar ways of discourses and the known ways of analyzing realities but also the unfamiliar and non-ordinary discourses which shape our meanings inside our own stories too. In light of a flight beyond the quotidian way of understanding stories, we come to this significant and liberating realization that everyone, no matter how poor or rich in the production of the verbal exteriorization of stories might be, is a storyteller. So we constantly and continuously tell ourselves stories. This understanding can be liberating, since it allows us to revisit the stories we tell ourselves or we allow others to tell us. Stories which may not necessarily appear in books, movies and places where we are accustomed to hear stories, can also turn out to be stories, albeit not in conformity with our already established ways of defining storytelling. Plato's attack on narrative and certain forms of discourse, in this sense, is itself tantamount to one form of story, one form of organizing our life, one form of expressiveness that constitutes one way of living.

Stories, therefore, not only appear in our recognized taxonomy of storytelling, but also marshal their forces deep in our various modes of thinking, even in our philosophical contemplation. In this sense, we are born with and into stories, we grow with stories, we fight and challenge beside and against stories. We let stories shape our lives.

Stories have been chasing us down from the zephyr of our insurgence to the sunset of our antagonism, from the crowds of the Metropolis to the solitude of the rural place, from the forest in the country to the factory in the town, from the apex of our triumph to the slopes of our fallacies, from the dungeon of our

semantic narrowness to the ocean of our conceptual munificence, from the passions of our philosophical demonstrations to the fervor of our poetry, from the debris of our skepticism to the oasis of our certainty, from the moisture and dampness of our allusions to the volcanoes of our illusions, from the cage of our proofs to the meadows of our imagination, from the waterfall of our syllogisms to the desert of our analyses, from the swamps of our generalizations to the valleys of our rectification, from the apogee of our deduction to the villages of our induction, from the breeze of our conversational implicature to the coasts of our perlocutionary acts, from the troops of our hermeneutics to the brigades of our reductionism, from the premises of our rationalization to the bus stop of our speculation, from our colorful diction to our pale parody, from the bitterness of our irony to the celebration of our humor, from the nutrition of our insolence to the eruption of our impudence, from the typhoon of our allegations to *the* deluge of our misapprehension, from the castles of *our* hubris to *the* abodes of our modesty, from the discursion of our discourses to the fixation of our representations, from the description of our nothingness to the establishment of our blissfulness, from the vampire of our condemnations to the angels of our consecration, from the dead end of our explanations to the meanders of our questions, from the rocks of our acknowledgement to the icebergs of our discombobulation, from the boats of our metaphors to *the* shores of our metonymy, from the harbors of our contemplation to the lakes of our conclusiveness, from the mirages of our scientism to the horror of our estrangement, from the distortion of our objectivity to the inebriation of our subjectivity, from the elation of our hypotheses to the paralysis of our formulations, from the darkness of our generalizations to the illumination of our perspicacity, from the cachinnation of our models to the prostration of our certainty, from the laxity of our premises to the solipsism of our propositions, from the frivolousness of our reasoning to the emptiness of our expositions, from the distillation of our dictums to the evasiveness of our reasoning, from the glory of our modernism to the crisis of our postmodernism, from the strangulation of our praxis to the enlightenment of our doubts, from your latest sedimentation of language in the pool of your senses to the very moment of reading these words.

Through understanding the creational capabilities of language, we may come to a better understanding of how our stories are made, how we choose to craft our stories, how others influence our story-making and how we are subscribed to various forms of story-making for ourselves and others. This understanding may also allow us to reconsider our stories, our modes of being in the world and our responses to ourselves, others, and the world around us. The very understanding can be of great benefit for educators, social workers, psychologists and others who work in rural areas since it offers an avenue for exploring the voices that may have been marginalized and forgotten. It is through this journey of exploration that some of the voices submerged under the flux of pervasive discourses may find empowerment and may experience a search for their real identity. That may also mean a hope for revitalizing the voices that faded away in the abyss of

the representational social discourses of power that prescribed meaningfulness being equal to identification with *others* as recommended by the discourses of the privileged.

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4

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGING *OTHERWISE*

Language and Consciousness

When it comes to language use, one may find himself/herself ready and vigilant in observing the choice of words, the forms of articulation and the manner of presentation, or he/she may see the automaticity of the language use in different levels.

Regardless of the easy access to the repertoire of the first language in terms of semantics and grammar and the easiness of applying the lexicons to express the needs at least on a rudimentary level, language users may sometimes experience their consciousness and mindfulness in spelling out what they tend to say. This may transpire when language users find themselves in a situation where they fail to mindlessly express what they want to say either because they may not have the words to display what they intend to convey or they may not generally know how to say what they want to say. This brings forth the emergence of attention or consciousness towards ways of expressiveness for the language users. It may be proper here to mention the concept of *understanding* in Heidegger's *Hermeneutics* where he distinguishes between understanding and knowing. Understanding, to Heidegger, occurs when the person finds himself/herself in a state of practical belonging or connectedness with the object of understanding so he/she goes beyond *knowing about* the object and *understands* it in the sense that understanding turns out to be a mode of being. Here in our case, the person may feel that he/she knows the language and he/she rarely thinks about what he/she says as it often happens when people do shopping and ask for the price of what they intend to purchase. Nonetheless, they may be entangled, entrapped or stuck in a situation, condition, mood or circumstances where they consciously seek to use the words and mindfully strive to employ sentences to articulate what it is

that they want to say. According to Ussher (1955, p. 80) "The world as world is only revealed to me when things go wrong." It is exactly in such cases when the person becomes so conscious of the language he/she uses or the significance of the type of language that he/she needs to hire to unearth his/her feelings, affects, ideas, opinions, beliefs, etc. For example, if someone plans to write a letter on an important or crucial issue of his/her life, or if one faces up with a situation where he/she engages in a defense, support and championship of what he/she assumes is brutally ignored by others, he/she may find himself/herself in a very sharp state of awareness and mindfulness in respect to the choice of the words, the arrangement of the phrases, etc. This consciousness does not necessarily warrant the production of a finely woven locution which is amazingly riveting in terms of style and opulently rich in view of content. The consciousness or mindfulness, however, cultivates the mindfulness for the user of a language to experience and understand the signification of language and expression. In other words, when caught in situations where acknowledgement of the significance of language becomes necessary, one becomes more conscious of the relationship with the language one uses.

The same mindfulness or consciousness can happen in more sublime cases of expressiveness where language unfolds itself in the context of poetic, philosophical and scientific expressions. Here, the poet, the philosopher and the scientist may feel his/her connectedness and relation to language and his/ her mindfulness of the language. For, notwithstanding their command, their expertise and their mastery, poets, philosophers and scientists may undergo and encounter situations where they voraciously seek modes, avenues and forms of expressivity either in terms of form and style or content and substance.

This consciousness usually stands out in cases of second language where the language user has not yet gained the necessary dexterousness to express himself/ herself. For the same reason, they may witness this mindfulness sooner and better, especially if they juxtapose their position, at the time of expressiveness, in their first and their second language. Second language learners can easily connect themselves to their first language's resources whereas they may experience some difficulty in regards to their second or their foreign language, at least in the early stages of learning.

The very consciousness can boil down to two major questions: 1) What is it that I want to say? 2) How should I say what I want to say? In other words, the questions find their way in both the content and the subject and the form and the style. The person in these states of consciousness can see himself/herself as the perceiver or the knower that perceives and knows his attempt to use language and yet he/she observes his/her need of language. The person can easily experience his/her consciousness regarding the above-mentioned questions. We will get back to these questions shortly after we briefly discuss some of the theories and scholarship which in one way or the other deal with the key component of these questions, namely consciousness and expression.

According to German Expressivism, the act of expression is not something that can be added or attached to other human characteristics. Everything that we do and every facet of our human activity is a form of expression and a form of self-realization and self-unfolding (Markova, 1982, p. 105). Our realization happens in every single act that we do. This brings a distinction between Leibniz's *monad* and *expressivism* since in Leibniz's view, monads, which are totally isolated, individual, "windowless" substances, move and develop in accordance with a predetermined plan by God. There is no interaction between the monads, yet the changes and developments inside them happen synchronically based on God's prearranged plan so the changes within each of them synchronize with the changes and developments within other monads. To Leibniz, this holds true for the human soul being a monad too. Expressivists were in agreement with Leibniz so far as he postulated that monads are unrepeatable. Expressivists also maintained that every human being is unrepeatable. Their distinction from Leibniz, however, lies in their agreement with Kant that it is the individual himself/herself who determines his/her own actions. Again, expressivists departed from Kant since Kant discussed the free action in the context of reason and excluded any other action which may come from irrational motives and desires, etc. Kant proposed that human rationality should determine the human freedom to act: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine, own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only" (Kant, 1998, 47).

Expressivists' departure point starts from the assertion that each person develops and unfolds according to his/her own code and there is not any universal moral code. This part may make expressivism somehow similar to postmodernism. Through breaking the grand narratives and negating the universality of Truth, postmodernism, too, focuses on local, provisional and particular truths.

The emphasis on expression in its general term can also be seen in romanticism where consciousness of one's expression, one's action, one's past, one's history and one's childhood are highly encouraged.

Although Sir William Hamilton (1870) attributes the use of consciousness to Descartes and claims that before Descartes, consciousness had been used merely in an ethical sense, the word consciousness has been profusely used in its entirely philosophical senses by a large group of Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, etc. (Ha'iri, 1992). Ironically enough, the issue of consciousness has been presented in certain circumscribed ways and has not received enough attention in the Western way of thinking: "Modern Western philosophy has, since its inception, been compelled to exclude certain claims of awareness from the domain of human knowledge, and to brand them as mere expressions of fervor or as leaps of imagination" (Ha'iri, 1992, p. 5). In defense of certain claims of awareness, Ha'iri (1992) argues: "Yet, the exclusion by philosophical thought of these matters does not, ipso facto, prove the falsehood of these types of knowledge." Ha'iri (1992) brings philosophical arguments to substantiate a wide array of awareness including mystical experiences and particularly knowledge by presence

by making a rigorous distinction between a knowledge based on the concept in the mind of something that is itself absent from the mind, and a knowledge based on something which is itself present in the mind and whose very existence is inseparable from the knowledge of it. I will elaborate on this further when discussing knowledge by presence.

In the realm of psychology, consciousness has often been used to refer to one's knowledge about his/her experience, and the construction of reality. In line with this approach, John Locke defined consciousness as "the perception of what passes in a man's own mind" or, according to Ornstein (1972), consciousness consists of "subjective life." In the meantime, Freudian psychoanalysis revealed specific domains where awareness is replaced by unawareness or unconsciousness or non-consciousness. Interestingly enough, one of the goals of psychoanalysis and Rogerian therapies is to "expand consciousness of our inner life" (Feshbach, Wiener, & Bohart, 1996).

Back to our questions, one can see that a language user needs to have an awareness of what he/she wants to say whether he/she is aware of this awareness or not. Even in stages of unconscious competence which may happen for a language user, he/she needs to have an awareness of one sort or the other. Otherwise, he/she cannot say or express what he /she wants to say. Arguably, he/she may be aware of one layer and not the other ones, or some and not all, or may be aware of some on the conscious level and unaware of some others on an unconscious level. In spite of a large bulk of unconsciousness that may protuberate, there remains a part, albeit miniscule, which inescapably stands out on the conscious level.

Before we go further with this we need to again look at some of the distinctions that have been made in philosophy and cognitive psychology. Some Aristotelian philosophers made a distinction between what they called *potentia pura*, or the fundamental activity to acquire an aptitude, *actus primus*, or the acquisition of this aptitude and *actus secendus*, or the utilization of this aptitude. Chomsky promoted this in linguistics with his introduction of competence and performance. Others such as Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) made an attempt to do the same in discussions of cognitive development. This distinction did generate various sorts of controversies both in theoretical and empirical spheres even by people who tried to use the distinction (see for instance Flavell & Wohlwill, 1969; Sternberg & Davidson, 1985; Chomsky, 1965; Premack, 1979). According to Chomsky (1979), "linguistic competence (the knowledge of the language) constitutes only one of the factors in performance" (Chomsky, 1979, p. 84). He points out that "there is, first of all, the question of how one is to obtain information about the speaker-hearer's competence, about his knowledge of language" (Chomsky, 1979, p. 18). In empirical aspects, the major question was: how do we know about competence if and only if the way to understand competence is nothing other than performance? As long as someone has not talked or written anything, how can we ever have any access to the repertoire of his/her knowledge of language? In other words, competence evaluation mainly relied on performance itself. As a

reaction to these controversial discussions, some such as Goodnow (1985) viewed the distinction on the same continuum or put aside the distinction and spoke of moderators of competence.

Back to our discussion of the awareness of the language user, we obviously see that whether we agree or disagree with this distinction, or other distinctions such as availability, i.e., what one can do, and accessibility, i.e., what one does do, some aspects of what the language user says are at the mercy of his/her consciousness. In other words, the language user may come to recognize his/her consciousness of the language s/he uses. At this stage, it may be worth recalling Vygotsky (1962) and his discussion on the direct relationship between consciousness of one's cognitive processes and one's ability to control them. In line with this postulation, he focused on the conditions under which children ultimately gain consciousness and mastery of their own thoughts. So this may suggest that attainment or increase of consciousness can make a contribution to the mastery of thoughts and thinking. So, if this is the case, namely, if increase of consciousness can be of help to the language user, we need to see what this consciousness raising or this mindfulness is.

Mindfulness and Language

According to Langer (2000),

> mindfulness is a flexible state of mind in which we are actively engaged in the present, noticing new things and sensitive to the context. When we are in a state of mindlessness, we act like automatons who have been programmed to act according to the sense our behavior made in the past, rather than the present.

On the detriments of mindlessness, the benefits of mindfulness and its implications, Langer (2000) refers to the experimental research conducted over 35 years and mentions "increase in competence; a decrease in accidents; an increase in memory; creativity, and positive affect; a decrease in stress; and an increase in health and longevity."

Langer (2000) argues that the majority of teaching and learning approaches harbor mindlessness. As our mindlessness increases, she argues, our creativity and the act of drawing novel distinctions decreases. It is only in mindfulness that we can look into alternative ways, and notice new and novel things. It is at the time of mindfulness that we can actively live in the present, situate ourselves in the moment and think creatively about perspectives and possibilities. On the contrary, it is in the mindlessness that we unquestionably rely on our mindsets and ignore alternative ways. Langer challenges many of our beliefs about learning and argues that these are some of the mindsets that have been mindlessly learned and work to our detriment. She recommends mindful learning and propounds

its consequences: "The result is that we are then able to avert the danger not yet arisen and take advantage of opportunities that may present themselves. Teaching mindfully not only sets students up for these advantages, but has advantages for teachers as well" (Langer, 2000).

In the meantime, Langer (2000) indicates that mindfulness "leads us to greater sensitivity to context and perspective, and ultimately to greater control over our lives." Langer (2000) considers mindfulness as something that liberates us from our limitations and allows us to learn as creatively and openly as possible. On the other hand, she indicates that mindlessness is not only an impediment for novel ideas and distinctions but it is also imposing mindsets "that have been mindlessly accepted to be true."

One of the biggest problems with classes of language and ESL lies in the promotion of prescribed ways of thinking. It is true that a student needs to learn the fundamental rules of grammar, speaking, writing, etc. in a language, and in this stage he/she should merely or simply imitate the stream of the competent language user, but if this is emphasized as the only continual key to learn a language in all levels, it generates solely passive students whose vocabulary does not exceed the boxes of recommendations within the limited world of their teachers and their practices and whose ways of expressivity would contain strict manifestations of articulations. ESL students may often use adverbs such as "actually" in an increasingly repetitive way and even in contexts where there is not any need to such modifications. Also the verb "make" may be used more profusely than any other word when it comes to a discussion or presentation of "causative sentences" whereas they have an enormous prism of options. The cornerstone of the ESL students' sentences may often be associated with clichéd ways of expressivity, too. The question, here, is: how much does learning a new language bring students familiarity with new ways of thinking, novel ways of reflection, and genuine ways of contemplation? If students' concern is only to remember what they are told to remember, how can they go beyond the paradigms of stuffed instructions? What can an ESL or a language teacher teach in this case except offering instructions whose violations would bring about being labeled "wrong," "incompetent," "weak," etc.? Therefore, what is the best way to achieve the emblem of "competent," "fluent," and "excellent" except marshaling all forces to remember the exact ways of the instructions and recommendations insofar as they pertain to speaking, writing and of course thinking? If the whole attempt is used to recall and recollect the instructors' ways of saying and writing, then what happens to students' experience of immediate consciousness when it is supposed to bring about students' novelty, creativity and innovation? How can a student be connected to his/her immediate consciousness if his/her fear is not to remember what should be remembered from the repertoire of the teacher's instruction? How can the avenues of creativity and novelty loom if teachers already prescribe traveling through only one or a few avenues?

Let's look at some examples from *American Headway* by Soars (2001). The book is also used in teaching English to ESL students by some language centers and colleges. Under the heading of "Vocabulary and Pronunciation," the book gives the following exercise:

Restate these sentences using not very (p. 48):

1 Mark's apartment is tiny.
2 Paul and Sue are stingy.
3 This TV show is boring.
4 Their children are rude.
5 John looks miserable.
6 His sister is stupid.

In the other section, "Listening and Reading, A Spy Story" (p. 22), the book reads: "who is James Bond? Write down any thing you know about him and share ideas with the class."

Under the heading "Vocabulary" in another section on page 72, the book reads:

> Discuss these questions with a partner. How long does it take from your school to the nearest train station or bus stop? From your home to your work? When did you last do some one a favor/make a complaint/take a photo/get angry? What time did you get home last night? Do you get along with your parents/your neighbors? Is it easy for you to make friends?

Having looked at these examples, it is now time to think of some questions such as: How much does the cited material stimulate learners' thinking? How much does the material invite students to think beyond the routine ways of thinking? How much does the material stimulate learners' critical or creative thinking? What kind of discourse is promoted through these examples, ordinary or non-ordinary? If learners are frequently exposed to these kinds of discourses, what is the possibility of thinking about other sorts of discourses?

I do not intend to argue that we need to make our learners philosophers who philosophize everything. Yet, I argue that along with attention towards everyday dialogue and conversation, we need to encourage students to connect to their power of thinking, to examine the relationship between discourse and self-construction and to look into self-construction, self-deconstruction and self-reconstruction through revisiting their languages.

We should be careful not to retain the young EFL learners at the "utilitarian" level of basic dialogues about mundane activities, or have them endlessly limited to the present tense. Yet, that is still a common approach in many ELT texts, including even the newer ones. Part of the reason for this, of course, can be

attributed to the constraints imposed by publishers seeking to reach the widest possible market for their materials.

Ghosn (2002) presents four reasons, being, respectively, "motivation, language learning, academic literacy, and literature as a change agent" to use literature in primary school of English teaching. She argues "through the medium of literature, we can provide young EFL learners with language experiences that will not only motivate and foster oral language, but also deepen their awareness of the target language in its written form" (Ghosn, 2002, p. 175).

While referring to the role of language teaching in critical thinking, she argues that teaching a second language based on some provocative thinking materials can help learners even establish more thoughtful relationships with their first language and help them foster the effective cognitive language development (Ghosn, 2002, p. 176).

Referring to the role of ESL teachers in encouraging students to think beyond the ordinary discourse and frequently habituated modes, Morgan (2002, p. 151) indicates that:

> In terms of critical reflexivity, one of the issues that emerges in this case is how we, as ESL teachers, encourage students to view their role as citizens in a new political culture. For example, to what extent do we consciously or unconsciously (through our theories, methods, and materials) create a learning environment that suggests the meanings of citizenship are already determined for our students, and is their duty to accept them as is? Conversely, to what extent do we suggest these meanings are open to negotiation and (re) definition, drawing from the experiences that newcomers bring to a society?

While drawing on scholarship in the field of ESL, Morgan (2002, p. 152) claims:

> the methods favored in many Canadian ESL citizenship classes tend to encourage political passivity. Instruction in these programs has often been preoccupied with the rote learning of "facts" and the stimulation of the question-and answer format used at citizenship hearings.

On the active role of language learners and the teachers' significant method of presenting the materials on awakening the ESL learners' power of thinking, Morgan (2002, p. 156) argues:

> As students start to question "texts in the world", they also begin to question "texts in the mind". They come to recognize that they are not necessarily the sole authors of "commonsense" beliefs but are instead *subjects* produced through language and discourse. Such forms of understanding,

> from a poststructural perspective, are necessary to imitate attention and action on social inequalities whose persistence is sustained by their seeming naturalness.

To invite the language learners to go beyond the ordinary discourse and its insinuating modes of thinking, to question the questions and to revisit the answers, to help students to reexamine their horizons of thinking, to display the possibilities and their wildness and wideness, to locate and to relocate the position of utterances and understandings, to think creatively and to teach critically would characterize a language educator who teaches language while cherishing thinking.

If learners are supposed to think inside the boxes, if they are to abide by the prescribed manners of expressiveness and recommended tables of thinking, and if they are to do their best to recall the rules of what need to be said and what need not to be said, how do they ever give themselves a chance to get outside the boxes, to escape from the mindsets, to connect to their immediate consciousness and to experience thinking away from the pervasiveness of the past engagements, and to express the gliding, unpredictable and creative reflection within the crystals of language?

The capacity of human learning, the aptitude of human responses, and the capability of human processing of information is not limited, contained or circumscribed in any way and can manifest within language in multitudes of known and unknown ways. What happens is that human beings get used to expressing ways that are recursively transpired and repeatedly occurring. In other words, we are used to hearing what we hear but this does not mean that the next thing we are going to hear in terms of content, form and discourse can be certainly predicted. The moment you liberate yourself from the fetters of the ordinary discourse, you find yourself frolicking in the infinite meadows of expressiveness where your modes of expressiveness and your modes of thinking are not contained inside the boxes. The mere repetition and the sole replication of patterns and paradigms insinuate the exclusiveness of their validity and their indisputable reliability. Modeling, Classical Conditioning and Skinner's Operant Conditioning are attempts to introduce the dynamics of the aforementioned repetition and replication and their impact on learning attitudes and behaviors. But what the codes and the rules or the recursion of the paradigms and styles cannot by any means exclude or nullify is the creativity of expression and immediacy of consciousness. For although a sentence may be identifiable to a number of constituents and components whose linguistic translation may develop terms such as "subject," "verb," "object," "adverb of place" or "adverb of time," this cannot preclude the generation of creative expressions. In other words, the creation of meaning is not bound to those identified paradigms within the linguistic construction but it can unfold itself in infinite ways and manners. If a sentence in English, for instance, is constructed with the "subject" first, followed by the

"verb," "object," "adverb of place" and "adverb of time" at the end, this cannot suggest a limited number of semantical constructions. To put it in another way, innumerable novel and diverse sentences with their ensuing meanings can be constructed and created within the same arrangement, let alone the break of the same ordering that opens up new patterns of orchestration as well. For example, the use of an adverb of place or an adverb of time or an adjective right at the beginning of the sentence, either for emphasis or any other function, breaks up the already-cited sequence and gives rise to the placement of the constituent of a sentence in a variety of places. The point, however, in this stage is the availability and the possibility of meaning making through benefiting from the very inventive, the very creative and the very innovative gift of human being namely language. For example, the sentence "In Italy, they celebrate this day in June" is a sentence with the following characteristics:

In: Preposition
Italy: Adverb of place
They: Pronoun (NP)
Celebrate: Verb
This: Definite demonstrative adjective
Day: Noun
In: Preposition
June: Adverb of time

The adverb of place has appeared at the beginning of the sentence, perhaps to lay emphasis on the place. The adverb of place could have appeared right before the adverb of tense. In this case we had the sentence: They celebrate this day in Italy in June. Now think of possibilities which may come for each component of this sentence, namely, in the very sentence what else can come instead of they? (e.g., the people, the merchants, the aged, the librarians, etc.). What else can appear instead of celebrate? (e.g., commemorate, observe, memorialize, hallow, etc.). You can do the same with the remaining parts of the sentence. The point is that these possibilities are by no means limited. So we can make infinite sentences with the same form while offering new perspective through each form. Our habits of hearing special utterances should not stop us from searching the unexplored modes of expressiveness. Creativity gives credit to these explorations.

The rejuvenation of all forms of language use, the revitalization of diversified manifestations of meaning making, and the revival of *otherwise* happen in line with the burgeoning transformation of language and its flourishing creativity. It is in line with this process of creativity and meaning making within language and through language and by language that Ricoeur (1990a) propounds the emergence of a linguistic imagination beside an epistemological and political imagination which originates meaning through the living power of metaphoricity.

The idea of being creative in language is not just an idea of ornamentation to festoon the expressions through appealing non-vernacular devices. The most significant demonstration of this creativity of language and discourse can pour itself into the structures of thinking. In other words, a new discourse may promise the opening of a new way of thinking, a new way of examining the layers of reality. Any time an act of creativity is displayed, it introduces the implementation of a new perspective: seeing the familiar in the novel and the novel in the familiar. Yet, one may be too much stuck in the familiar, so one may wear blinders that prevent one from seeing the forest through the trees. Seeing everything from a 180-degree angle may deprive one of examining things in other burgeoning horizons.

The horizons of thinking are manifested in language in that what is expressed somehow reveals the scope of thinking. So language is reflexive in this sense to the effect that it can expose the structure, the foundation, the composition, the configuration and the form of thinking. The creativity of language unfolds new discourses that offer new ways of thinking just as the new styles of thinking open themselves in new discourses of language.

Now from an educational point of view, these are some significant questions: if students are given the chance to experience new and creative ways of expressiveness, does this allow them to experience new ways of thinking? If students are educated to connect to new ways of thinking, would they simply and passively abide by the pre-packed triggering systems of thinking which manifest themselves in the prevailing, and dominant ways of looking? (Think about the social and political implications of these questions.) What are the implications of looking into new things for language and thinking? What can language educators do in terms of creative thinking and language competence for students?

The language educators' excessive emphasis on forms and the correction of forms may overshadow the attention towards the other essential constituents of language and language understanding, including the conceptual, semantic and pragmatic aspects. Let's say that a student writes the following sentence:

Horses eat also.

The teacher may only focus on teaching the proper placement of 'also' thus correcting the above sentence into "Horses *also* eat." The teacher may keep on teaching the discussion on the alternative use of "too" in such a sentence therefore teaching the possibility of the conversion of the sentence into "Horses eat too." He/she can also discuss the agreement of the verb "eat" with the subject "horses" teaching the other versions such as "A horse eats" or "The horse eats" hence opening the discussion on the requirement of "s" at the end of the main verb "eat" in the event of the appearance of the third person singular subject i.e. he/she/it or their substitutes such as cat. John, the animal, etc. The teacher may also focus on the use of articles "a", or "the" with the singular noun of "horse" versus lack of any articles for the plural noun of "horses". The discussion can carry on and cover

issues such as the change of the form "eat" into "ate" and "eaten" for the respective tenses of simple past tense, present perfect tense and past perfect tense with the introduction of "eat" as an irregular verb in English whose other converted forms of the verbal conjugation do not accept "ed" or "d" (being idiosyncratical to the so-called regular verbs). If these emphases and similar points of concentration constitute the mere or the major axis of teaching, students are compelled to attend to the issues of formalism in the sense that they become concerned to use the right form where it is prescribed and to avoid the improper form where it is proscribed.

The essence of creativity and critical thinking begins with questioning and challenging the boxes of clinging habits, ordinary and everyday discourses, memory's impact, and the interference of association of ideas. It is here when the new horizons of thinking powerfully beam, it is here where the spectrum of looking into things in a novel way glows. Creativity starts with a journey inside and outside the existing values, prevalent practices, pervasive approaches and common modes and exercises. It begins with questioning the flux of order, the arrangement of presentation, the apparition of the happenings, the manner of unfolding, the ways of showering, the moments of satisfaction, the pleasures of certainty, the avenues of solutions, the mansions of conclusiveness, the comfort of sufficiency, questions to discuss its roots or the social approaches of discourse analysis to examine the veracity of its subject matter, the impressiveness of suppositions, the forcefulness of associations, the obviousness of realization and the easiness of acceptance. Creativity challenges the way things are and explores other ways things can be. Creativity fights for otherwise. Creativity targets the unknown, the unfamiliar and the unexplored. It searches for mystery within mastery, the opening within the closure, the possibility within actuality, the passage within the blockage, the revolution within stability, the disintegration within integration, the decomposition within the composition, the indeterminacy within determinacy, the plurivocity within univocity, the imperturbability within perturbability, and the light within the darkness. Creativity rises in the midst of habituation, acclimatization and familiarization and seeks novelty, exquisiteness, innovation and revivification. Creativity does not succumb to the deluge of ordinariness, commonality, platitudinous and conventionality.

Creativity of language and creativity of thought unfold and evolve dialectically and yet syllogistically. Creative thought harbors creative language and creative language nourishes creative thought. Creativity of language defines grammar, grammaticality and syntacticality in line with the creation of new rules, new openings and new perspectives. Creative language can open up the possibilities of seeing things in a new way. It can augur a change in the interpretations, a revision of the unquestionable, and a challenge of the well-taken-for-granted premises. Creative language can offer re-description of things, subjects, categories, issues, people and existence. In any act of creativity being epitomized in an enunciation

or articulation, the act of redescription, and redefinition parade by virtue of a re-exploration of the consistent constituents of any compound or composition.

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5

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RECEPTIVENESS OF LANGUAGE

In voicing out what one desires or needs, one may look only at the superficial layer of the parlance and look for accord, agreement and compatibility within the standard use of any given language and its contextual frameworks. On the other hand, one may ponder deeper and look for the underlying elements of the modes of expressiveness and its unique psychological embodiment.

You may remember having said "Hello" to someone and having received nothing as a response or having received a cold shoulder. The feeling of being discounted, being rejected, and being ignored or not being recognized is certainly not a positive feeling. Now, you may better imagine the feeling of a nine-year old school boy who wrote a composition entitled "My Father" in which he explained his feelings about the death of his father and received the following answer from his teacher: "Tenses, you keep mixing past and present" (Blackis, 1965).

This real story is not the first nor the only one in the real world of education. There are multitudes of examples indicating the lack of recognition and lack of understanding in the mutual communication of our lives. History is fraught with bitter memoirs of students who have not received any positive recognition from so-called teachers who are supposed to teach how to recognize facts and realities. Contemporary Canadian poet, Carl Leggo (1999), calls himself "a wounded writer," and recounts the story of his grade eleven English teacher in the following way:

> One day she passed me back a writing assignment and said, "Carl, you will never be a writer." Then she added, "But you don't want to be a writer anyway." I respected that elderly woman with frosty hair like cotton candy. I would not tell her that all my life I had harboured only two ambitions. I either wanted to be an astronomer or a writer.

This chapter attempts to discuss the issue of identity and language, particularly in relation to writing. The question of identity can be examined from various points of view including psychological and philosophical ones. It is always crucial to know who is this "I" who writes and how this "I-ness" is crystallized in the form of writing. Is this I-ness made, established, and built or is it given, determined, and imposed? Should we search for the I-ness in the individuality of individual or should we trace the root of the I-ness in the social aspect of the "I"?

Since Aristotle, many theories have tried to focus on some of the foregoing questions and have presented some answers. Some authors (e.g., Turner, 1991; Gergen, 1991; Burkitt, 1991) have claimed that social construction is the first and the last word, and that identity is nothing but the construction of social elements. Therefore, they argue, identity is not the product of individuals' minds and intentions, but it is socially constructed and is the result of affiliation to particular beliefs and possibilities.

This interpretation of identity has been challenged and can be challenged further mainly because of what Michel Foucault calls the decentering of "I." In other words, the concepts of agency, accountability and choice or option are seriously undermined in this viewpoint. The roads to self-actualization are blocked and there remains no optimistic chance for the intervention of "I" for making the I-ness in a responsible way. This paper does not totally turn down the importance of social factors in shaping identity. However, the social constructionist view of identity ignores what Goffman (1959) calls "the performer."

Others such as Ivanic (1997) have discussed different aspects of identity, particularly for writers. Ivanic's claim is that "writing is an act of identity in which people align themselves with socio-culturally shaped possibilities for self-hood, playing their part in reproducing or challenging dominant practices and discourses, and the values, beliefs, and interests which they embody" (Ivanic, 1997, p. 32).

Although self-concept is closely related to the issue of identity, it is fundamentally different from identity. Self-concept is one's description of who one is. Identity is one's definition of who one is (Baumeister, 1987); it consists of those things that most basically define who we are. Identity is defined by various aspects of our life, and it helps us locate ourselves in terms of who we are and where we belong (Lewis, 1990).

A very significant constituent of identity is the sense of continuity in one's life. Narrative approaches to personality assume that people's lives are bound together by the stories they tell about themselves. McAdams (1989) presented a narrative approach to identity, which assumes that identity is a life story. From a practical point of view, Harvey, Orbuch, and Weber (1993) provide an example of how people can utilize narrative accounts to deal with a life problem. Their study included hundreds of individuals dealing with traumatic experiences such as armed combat, an airline crash, and the loss of a loved one or incest. They argue

that it is in developing an account of the incident that the victim learns how to cope with the event and to restore a sense of meaning to life.

This paper offers a new outlook in relation to identity and writing while commending the merit and painstaking endeavors of the researchers who have restlessly mobilized their focus on scrutinizing the issue of identity, particularly its relation to writing. The implications of this new approach signal promising news for all of those who pursue the objectives of learning and teaching in the broadest sense of the word.

A New Look at Identity and Writing the Urge Towards Recognition

Writing is the expression of identity, though it is not the only way. People write for and because of various reasons, in various situations and in various moods. What people write about can be anything from the least important thing in the world to the most superordinate categories of existence. The claim here is that, first of all, when people write, they expose their identity in numerous forms, consciously or unconsciously. Second, all writings, particularly poetic and personal writings, reveal an underlying message. The message may not be transparent on the surface but it solidly exists. It is an urge to be recognized by the audience and not necessarily by the actual reader who is now reading the text, but by the potential reader whose recognition of the writer is of great significance or vitality for the writer. The writer writes, in this sense, in order to be recognized. Recognition of identity, therefore, constitutes one of the most striking aspects of a writer's writing. This recognition, as we will see later on, is not only about the positive sides or flaunting dimensions of the writer, but also incorporates a great variety of attributes, traits, moods, affects, and pains in relation to the writer. Furthermore, the writer is not always consciously aware of his/her urge for recognition.

The Logical, Linguistic and Psychological Model of the Discussion

Here, we try to present our claim in a logical framework in order to clarify the content and implications of what is being said. All writings will ultimately turn into a "proposition" or a "sentence" form. They may purport an affirmative relation between the subject and predicate or a negative relation between those two. In this category, the writer affirms or negates, approves or disapproves, ratifies or nullifies something. The writer takes for granted that the audience, the potential reader that he/she writes for, does the same; i.e., to comply with the writer in the same process of affirmation or negation, approval or disapproval, ratification or nullification which all consist in recognizing the writer with respect to what he/she wants to be recognized for. In some cases, the recognition immediately takes place because of the authority that the potential reader immediately confirms for

the writer. Jonathan Culler's example (1997) is worth mentioning here. When the narrator of Jane Austen's Emma begins, "Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, with a comfortable home and happy disposition," Culler writes, "We don't sceptically wonder whether she really was handsome and clever. We accept this statement until we are given reason to think otherwise." What we have here is the writer's urge, even on the unconscious level, that what is presented be accepted by the potential reader.

In the above-mentioned example, the form of the writing, at least what is quoted here, does not make up a proposition in the logical sense of the word since it does not establish a copula that connects the subject, i.e., Emma, to its predicate, i.e., handsome, clever, and rich, etc. Grammatically speaking, it does not serve as a connecting link, nor does it establish an identity between subject and complement. Nonetheless, it exposes the affirmation and it demands the recognition. The writer writes for the potential reader who says, "Fine. Let's keep on reading." The potential reader whom the writer wants doesn't start denying the writer right at the beginning of his/her reading. The writer writes in the hope that what he/she writes will be recognized by the potential reader he/she is looking for and this, eventually, leads to the recognition of the writer. The writer may not expect that the whole constituents of his/her writing will be recognized, but he/she never writes without the urgent urge to be recognized. It is similar to the utopian hope of everyone that, while not expecting everyone to like their choice of hat or suit or hairstyle, there is at least one aspect of their appearance that everyone likes about them.

A poem by Paul Verlaine presents another example: "*Il pleut dans mon coeur! Comme il pleut sur la ville*" (It cries in my heart, as it rains on the town). Here, the poem obviously calls on the potential reader to recognize the emotion being affiliated to the poet. Although this recognition partially focuses on the emotion, it essentially goes back to the writer, i.e., the poet, whose urge to be recognized is crystallized in his piece of writing. The poet presents an affirmation regarding what is being experienced in the realm of his heart and wants the potential reader to have congruity with him in this affirmation. The logical form of the writing here also turns into a proposition.

The point is that the form is not the mere determinant of the recognition since the form may not exactly produce a logical judgment, proposition or sentence which evidently discloses the relationship between the subject and predicate. The grammatical or linguistic form cannot be taken as the only yardstick for our diagnosis either. Expletives, which fill the subject positions for structural reasons and turn up in the subject positions of the sentence or the NP position, are not real subjects. (Note the second example by Paul Verlaine and his use of "it" in the subject position.) What really matters, and is the centerpiece of the claim, is that the writing can be translated into the *proposition or sentence form* regardless of having the perfunctory qualifications of logical or linguistic forms. That ultimate proposition or sentence which can be elicited from the writing of the writer by

the potential reader reveals the writer's urge for recognition. Although the writer may display his/her urge for the potential reader to recognize a series of facets belonging to him/her, the ultimate recognition is that of the author, i.e., authorial recognition.

Let us note Robert Frost's two-line poem:

> We dance round in a ring and suppose,
> But the Secret sits in the middle and knows.

On the surface, there may be no clear sign indicating the poet's urge to be recognized. However, if we fathom into the profound layer of the poem, the least we will find out is that the poet offers what he wants to be recognized as an understanding, as a special interpretation, as what he feels is worth mentioning. Otherwise why would he say or write what he writes? It is as though the poet opens a window through which we can see something, no matter what it is that we see. The mere action of opening the window indicates and verifies the existence of the one who opens the window. So the window, in itself, implies the existence of the one who opens the window.

However, as potential readers, we might be so intensely immersed in the window or what appears through the window that we ignore the one who has opened the window. The two-line poem mentioned above is what we see through the window and many interpretations might crop up in relation to what that thing is (For example, what does "dancing" mean? What is the contrast between knowing and supposing? Who is we?). But the point of the argument, here, is not focusing on what we see through the window and engaging on presenting interpretations or meanings. The point is to focus our attention on the one who has opened the window. This window opening enterprise carries with it a deep sense of recognition; it reveals the urge of the one who has opened the window to be recognized by the ones who are the potential observers of observing that recognition. The moment they take a look at the window or what appears through the window, they see the presence of the one who has opened the window, and that is the ultimate urge of the one who has opened the window, i.e., being recognized.

There is a subtlety here: sometimes the one who opens the window is so closely tied and linked to the window that the main objective for him/her is the recognition of the window; consequently, we may not see the evidently transparent urge of the one who has opened the window to be recognized as much as we see the emphasis on the window itself or what it appears through the window. But this is just the surface; the deep part entails the urge of the one that is behind the window, the one who has opened the window, the one whose urge for recognition has led him/her to open the window. In addition, this displays a unity between the one who opens the window (the writer) and the window (the writing). This unity is sometimes so strong that the one who opens the window is

totally crystallized in the window so that he/she wants nothing but the recognition of this crystallization viz. the writing since he/she is the embodiment of the writing and the writing is the embodiment of him/her. Therefore, the very urge eventually goes back to the one who has opened the window, i.e., the writer or poet. The authorial recognition substantially manifests itself.

Sometimes the writing clearly exhibits an emphasis and urge for recognition by the unambiguous reiteration of pronouns or possessive adjectives. The following poem by Langston Hughes (1902–67) is another example of authorial recognition:

> Way down south in Dixie,
> Break the heart of me.
> They hung my black young lover
> To a crossroad tree.
> Way down south in Dixie,
> Break the heart of me.
> Love is a naked shadow,
> On a gnarled and a naked tree.

The poet clearly voices his call for recognition—recognition of the pain, anguish, suffering and loss. The centerpiece of recognition, here, goes back to the emotional facets belonging to the poet. Those emotions constitute an independent entity being not equal to the whole entity and existence of the poet. Nonetheless, the poet (at the time of producing or writing the work) is so closely bound and tied to those psychological experiences that he feels the completely dramatic effect of the incident on his entire soul (break the heart of me). By ascribing the elements of this incident to his own self and soul, the poet unambiguously shows his urge for recognition which on the surface may make us differentiate between what he wants us to recognize and he himself. Recalling the analogy of the window, we can see how the poet (the one who has opened the window) centers on the happening (what we can see through the window) rather than himself (the one who opened the window). The point culminates itself here, that what is seen through the window is ultimately under the auspices of the one who has opened the window.

Sometimes the significance, anguish, ecstasy, beauty and/or mystery of what is seen through the window is so paramount for the one who opens the window that he/she may let the whole focus be centered on what is seen at the cost of ignoring or disregarding himself/herself. In such cases, the writer or poet mobilizes all possibilities to concentrate on what is seen through the window rather than on the one who opened the window. This reveals the mysteriously inextricable ties between the writer (or poet) and what is imputed to him/her. But once we delve in to the whole process and look for the roots, we unavoidably face the specific "I" who requires recognition. The pronoun "I" always looms up in the

final analysis of the complications which may block or darken accessibility to this diagnosis.

The use of the pronoun "I" is not always obvious; it may try to disguise itself under numerous masks but as we track down the components of writing, we eventually bump into the long-awaited "I" which is sitting with a strong urge to be revealed, to be recognized and to be acknowledged. Empirically speaking, go to the people who proscribe using "I." Tell them that you read what they wrote, that their writing doesn't make any sense, and that their work is nothing but a failure! Closely examine them while you are saying these words; meticulously look at their face, eyes, body language, etc.; you will definitely see their anger, their detestation, and their clamorous outcry which challenges your ferocious assault against their holy, sacred urge for recognition, recognition of their "I." Just as they dislike someone trampling on their feet, so writers don't want to be denied. Their writing is a manifestation of an element of their identity; denying their writing is tantamount to denying their identity. Every writing essentially affirms or negates something and seeks recognition in this connection. This affirmation or negation, implicitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously, discloses the one who is behind this affirmation or negation, the one whose urge to be recognized (in the broadest sense of the word) caused him/her to take the pen and write.

The Arguments and Counterarguments

The claim mentioned in the preceding sections reiterates that there is always an urge for recognition in every piece of writing, and that the writer writes in order to be recognized by a potential reader who recognizes him/her. One might argue that some writings are anonymously written, such as the poem about Richard Corey or many other prose or poems which do not have a clearly mentioned author. Many pieces of writings are available whose authors have concealed their real name by using a sobriquet, nickname, pseudonym or alias (e.g., Johannes de Silentio by Søren Kierkegaard). How can one say that these authors, who have hidden their identity, had an urge for recognition? How do we prove the existence of an urge for recognition in these sorts of writings, which do not seemingly substantiate our claim?

We need to pose some questions in order to argue the veracity of our previously mentioned claim: why did those anonymous writers write those anonymously shown pieces of writing? Why did they take a pen and put into writing what they wrote about? Isn't this a confirmation that they at least wanted to share or display what they were internally aware of with or for the potential reader? Does the action of writing itself not indicate that they wanted to somehow expose or send out what may be described as a part of them? Might it not have been social restriction, censorship, fear, or trepidation that prevented these writers from bravely or clearly mentioning their names? Does the mere action of writing in an anonymous way not prove that the writer is so sensitive and caring about his/her writing

that he /she may overlook his/her name because he/she wants the writing to be exposed to the public? Does this not signify that the writer is so closely bound and tied to the writing that he/she wants the writing to be sent out and presented even at the expense of forgetting or ignoring or hiding his/her name because he/she feels that the writing is nothing but him/herself? Does this not corroborate that the writer is seeking the presentation, and the recognition of the writing? Why, otherwise, would the writer have written? It might be said that, here, the recognition goes to the work, the writing, and not the one who wrote, but can we really separate the writing from the writer in the sense that writing happened out of nowhere? Isn't the writing like an effect, which displays a cause which lies behind it? Isn't writing a representation of identity? Isn't it true that the writer as a creator creates the writing? In addition to all, why does the writer write? Does he/she not feel that he/she is the one who is writing? Does he/she not want to present or offer any kind of thing, no matter what it is, to at least some who may be his/her potential audience? Recognition, even in an anonymous way, ultimately consists in the writer's recognition. (Let us remember here what Freud said: immortality means being loved by many anonymous people.) The thought or the dream of being recognized by potential readers is always within the writer's mind.

One might bring another argument into play, by asking when someone writes a handbook, such as a manual about the Boeing Company and its products, or when a secretary writes down the instructions or blueprint of some mundane clerical job, what kind of recognition could be conceivable? Where is the urge for recognition here? How do we account for our claim? It is true that recognition of the so-called writers of these examples is not comparable at all with that of authentic writers, but authorial recognition exists here as well. In other words, the secretary or the Boeing expert writes in specific ways in order to receive approval and recognition by those whose endorsement will be of significance. Consequently, the secretary or the Boeing employee writes in accordance with the criteria, formulations, and regulations which eventually boost his/her recognition. These so-called writers do not write in any way they might choose to write because they are expected to write in specific ways which meet the standard of those specific writings. These writers write within the required frameworks in order to get a specific form of recognition.

Another argument might resort to citing examples of writings in which the author clearly depreciates him/her/self. The writer in these kinds of writings sells him/herself short in various ways. How can our claim be true for such writers and writings where there is obviously a desire to disclaim or an urge for denial? The point is that even in denial there is an urge for recognition. You, as a writer, want someone to know (even if that someone does not exist within your scope of knowing) that you are tired, that you are disappointed, that you are frustrated, that you have no interest in yourself. You write in these cases to declare your unconscious urge for recognition amidst the arduous path of alienation. Besides, depreciation, psychologically speaking, is in pursuit of appreciation and recognition. People who harshly depreciate themselves and put themselves down hate to

hear or receive the same depreciating response from his/her audience. Someone who writes, "Oh I know I'm good for nothing and I want to die!" is not waiting for the atrocious response of "You bet your sweet life! You better die before it's too late!" He/she is waiting for a response not unlike the following: "Life without you is like twenty without two."

Every book or piece of writing is an extended sentence which ultimately affirms or negates something; regardless of form, which may be logically devoid of copula or linguistic appearance, which may be a performative utterance (e.g., "I promise to give you the book"). Instead of a constative utterance ("He promised to bring me the book"), the whole constellation of writing is transferable to a proposition which calls for confirmation or nullification, and presents the urge of the author to be recognized by the potential reader. It might be said that performative utterances are not true and false and do not describe or explain something but merely perform the action they designate; and that constative utterances are true and false and describe something or make a statement (as J.L. Austin (1962), the British philosopher, proposed the distinction between them). The point, which can further disambiguate our claim and argument, is that we not get caught in the formal analysis of the writing but, instead, go beyond what the mere form(s) express. Even with the use of performative utterances (if we assume that the whole writing of a writer is nothing but performative utterances), the writer is in pursuit of an objective. He/she follows his/her goal, albeit unconsciously. It is true that once we say, "I promise to bring you the book," we have not described a state of affairs, and that this is nothing but performing the act of promising; nonetheless, the utterance is itself the act. I may want you to recognize my utterance which ultimately embodies my own recognition. The writer may write nothing but a series of performative utterances which formally are not categorized as true or false since they only perform the action they designate, yet the authorial recognition is still there if not for any reason except for the fact that the author wants the potential reader to have congruity with him in the uttering of the performative utterances.

Hierarchy of Authorial Recognition

Authorial recognition, though found in every writing, is not equally and invariably the same for every writer. In other words, the urge for recognition varies. One might have an insignificant urge compared to others who might have an insatiably strong urge for recognition. The level of recognition which satisfies one author may not give any kind of satisfaction to another author. The person who writes the manual for Boeing expects a specific recognition within the framework of his/her writing. His/her writing does not have the quintessential recognition such as L.M. Montgomery received by writing *Anne of Green Gables*. Recognition of the writing by the secretary is also limited to its circumscribing parameters, which emanate from the writing itself. The more personal the writings, the more the urge for recognition can be found. But, as Roz Ivanic (1997) claims, "no

writing is impersonal," so there is always the footstep of a person in any writing notwithstanding the non-existence of the pronoun "I." Therefore, there is always an authorial recognition in any writing which, indeed, may be different from a qualitative point of view. A school boy who is forced to write because of a teacher's insistence carries a kind of authorial recognition which lies far away from that of T.S. Eliot or Fyodor Dostoevsky. The least level of recognition that the boy may receive may be that of a positive, encouraging response from the teacher indicating that he has done the job (if not a good job).

A significant element in the hierarchy of authorial recognition is that the writing itself essentially demands a different level of recognition. The more the writing touches upon universal and quintessential issues, the more the recognition will or may come. The more the writing develops harmony and consonance with the souls and thoughts of human beings, the more it will create numerous forms of recognition. The fact that L.M. Montgomery's *Anne of Green Gables* has been translated into more than twenty languages in the world casts some light here. This hierarchy of authorial recognition, however, should not obfuscate the distinction between the writing and the urge of the writer for recognition.

One might argue that scientific or so-called academic writings or five-theme paragraph papers are usually written without the use of personal pronouns and that therefore they do not open space for any kind of or level of authorial recognition. But you need only harshly criticize or ignore those of kinds of writings and gauge the author's response to see the veracity of the claim that they too carry a desire for authorial recognition. A paper dealing with a problem in math may not reflect an author's urge for recognition on the surface but, deep within, there dwells a strong authorial urge. A lollipop may soothe a child and give him/her satisfaction but it certainly cannot give the appropriate satisfaction to an adult who is seeking beyond sublunary goals and demands. There is certainly a hierarchy for authorial recognition. Levels of recognition may be subjected to a wide variety of factors that turn out to be significant in their own contexts. Moreover, there is the multiplicity of elements within a writing which may be the primary target of the author for recognition such as emotional states but they ultimately return to recognition of the "I" who is always behind the writing. A poem, for instance, may underscore an element of loneliness and the poet obviously expects the actual reader to recognize that feature as he/she delineates it but this, eventually, endorses recognition of the poet as well. This case of loneliness may not be identical for the author of a math formula but that author is also in pursuit of recognition at another level—the least of which could be the approval or endorsement of his/her formula which, ultimately, embodies his/her recognition.

Dialogism and Recognition

The concept of dialogism originally dates back to the German philosopher, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1170–1831). In Hegelian epistemology,

self-consciousness takes place in a mutual way in that the person attains a concept about him/herself while understanding the concept of the other person. Therefore, there is always a simultaneity. Self-concept, therefore, is acquired by the individual simultaneously with his/her concept of the other and through what Markova (1997) calls "the process of mutual acknowledgement (or recognition) of one individual by the other." Markova (1997) claim that the religiously oriented Neo-Kantian philosophers coined the term dialogism. According to Markova (1997), the Neo-Kantians were concerned with the "dialogical principle" involved in the relationship between the "I" and "thou" that is established and maintained through speech and communication. Bakhtin (1979/1986), who according to Markova (1997) also adopted the term "dialogism", believes that all understanding is dialogical in nature (Volosinov/Bakhtin, 1973, 102). He also claims that in the process of knowledge, human subjects reflexively cognize other human subjects and their products (Bakhtin, 1979/1986, p. 161).

What can be of help in relation to our argument here is that dialogism implies the element of recognition. There can always be dialogism not only in face-to-face, vocalized, and/or verbalized communication but also in any kind of written communication or text. This leads us to what was already mentioned as the potential reader or potential audience for the writer. The writer always writes for a potential reader who reads his/her text and recognizes him/her. Even if the writer does not make the text available for others and does not allow others to peek at what has been written, the writer always writes while considering a potential reader who appreciates and acknowledges and recognizes him/her. "If one end of the bridge depends on me, then the other depends on my addressee" (Volosinov/Bakhtin, 1973, p. 83).

The least that dialogism can tell us is the process of mutual acknowledgement or recognition of one individual by the other. A writer who writes something always thinks (consciously or unconsciously) about some potential reader(s) who acknowledges and recognizes him/her. Writing does not take place based on monologism and is not a one-sided process or act. Writing occurs in a mutual or reciprocal context in that the elements of revealing, exhibiting and displaying are always conceivable in the act of writing. As the verbs mentioned above imply, they demand an object, i.e., revealing something, exhibiting something, etc. But there will always be a question of "why?" for such objective forms; namely, "Why does he show? Why does he reveal? Why does he display?" The possibility of the use of the interrogative forms of "why?" and "what?" suggests the possibility of the existence of an objective, a goal, a want for the writer. This possibility, *ipso facto*, implies that the author undertakes an enterprise that is neither a unilateral nor one-sided act. It suggests that there is always (even if not in actuality, but in potentiality) some reader who recognizes the author and gives a positive (or negative) answer to authorial recognition.

When someone speaks and articulates, he/she wants a listener to hear him/her. If there is no one around and the person talks (which might be nonsensical to

some), he/she thinks about a potential listener who recognizes what he/she says, i.e., recognizes him/her. And if the person does not talk aloud, he/she definitely talks inside, and more definite than that, he/she has a potential listener even if that listener is no one but him/herself. Ask anyone who writes or talks if they think about an addressee when writing and talking, you will always find another pronoun beside(s) "I." This further substantiates our claim that even the most futile, the most absurd, and the most banal form of writing demands recognition and that recognition is, indeed, authorial recognition which is associated with the author. The essence and quiddity of recognition are different from author to author but the very urge is always there. Even in the most sublime, transcendental types of writing where there is no room for hubris, the writer wants recognition, the least of which is the conformity and congruity of the potential reader with those sublime and transcendental concepts that the writer has presented. This congruity, which endorses the thoughts and ideas or beliefs of the writer, is certainly an acknowledgement or recognition of him/her who has been crystallized in his/her writing. (Recall the analogy of the window.)

Pedagogical Implications

Failure to positively recognize students' writings is tantamount to failing to recognize their identity, thereby insinuating negative and deleterious energies to their minds and souls. A writer, before anything else, is a human being who needs to be recognized, at least, as a human being. Even if his/her writings appear to be nothing but a terrible failure, he/she needs recognition. It is the teacher with perspicacity, wisdom and emotional intelligence who praises and criticizes. Mere brutal criticism will do nothing but lead to destruction, despair, despondency, resentment and pessimism. This statement requires no statistical nor speculative confirmation: Pause for a moment and remember how you feel when you are denied, when you are ignored, or when you are not recognized.

The spirit of education is associated and coupled with recognition. Recognition does not mean the endorsement of any irrational, illogical, nonsensical or hackneyed thought which appears in the form of writing. It does not consist of verifying errors, mistakes or blunders in writing. What is extremely crucial for students in writing classes is that their feelings, their ideas, their beliefs, their understanding, their having an "I" be properly recognized. Just as people are sensitive about their names being pronounced properly, they are sensitive about their writings. This is emotionally true for students.

If teachers realize that their understanding of language, thinking, mind and recognition is not the only indisputable way of cognition and recognition, and if they allow themselves to doubt and question recognition and cognition in the broadest sense of the word, they will open up a space of possibility, hope and celebration. This will, practically speaking, open new horizons for the enhancement

of education. Education is inseparably linked to delicacies of human soul, body, and mind; our acts of education must not treat human beings as inanimate objects devoid of feelings, emotion and spirit.

Students as writers need the serious, caring attention of teachers, who, in turn, by meticulous, constructive recognition of students' writings and identity, can recognize their own lofty human dialogue in relation to other human beings, i.e., their students, in the transcendental process of becoming. Teachers also need to recognize that not recognizing students' works and writings is not a constructive way for realizing recognition for themselves. An internal richness which generates self-recognition and composure cannot be attained, in any way, by building castles on the ruins of others.

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6

PSYCHOLOGICAL TAPPING OF LANGUAGE WHEN IT COMES TO READING

Reading as Swimming

Language appears in manifold manifestations including speaking, writing and reading. This chapter focuses on the psychological examination of reading through the analogical and metaphoric underpinnings of its dynamics.

Reading is like swimming. It is a conscious and voluntary act, which involves a composite of many factors. When reader takes upon himself or herself to read a text, he/she starts an act, which bristles with multifarious elements and constituents.

Applications

Here we look at the analogy of swimming and try to apply the findings. The swimmer (the reader) can swim (read) just to find something, something for which he/she has begun swimming (Efferent reading, Rosenblatt). The swimmer, however, may swim and, in doing this, he "fixes his attention on the actual experience he is living through" (Aesthetic reading, Rosenblatt). The activities that the swimmer (the reader) does in relation to the swimming (reading) determine the distinction on what kind of swimming (reading) takes place in relation to the water (text). (Efferent or Aesthetic, Rosenblatt).

The Experience

The swimmer (the reader) can swim (read) and experience the rapture and enjoyment of swimming (reading) not because of what will happen after swimming (reading) and what will be the end result (product) but because of the fact that

swimming (reading) itself can be a delectable and pleasurable experience with an enjoyment, *rara avis* and exquisite, in its kind (Bleich, 1975). The swimmer (reader) cannot swim (read) by obeying the "emphatic classroom demands" on how to swim (read) without actually being engaged in the act of swimming (reading) (Meek, 1988; Dias, 1987).

The swimmer (reader) needs to experience swimming (reading) by swimming (reading) not by going through the prefabricated categories that others have placed for swimming (reading). Engagement is important (Dias, 1987).

Of course the background knowledge of swimming (reading) is significant and the type of water (text), its depth and its characteristics generate openness and constraint on how to swim (read) (Rosenblatt). But here is the point: No one can swim (read) for you, you need to experience it yourself (Rosenblatt).

The swimming (reading) is "an event occurring at a particular time in a particular environment at a particular moment in the life history" of the swimmer (reader) (Rosenblatt). The swimmer (reader) can celebrate this event by truly engaging in the process and in the very act of swimming (reading) (Rosenblatt), a transaction happens between the swimmer (reader) and the water (text) (Rosenblatt).

The swimmer (reader) cannot passively swim (read) in the water (text). Passive swimming (reading) will smother the swimmer (reader) (Meek, 1988). Water (text) is activated by the swimmer (reader) as the swimmer (reader) starts the very act of swimming (reading) (Rosenblatt).

Swimming (reading) is not just a response to a stimulus; it entails an ongoing process, something beyond the mere responding to a stimulus (Rosenblatt). Not everyone swims (reader) in the exact way as the other/another swimmer (reader) does.

One may have a quick swimming (reading), with a very fast speed (efferent reading) but that is entirely different from swimming in depth; and living by swimming (Aesthetic reading) (Rosenblatt).

The more prolific a swimmer (reader), the more brilliant and profound swimming (reading) (Applebee, 1978; Fusco, 1983; Parnell, 1984). The way the swimmer (reader) swims (reads), can be related to the swimmer's (reader's) assertiveness, aggressiveness and ego strength (Bleich, 1975).

Teaching

The coach (teacher) needs to understand that being imposing and controlling and emphasizing adamant techniques on how to swim will not enhance the richness of swimming (reading) and the interpretation of swimmers' (readers') response (Applebee, 1978; Meek, 1988; Dias, 1987; Michalack, 1977). On the contrary, when the swimmer (reader) is given freedom of action by the coach (teacher), he/she can take responsibility on how to freely swim (read), something which will give the swimmer (reader) a good feeling in the entire act of swimming (reading)

and will produce an effective interpretation (reader's response) after the completion of swimming (reading) (Doerr, 1980; McClure, 1985).

Experiencing the Experience

Again the swimmer's abilities (reader's cognitive factors) play an important role on the manner of swimming (reading) and on the swimmer's recount of swimming (reader's response) (Petrosky, 1977; Bunbury, 1985; Cullinan, Harwood, & Galda, 1983). The coach (teacher) needs to seriously take into account the existence of the said factors (cognitive and social).

The type of coaching (curriculum and teaching) and the kind or constituents of the water for swimming (text) can have an effect on the swimmer's swimming (reader's reading) and his/her subsequent recount of the swimming (reading) (Dias, 1987; Ambrulevich, 1986). The goal is not just to get into the water (traveling without arriving), but to experience the empowering enjoyment of swimming (reading) in the most sublime form (Rosenblatt; Dias, 1987; Bleich, 1975; Meek, 1988; Beach, 1993).

Perspectives

The very act of swimming (reading) may be discussed in the context of different perspectives. Some may only lay emphasis on "water" (text) (New Criticism), others may underscore "systems and structure of constituents of "water" (the norms, conventions, and mental processes that account for meaning) (Culler, 1980) (Structuralism). There are also some others who may underline neither "the swimmer" (reader) nor the "water" (text), and question the established interpretations and formulations on swimming (reading) as a system (poststructuralism).

The Dialectics of the Experiencer and the Experience

The interaction of the swimmer (reader) with water (text) is a remarkably conspicuous point (Reader-Response Criticism). Water is not known until the swimming starts (text is incomplete until it is read). Each swimmer (reader) brings something to the water (text) that gives a new facet to the water (completes the text) and that makes each swimming (reading) different. What the swimmer (reader) brings to the water (text) is discussed in different ways. Some say that what swimmer (reader) brings to the water (text) is not under his control, it is quite unconscious (Lacan & Holland).

Others say that it is the "language" that makes up the conscious mind of swimmer (reader) (poststructuralist critics). Some others say that oceans or pools (authors) always leave something hidden, cryptic and clandestine (unsaid, or unexplained), and they thus invite swimmers (readers) to fill the resulting spaces

with their special acts of swimming (imaginative constructs). Many equally valid accounts of swimming (many equally valid interpretations of a work) are possible (Iser, 1978).

Each time a swimmer (reader) swims in the water (reads the text), the swimmer (reader) experiences the freshness, vivacity and liveliness of water (text). The water (text) reveals a new dimension for the swimmer (reader) in each act of swimming (reading). The movement of the swimmer (reader) can start from "immature" response to "mature" and "developed" response as a progression from a stage of "unconscious enjoyment" in which "the swimmer" (the reader) knows what he likes but doesn't know why; through a stage of self-conscious appreciation to a stage of "conscious delight". The coach (teacher) needs to notice the significance of removing a narrow-minded attitude in teaching how to swim (read). Swimming (reading) is inextricably tied to "a quality of relaxed absorption".

Constructing, Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Experience

It is in the magnificent act of swimming (reading) that the swimmer (reader) identifies with water (text) and lets his /her unconscious take over for a while without fear that he/she will lose control or not return (Moffet, 1997). The water (text) becomes meaningless without the swimmer (reader) and the swimmer (reader) loses meaning without being connected and linked to the water (text) [monologism]. This ultimately delineates the interaction between the swimmer (reader) and the ocean [sea, pool, etc.] (author) by virtue of water (text) (Bakhtin, dialogism). Of course, the coach (teacher) can offer techniques that can help swimmer (reader) "accepts responsibility for" his/her "encounters" with water (text) (Dias & Haynoe, 1988).

Different theorists may single out a particular aspect of the process of swimming (reading) and represent different angles that illuminate particular aspect of the swimmer (reader), water (text) and the transaction.

Swimmers' knowledge of water (text) is the focus of one perspective [Textual perspective]. The other perspective looks at the influence of social context on the swimmer/water (reader/text transaction) [Social perspective].

The nature of swimmers' (readers') engagement or experiences with water (text) is the focus of another perspective [Experiential perspective]. Here, the swimmer (reader) identifies with characteristics of water (characters of text). Swimmers' (readers') subconscious or cognitive processes and how those processes vary according to both unique individual personality and developmental level is the center piece of another perspective [Psychological perspective]. Finally, swimmers' cultural roles, attitudes and values, as well the larger cultural historical context, shape the responses. [Cultural perspective].

Each of these perspectives illuminates only a particular facet of the swimmer/water (reader/text) transaction. Their common point, however, is that they are all focusing on the same process:

How swimmers (readers) create moves (meanings) (Beach, 1993).

The coach (teacher) needs to apply the five above-mentioned perspectives to plan activities for eliciting responses form swimmers (readers). The first and foremost prerequisite of swimming (reading) consist in a readiness which starts with a genuine composure, relaxation and equanimity (Knights).

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7

THE INTERPLAY OF PSYCHOLOGY OF LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE

Words and sentences and their assortment, their togetherness or differentiation, their modes of lingering and special proximity may all reveal how what is said is distinct from how that thing is said.

A sentence is the embodiment of a finite form of language with a particular tilt towards a particular perspective. In other words, a sentence is the demonstration of language where it contains, circumscribes, and yet liberates. If we look at a simple sentence, such as "The sky is blue," we see that the arrangement of the words, i.e., *the*, *sky*, *is* and *blue* in a particular order contains the elements of the very sentence and circumscribes their functions in a way so they cannot be as free as they were, namely when they were not molded in the framework of a sentence and were floating free in a dictionary or someone's mind. Before the framework of the sentence gives specific containment and circumscription to the freely floating words of the above mentioned sentence, those words could have the possibility of appearing in infinite forms, thus developing infinite sentences. They (those words) could also have had infinite meanings in infinite coatings, but the moment they constitute a configuration as a sentence, they lose the infinite direction that each could have gone for. They, therefore, become subjected to certain positions with certain roles and certain functions. Following is the picture of the sentence with the analysis of its fragments and pieces along with examples of other possibilities where the same words could have other functions, thus producing other sentences (Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, Sentence Configuration):



FIGURE 7.1 Sentence Configuration



FIGURE 7.2 Sentence Configuration



FIGURE 7.3 Sentence Configuration

There can be other forms of analyses of a sentence depending on our methodology and viewpoint in identifying the constituent(s) of our analysis. Following is an example:

> I think I should remind you, my friend, of a fact you seem to have forgotten. You are yourself one of the most splendid worlds to look at.

The structure REMIND + OBJECT + OF has two meanings. It is used to talk about remembering the past and also to say that something is similar to something else. The sentence exemplifies the first meaning. The verb "seem" can also be followed by either "to + simple form of the verb" or "to + the perfect infinitive." Also note the perfect infinitive in the following part. The agreement between the antecedent and the reflexive is also shown in the example.

The reflexives need an antecedent with which they agree with respect to the features of person, gender and number. The antecedent must not be too far away

from the reflexive. In a sense to be made more precise, the antecedent must be found in some local domain, the binding domain. The reflexive must be locally bound. According to the principle of reflexive interpretation, a reflexive must be bound in the minimal domain containing X, X's governor and an accessible subject/SUBJECT. So we cannot say "I talked to himself."

There can be hundreds of other sentences in simple, complex and compound forms where the initial fragments of the first sentence occupy varying positions and fulfill different functions from a noun phrase (NP) to an adjective clause where the NP can be one of its parts (e.g., "The girl, who gave me the peaches, came from the land of the sun"). Also the function of each piece or each constituent of the sentence can be extended in further analysis from being a common noun (e.g., bottle) or a concrete noun (e.g., cow) to a coordinating conjunction (e.g., and/but/nor/so) or a descriptive adjective (e.g., perfect in perfect marriage) or dynamic adjective (e.g., careful). This can be explicated ad infinitum depending on the constituent and its function in the sentence. (We can look at each constituent as what they can be in general according to a linguistic taxonomy and what they are in their actual appearance in a sentence.)

The point, here, is that before the constituents of a sentence have established a sentence, they can go anywhere and they can have potentially the bedrock for infinite sentences, but the moment they appear in a special construction of a sentence, they are circumscribed in that specific framework which gives them a special appearance. It is like wearing an outfit which is always associated with a special manifestation. In Saussurean terminology, the words in their freely floating expression are what he calls *langue*, namely the code—or the set of codes—on the basis of which a particular speaker or writer produces *parole* as a particular message. Once the constituents of a sentence or a clause (*regardless of the old controversy between a clause and a sentence*) bring about a configuration, they can no longer be indifferent towards a meaning in that it develops a certain, in Vygotsky's term, "sense" or, in Wittgenstein's words, a "language game." One might here say that if we look at each constituent, that is, each signifier, they have the same characteristic, viz. they cannot be anything except what they are in their particular mode (even before they come to a configuration known as a sentence) in spite of having multiplicity in their possibility of being multifarious. For example, a tree without serving as a fragment in a sentence such as "I like apple trees," can have the potentiality of bearing numerous meanings as a dictionary may cite. Nonetheless, a tree is not a cup so it already has its own circumscription even prior to being a part of a sentence where the actual circumscription is vividly perceptible. The answer to this argument is that tree (as long as it has not been used in a sentence) would refer to other signs within the semiotic system. In this sense, it (tree) is free in that it can be anything in its realm of possibilities, it can sit anywhere like a flying bird flying freely in the space. But the moment it sits somewhere, the condition changes, it takes up a direction. It occupies a certain space quite different from other spaces available for it. Again, some may argue and pose these questions: "If

this is the case, how come we can have multitudes of interpretation for a single sentence? Or how come we talk about ambiguity or equivocalness of sentences?" The answer needs to be sought in light of the production of a sentence, which according to Ricoeur (1991b), is the "basic unit of discourse" and for the same reason claims to "describe, express, or represent a world." People may, indeed, have disagreement or conflict with respect to how the sentence should represent or describe the subject matter of representation or expression. It is on the basis of similar considerations that Schiffrin (1987) talks about the key assumption about language (contextualization) which she takes to be central to discourse analysis. Among those assumptions she refers to the ever appearance of language in a context. (The subtle diagnosis, here, reveals that she talks about what Saussure discusses as *parole* and not *langue*.)

In the beginning of our argument, we mentioned that the sentence is liberating while it is containing. How come a sentence can be both incarcerating and yet liberating? It is incarcerating since it provides a certain direction. The moment we say, "The sky is blue," we have issued a judgment, logically speaking, where the predicate "blue" is attached to the subject "sky" thanks to a copula, that is, "is." We cannot get the negative connotation from the same sentence unless we change the affirmative mood to a negative mood, thus producing another configuration where the predicate is not predicated to the subject: "the sky is not blue." It is liberating since it liberates the signs from an indefinitely infinite suspension and gives them a special abode, albeit improper, weak, not eloquent, etc. In addition, it is the reflection of someone's psychological subjectivity in a certain period of time where perception, memory, association of ideas, cognition and many other complex psychological phenomena work and present their product towards a certain direction. It is for the same reason that discourse always refers to what Ricoeur (1991b) calls "its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators such as personal pronouns." It is, therefore, sound to say that any discourse generates addressee(s) for whom the discourse presents itself.

If we have the assumption that a sentence, being the basic unit of discourse, has a configuration in which the signs of X, Y, Z appear not any more as pure signs but with a reference to a world, we can show this as depicted in (Figure 7.4.):

The interesting point is that from the infinite signs, the speaker can make infinite instances of sentences where infinite discourses can be created. This is the inventive nature of language where the creation, invention, generation and production of form, content, configuration, appearance and modes can emerge as vast as possible. Although the grammar has its own prescription (prescriptive grammar, e.g., don't say "I've forgotten my umbrella at home," say "I've left my umbrella at home," or don't say "Everybody are ready" say "Everybody is ready"), infinite utterances can be made thanks to the inventive power of language, thus introducing infinite discourses. Structuralism, i.e., Russian Formalists, the Prague school, and the structuralism of Saussure, Levi-Strauss and Genette made an attempt to describe the codes and paradigms of language in a clear scientific way where



FIGURE 7.4 Sentence and Discourse

every piece can be named and known in a certain system and can be treated in light of its having certain characteristics. This, however, cannot and should not impede the process of creativity in language. Even if we accept that the paradigms are nothing but what structuralism has identified (something arguable by some), with the same paradigms, one can present the exquisiteness of language by producing exquisite sentences and offering creative discourses which may be quite unknown or uncommon to the established discourses. Language has the potentiality of being revealed, expressed, represented, described and presented in diversified ways. This is the key to opening up a multiplicity of discourses.

Having realized the creative power of language and its potentiality for offering manifold creative ways of expression, we may notice that each discourse has its own way of introduction in that it introduces certain ways of looking at something by presenting certain ways of thinking. Apart from the long discussion of thought and language and priority of one to the other one, one may say that any representation of language in a certain mode displays one way of thinking or possibilities of thinking in various ways. Let's look at concepts such as "the fourth dimension," "postmodernism," "free will," "cultural diversity," etc. Do these concepts, in their own contexts, not offer special discourses? Is it not the case that any new way of describing things, from atomic analysis of the world and gravity to metropolitan discussions of industry, brings about a new trace of discourses along with their corollaries?

It is because of the same specific nature of discourse that language is context-dependent, metaphorical and figurative. It does not successfully mirror complex circumstances. It is in this sense that Saljo (1990) says language does not reflect reality but "perspectivizes" it, that is, presents it in a special light. More than a half century ago, Wittgenstein (1963) pinpointed that we cannot take for granted

people's capacity in describing their interior realities or external conditions. Some (see, e.g., Van Maanen, 1979; Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000) even have questioned whether people actually have definite, unambivalent conceptions or values and attitudes which can be clearly and explicitly expressed at all.

Even if we comply with those who cast doubt about the explicitness of what people say or write in different situations and circumstances and therefore endorse the problematic nature of people's assertions about their own experiences, ideas, self-images, etc., because of being dependent on contexts and because of being affected by micro contexts and previously established influences, we still need to acknowledge the emergence of certain discourse(s), albeit unrealistic and problematic, with a special display.

The French linguist Emile Benveniste (1971) distinguishes between the linguistics of discourse and the linguistics of language. The phonological and lexical "sign" constitutes the basic unit of language, while the "sentence" is the basic unit of discourse. According to Ricoeur (1991), discourse is an "event" in that it consists in something happening. A dialectic of event and meaning is born from the linguistics of the sentence. The system of language is virtual and outside of time. Discourse is realized temporally and in the present. Benveniste mentions this as an "instance of discourse." Language as *langue* used by Ferdinand de Saussure or as schema used by Louis Hjelmslev, lacks a subject in that it does not refer to any one, it only refers to signs, whereas language as discourse refers back to "its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators, such as personal pronouns. We can say, in this sense, that the instance of discourse is self-referential" (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 145). Discourse as an event always carries someone along its creation, someone who speaks and expresses himself or herself. He/she who speaks creates the speech and this itself generates an occurrence, an event, a happening. Language as a system of signs only refers to itself in that signs relate to other signs and in this sense there is no subject, nor time, but discourse, which according to Ricoeur (1991, p. 145) refers to a "world that it claims to describe, express, or represent." This gives us something else and that is in language (if taken as signs) we only have the preparatory medium for conducting communication but all messages are exchanged in discourse. Therefore, in discourse we have not only a world that is described or represented or expressed, but also an "other," another person who is the addressee of the discourse. Discourse always has an interlocutor. Ricoeur then proposes that "if all discourse is realized as an event, all discourse is understood as meaning"(1991, p. 146). He, contrary to what it might seem, does not revert from the linguistics of discourse to the linguistics of language; he presents the articulation of event and meaning in the linguistics of discourse. Some might question and argue that if discourse, as Ricoeur says, exists only as a temporal and present instance of discourse, what happens to writing? If we fathom his analysis, this question can be properly answered since the instance of discourse acts differently in living speech than in writing. He refers to a "fleeting event" in the living speech in that no sooner has the event appeared than it disappears. The myth in Plato's *Phaedrus*

mentions that writing was given to men to "come to the rescue" of the event. In other words, discourse disappears. But this can be fixed by inscription. So the writing fixes not the event of speaking, but the "said" of speaking. Writing, therefore, is not the reflection of the event as event but is the "meaning of the speech event." "What we write, what we inscribe is the noeam of the speaking" (Ricoeur, 1991).

A language as discourse, therefore, always has an appearance because of its being or happening as a particular manifestation of a being, in the context of its own appearance. Language in this sense, i.e., discourse, is always about something. In his analysis of *Verstehen in Being and Time*, Heidegger says that what we understand first in a discourse is not another person but a project, that is, the outline of a new being-in-the-world. It is in line with this way of thinking about language and discourse that Wilhelm Von Humboldt mentions the great justification of language as the establishment of relation of man to the world.

The concept of discourse has been profusely presented in academic discussions across the social sciences, literary theory and philosophy. In the past decade, ideas about discourse have appeared in psychology in the context of discussions on the importance of language in shaping and constructing our understanding of the world we live in. Psychology's models, methods and paradigms were seriously and critically questioned in the 1970s, something that is considered as a crisis in psychology. According to Burman et al. (1996),

> mainstream psychology investigated its subject matter—people—as isolated individuals, rather than as members of special social and cultural practices. This impoverished view was made possible by psychology's failure to theorize language. The world was treated as a silent place (Parker, 1989). Psychology has failed to address the way discourses mark out positions for us as individuals within liberal democracies.
>
> *(p. 5)*

Burman et al. argue that psychology has failed to reflect on its own culturally privileged (White, Western) positions.

> In these ways psychological theory has severed individuals from social and institutional practices. Socially produced characteristics and relationships are treated as properties of individuals. Thus individuals can be treated as the originators of, or responsible for, the circumstances that they suffer. This accounts for the role of psychology in pathologizing those who fail to fit its norms.
>
> *(Burman et al., 1996, p. 5)*

Some (see, e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Shutter, 1991) may predominantly focus on the social aspect of discourse in which there is always an "other" or an

addressee to whom the locution of discourse is addressed. Some, such as Goffman (e.g., 1974, 1981), also centered on microanalytic frames of social interaction, including the use of language as a sign-vehicle in discourse. Such foci discuss the production or construction of meaning in its social aspect. The focus on discourse, in this sense, can mean a preoccupation, an engagement or a concern with "talk and texts as parts of social practices" (Potter, 1996). This special emphasis has given rise to discourse analysis as it is prevalent in social psychology and social sciences with its claim on rejection of a use of "realist methods in social science, which aims at mirroring extra-linguistic reality by finding patterns in empirical material" (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000). The rejection can be applied to both quantitative and qualitative methods.

Halliday (1964) discusses "field of discourse, mode of discourse and style of discourse." Later on he replaces the term "style" with "tenor." To him, these three variables serve as a conceptual framework for representing the social context as the semiotic environment in which people exchange meanings. (Recall Ricoeur's analysis of discourse and one of its characteristics, i.e., all messages are exchanged in discourse. Here, Halliday mainly focuses again on the social side within semiotics.) According to Halliday, field of discourse refers to "what is going on: to the area of operation of language." Mode of discourse refers to the "medium or mode of the language activity and the role played by the language activity in the situation." Style renamed as tenor, refers to "the relations among the participants."

It is not odd to say that discourse and discourse analysis are among the most controversial concepts in terms of definitions. The ambiguity of the field of discourse and particularly discourse analysis has generated many other discourses as vast as the number of definitions and interpretations. Brown and Yule (1983, p. 1) state that "the analysis of discourse, is necessarily, the analysis of language in use." Based on their definition, we obviously encounter the functions of linguistic forms in direct association and link with their application. To them, a functional perspective is preferable to a structural perspective of language. In line with this perspective, Stubbs (1983, p. 1) takes a similar perspective and introduces discourse analysis as something "concerned with language in use in social contexts, and in particular with interaction or dialogue between speakers." The roots of discourse analysis can be found in pragmatics as a field that looks at discourse analysis as "the study of the general conditions of the communicative use of language" (Leech, 1983). The roots can also be traced down to sociolinguistics (see, e.g., Baugh & Sherzer, 1984; Giglioli, 1972). In fact, discourse has been under the constant attention of sociology, anthropology, philosophy, social psychology and linguistics. In sociology, for example, ethnomethodology (which is indebted to Schutz, 1970) concentrates on the procedures of common sense used by individuals to construct social worlds. Here, discourse not only serves as one of the procedures but also includes a part of the social world under construction.

Apart from the differences of viewpoints or modes of explanation and justification, one may say that the common denominator of all the above discussions

and definitions of discourse is that discourse always has its own mode of appearance or emergence in that its production or creation introduces a special way of looking at or thinking about things (no matter whether right or wrong, complete or incomplete [and other value-laden judgments that one may issue regarding specific discourse]). For the sake of argument, we focus on the certain exclusive mode of representation and presentation as the salient characteristics of discourse. The emergence of discourse or its establishment may be similar to the arrival or presence of a being, say, a human being who has specific characteristics, idiosyncrasies and singularities which constitute him/her as being different from others. Discourse also has characteristics and it is exactly because of certain characteristics that we can notice the configuration of a discourse as distinct from other discourse(s). Thus, discourse is associated with the production or generation of a cluster of semantic, conceptual, structural, contextual, psychological, individual and social meanings. Depending on the area of focus and our selectivity, we may concentrate on one or several particular constituents of the configuration of discourse and present an analysis, hence creating another/other discourse(s).

At this point, I would like to propose four layers of analysis, namely, linguistic, psychological, philosophical and social analysis, for a discourse. I elaborate them one by one through examples.

The Linguistic Layer

We may take the sentence as the basic unit of discourse, as Ricoeur takes it, or we may consider the discourse as something above the clause or above the sentence as Stubbs does. In either case, we can look at the constituents of the configuration of discourse in its constitutive aspect, whether we look at the structure or we focus on the function. Let's look at the following famous example and show this: "I have promises to keep/And miles to go before I sleep" (Robert Frost, 1923, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," cited in Kennedy & Gioia, 1998).

We have here a sentence with different linguistic units: "I" as the subject which appears in the personal pronoun form; "have" as the main verb with its simple present form which demonstrates a certain tense. It also serves as a transitive verb in that it needs an object as we see the presence of an object right afterward to meet the need of the verb, so to speak; "miles" as a plural noun which acts here as an object for the verb "have," followed by an infinitive "to go." We have "and" in continuation of the sentence as a conjunction which conjoins different parts of this sentence to one another. (From the perspective of discourse analysts such as Schiffrin (1987), who focus on discourse markers, "and" is considered a discourse marker.) "Promises" appears as another constitutive part of the sentence but not in the form of a verb (such as, "he promises to go") but in the form of a noun and plural noun at that. Right after this noun, we see the appearance of another verb with its simple form as an infinitive that again serves as a transitive verb and needs the object. Interestingly enough, it may seem that the object, i.e., "promises" has



FIGURE 7.5 Linguistic Analysis

preceded the verb "keep," contrary to the first part of the sentence which displays the object after the verb viz. "have miles." (Another creativity of the form along with the creativity of the content!) So in one level we have the object "miles" for the verb "have", but in another level we notice "miles to go" as the object for the verb "have" as we have "promises to keep" as another object for the verb "have". (Independently, of course, "promises" can serve as an object for the verb "keep".) (See Figure 7.5.)

Our linguistic analysis of the sentence can be extended further should we plan to scrutinize the other linguistic relations, whether structurally or functionally, within the same sentence. The "anaphor" "I" for instance can be looked into from different linguistic points of view. The above analysis is just one instantiation of the analysis within the linguistic framework.

The Psychological Layer

Our analysis of the psychological layer can focus on variegated psychological aspects. We can address questions, such as: What is the relationship of the "self-concept" in the entire actualization of the articulation? Does the overtone of the sentence, especially with the reference to the verb, not suggest an assertive attitude associated with a positive self-esteem? Can we argue that the poet in saying what he has said has given us a description of who he is or a definition of who he is or maybe both? (self-concept, identity) (Baumeister, 1987). What does the future perspective embedded in the poem purport? (The poem talks about the implementation of something in the future, namely "miles to go and promises to keep.") Does it suggest something deterministic or something optional? Why does the first part, i.e., "promises to keep," precede the second part, "miles to go"? Is this an indication of a correlation, a prioritizing or a causal relationship? Or it may be a mere production of the unconscious subliminal messages involving certain cognitive plans or structures for organizing the experience and guiding the action. (This may get us into the psychoanalytical perspectives.) We need to seriously pay attention to the element of "situatedness" in our analyses, in that in each of our analyses we need to look at the context in which the saying or locution is enunciated to figure out the implications. This suggests that we need to go

beyond the sentence and look at other marginal, affective, associative meanings in addition to the "core meaning" of the text. Our psychological analysis can also be further elaborated depending on the intensity of our dialectical relationship with the psychological implications of the sentence as well as our selective approaches in offering a psychological and psychoanalytical analysis (e.g., behaviorist, cognitive, psychodynamic, etc.).

The Philosophical Layer

Our philosophical analysis can begin looking at the discourse from different points of view. In a very rudimentary way, we see the acknowledgement of "I" as the first ontological endorsement of agency in serving the function of a philosophical subject. In other words, the existence of an "I" is already substantiated by virtue of the imputation of things which cannot ontologically exist without a reference to an entity which can take the position of a philosophical subject. We also notice the acknowledgement of epistemological aspects by the confirmation of the subject's report of "miles to go" and "promises to keep" as the subject matter of the clearly stated appendices and designation of the epistemologically identified categories.

In looking into our philosophical analysis, we inevitably encounter our logical analysis too, since the locution as exteriorized in its configuration has generated a proposition in which we can identify the imputation of a predicate to a subject. Furthermore, our configuration, as it were, suggests an affirmative relationship versus a negative relationship where the predicate is taken away from the subject.

In the ontological level, the question can be further investigated: whether the "I" as the subject behind the action or decision making process exists in a different way prior to decision making, or the "I" is somehow identified with what it chooses to do in that it converges with the undertaking. Our philosophical analysis can also be expounded and can concentrate on multifarious questions.

The Social Layer

Our social analysis, in fact, is the extension of our psychological analysis with special emphasis on the social aspect of discourse. The first thing we may find out is that behind any discourse, there is a reference to an "other" (something that we already discussed in the presentation of Ricoeur's theory of discourse). In other words, the locution is addressed to someone or some people as it describes, represents or expresses something about a world. The "other" can be the speaker or the author himself/herself, even if we exclude everybody else. Therefore, a dialogical relationship is inherently born within any discourse that the speaker or the author says or writes, and in doing that he/she has an addressee to whom the locution returns. This can also indicate something else, too, and that is the recognition that

the speaker or the writer gets by pouring out what he/she cannot keep inside in an unexteriorized manner.

From the early stages of life, when the child starts the first locution, thus bringing his/her own discourse, we can see the element of an "other" in the process of his/her saying. Piaget (1923) suggested that the young child has "egocentric speech." We often hear the egocentric speech in young children when they are engaged in playing or they are about to sleep. This is tantamount to a kind of monologue. Piaget suggested that the most primitive forms of thought are "autotistic," namely the unconscious desires, wants, wishes or fantasies which cannot be conveyed and communicated by language. Their first appearance occurs in the young child in the form of egocentric speech.

Piaget distinguished socialized speech from egocentric speech. The function of socialized speech, according to him, is communication with others, whereas egocentric speech does not serve to communicate with others, but is just a means for fulfillment of the immediate needs of the child. To him, the child cannot understand the viewpoint of the listener, or cannot understand that he/she has even one listener. Therefore, the egocentric speech is centered on the self. According to Piaget, socialized speech replaces the egocentric speech as the child develops.

Vygotsky (1962) argued that all speech is "communicative" and socialized. The socialized aspect of the speech in a child emanates from the child's endeavor to respond to the language of adults around him/her. His experiments indicated that the child was less likely to use egocentric speech in circumstances where there was nobody around him/her. On the contrary, the child's use of egocentric speech considerably happens in the presence of somebody in the room. Egocentric speech, Vygotsky argues, is just one manifestation of communicative speech in which the child tries to conceive for himself/herself his/her environment in the course of his/her exploration of it. He almost agreed with Piaget that egocentric speech disappears, but to Vygotsky it does not die away. It, in fact, turns into "inner speech," namely the language in the mind, so the egocentric speech becomes internalized, serving and interacting with the thought process.

The listener or the reader who can be the addressee of the locution may find the locution purely referential in a very simple communicative mode or he/she may find the locution as something that, in Shotter's (1993) words, "moves us in the sense of morally repositioning us in relation to our own situation, so that we come to re-see it in a new perspective."

The social analysis of discourse can inform us of the power of discourse, the influence of language on thought. (I will elaborate, later, on the relationship of thought and language and their impact on one another.) From a social point of view, which can obviously and inseparably be linked to education, the discourse may not necessarily entail something new with respect to the form of exteriorization but it, indeed, offers us something new with respect to its role and function, in Wittgenstein's terms, in reminding us of something about ourselves. Shotter's words are helpful here to cite: " It breaks the flow of our mundane thoughts and

interests, and, in contrasting with them, confronts us afresh with a new realization, a consideration, an occasion, perhaps for a revaluation of our lives" (Shotter, 1993, p. 123).

Our analysis of the social layer of discourse can also be explicated in light of a selective look at multifaceted social characteristics of a discourse. The least social dimension is the involvement of the audience (listener or reader) with the reality of a text as something which has already appeared. This involvement is a dialectical process that can enhance and flourish in view of the explorations. The involvement, though initially stimulated by the discourse, can be actively upgraded in a more enriching aspect owing to a productive background of the audience.

Our layers of analysis are inexorably tied to one another so they can have a simultaneous operation without necessarily going through a hierarchical synchronization or a prioritizing stage.

The question, here, in the realm of language education is: how can language educators introduce various modes of expression and diversified discourses if they are already contained only in some recognized ways of presentation? How can language educators enrich the discourse of education if they are not creatively questioning the existing discourses? How can language educators produce and generate numerous ways of looking at things and thinking about things if their own mode of thinking cannot go beyond the mundane ways of looking embedded in ordinary discourses? If the reservoir of language educators be replete with strictly determined ways of articulation, how can their discourses be brimming with exteriorization of creative epitomes outside those deterministic ways? How can discourses of creativity be offered if the examples and reflection of discourse have already been entrapped by the passive tone of obedience to only prescribed ways of saying as formulated in a certain educational system?

When you say or write something, whatever you say or write, your saying or writing is presented in a special way. It appears in a special mode, complexion, countenance, façade, and expression. It may cavort, glide, fly, drift, coast, float, slide, slip, lark, stagger, stumble, stutter, splutter, roll, run, sail, soar, glissade, glimmer, twinkle, shimmer, glow, glitter and flicker. It expresses itself in one way or another. This is discourse.

Let's look at some examples to see how words are poured into texts, contexts, how language displays its expression in frameworks, settings, and how language shows its being as both an expression and an event. (Some dear souls might already suggest no further exemplification since the contextualized locution, so far, unfolds the instantiation of discourse.)

The following conversation between two four-year-old children was recorded in a playroom situation:

Girl: [on toy telephone] David!
Boy: [not picking up second phone] I'm not home.
Girl: When you'll be back?

Boy: I'm not here already.
Girl: But when you'll be back?
Boy: Don't you know if I'm gone already, I went before so I can't talk to you!
(Miller, 1981, p. 115)

Now, let's look at another form of discourse where language glides and larks with a special rhythm and nuance. We look at Immanuel Kant's (1998, pp. 338–339) *Critique of Pure Reason,* "The Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgement (Analytic of Principles)" Third Chapter, "On the Ground of Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena":

> We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, and determined the place for each thing in it. This land, however, is an island and enclosed in unalterable boundaries by nature itself. It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands and, ceaselessly deceiving with empty hopes the voyager looking around for new discoveries, entwine him in adventures from which he can never escape and yet also never bring to an end. But before we venture out on this sea, to search through all its breadth, and become certain of whether there is anything to hope for in it, it will be useful first to cast yet another glance at the map of the land that we would now leave, and to ask, first, whether we could not be satisfied with what it contains, or even must be satisfied with it out of necessity, if there is no other ground on which we could build; and, second, by what title we occupy even this land, and can hold it securely against all hostile claims. Although we have already adequately answered these questions in the course of the analytic, a summary overview of their solutions can still strengthen conviction by unifying their various moments in one point.

Now let's watch another form of discourse being considered as nonstandard according to prescriptive grammar. The following sentence belongs to a classic movie, *I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang*: "I ain't do nothing."

All the above-mentioned examples offer the embodiment, crystallization, actualization and expression of language in specific modes, namely certain discourses which display a particular representation or presentation.

Non-Ordinary Language

The taxonomy of ordinary versus non-ordinary is not to propound a dichotomy, a binary or an either-or border. It rather discusses the range of possibilities within discourses in terms of their oscillation, their capacity and their incorporation. In this sense, it reveals the leap, the shift and the capacity of soaring the magnitude

of expressiveness and the openness of components of discourse, thus allowing everyone to experience this elevation.

How can language extend itself to its very limits, thus discovering new reverberations and resonances within itself? How can the possibility be open in creating and inventing new discourses instead of getting stranded within one actualized way of discourse? How can meaning be generated and regenerated within language? How can language teach us new ways of thinking, and formulate new ways of experiencing? How can the creation of meaning, hence creating new worlds to look at, be possible through the inventive power of language?

To Ricoeur, "it is the task of poetry to make words mean as much as they can and not as little as they can" (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 449). Therefore, the capacity of enlarging, increasing, enhancing and augmenting the meanings in language can be done by poetry. Here, we see a new horizon of possibilities where new looks at things, and new ways of thinking, can emerge. These possibilities can open up new worlds where we can, in Heidegger's word, "dwell." It may be in line with the same perspective that Gadamer mentions that we don't just try to conceive and understand what is in the poem but to reach the kind of world to which the poem belongs or which it projects and displays. In and through poetry, one may say, language can be liberated from the constrictions of ordinary discourse, and new layers of reality can be revealed.

In "The Meaning of Meaning," I.A. Richards (1923), in discussing the language of poetry, lays emphasis on the element of being "emotive" versus being "symbolic" as a distinction of the language of poetry. On talking about the distinction of the language of poetry, he does not consider truth or falsehood as the primary determinants of the language of poetry. Rather, he focuses on the evocative function as the main fundamental constituent of such language.

> Very much poetry consists of statements, symbolic arrangements capable of truth or falsity but for the sake of the attitudes which their acceptance will evoke. For this purpose it fortunately happens, or rather it is part of the poet's business to make it happen, that the truth or falsity matters not at all to the acceptance. Provided that the attitude or feeling is evoked the most important function of such language is fulfilled, and any symbolic function that the words may have is instrumental only and subsidiary to the evocative function.
>
> *(Richards, 1923, p. 150)*

Swanger (1990) abides by a similar approach and in "Response to Poetry" states that poetry may not consist of a right or wrong language.

While the above analysis of poetry can present one salient of poetry, the language of poetry, however, cannot be limited to only evocative function. The evidence in this regard can be born from a huge series of poetry in different

languages which demonstrate other major functions in addition to the emotive and evocative function. In the Arabic and Persian (Farsi) languages, for example, there are innumerable examples of works of poetry where very deep philosophical or even logical arguments, discussion, viewpoints and perspectives are presented. Numerous books of philosophy, logic and metaphysics have been written in strictly explicit poetic language. Among the salient ones, one can refer to *Jallaleddin Rumi, Hafez, Sa'adi, Attar, Ghaznavee, Qa'ani*, etc. Following are some examples to illustrate the point (translations are mine):

> So the heart would be as a substance and the world as an accident
> How can the shadow of the heart serve as the goal for the heart?
>
> *(Jallaleddin Rumi)*

> Although my heart made much haste in this desert,
> It did not know a single hair, but took to hair splitting.
> In my heart shone a thousand suns,
> Yet, it never discovered completely the nature of a single atom.
>
> *(Ibn Sina (Avicenna))*

> Oh, You who bestowed upon wisdom,
> All forms of gratitude and appreciation are ultimately yours.
>
> *(Hadee Sabzevaree)*

Eastern ways of thinking have not limited rationality and forms of discourse in some recognized ways of expression but have acknowledged numerous modes of thought associated with numerous forms of discourse for the presentation of rationality.

The above-mentioned examples indicate that poetry can also be used as a language which presents not only evocative and emotive messages but very deep fundamental philosophical points and perspectives. For instance, the terms substance and accident in Rumi's poem above are used in purely philosophical contexts. Rumi's poems are brimming with philosophical discussions. The assumption that poetry enters the scene when the intellect gets feeble needs to be seriously reconsidered. Therefore the subject matter of poetry can be as vast as possible (to use Leggo's (1998) word, "capacious") covering infinite realms while revealing worlds for dwelling.

In the English language too, one can see, for instance, Immanuel Kant's complex reaction against the extreme Cartesian rationalism. Kant discusses the problem of the "sublime," exploring numerous issues in poetic aesthetics. Following Kant, a number of thinkers continued exploring the language of poetry in their works, revealing the application of this discourse as an effective yet inventive way of examining everything. Johann Gottfried von Herder (1774–1803) enormously inspired by Kant, proposed that the language of poetry is a psychological necessity.

His writings and thinking had a great influence on Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) "whose clear perception of linguistic relativism is scattered through his writings. He who doesn't know a foreign language, knows nothing of his own" (Friedrich, 1986). These and related ways of thinking also had an influence on leaders of English Romanticism such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1832) who studied in Germany and communicated with Wordsworth, Shelley, and other "shapers of what was a fundamentally new world view" (Friedrich, 1986).

Almost simultaneous with the formulation of new ideas in questioning the paradigm of language by Franz Boas (1858–1924), Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) propounded a philosophy in which language was considered the essence of intellectual and emotional values, asserting that language was to a large extent poetry. (I will, later, discuss two dramatically different perspectives on the precedence of literal or figurative meaning in the mind, thus covering a perspective which strongly believes that the language of mind is essentially poetic.) Along with the same emphasis, we notice the attack on the foundations of linguistic positivism and positivistic semantics by thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1899–1951) who revisited the relation of thought, language and reality.

While introducing the perspective on linguistic relativism and poetic indeterminacy, Friedrich (1986) pinpoints the existence of different worlds within the heart of different languages, noting that "it is persons with experience of foreign languages and poetry who feel most acutely that a natural language is a different way not only of talking but of thinking and imagining and of emotional life" (Friedrich, 1986, p. 16). Whether at the individual, sociocultural, or some universal level, language is "inherently, pervasively, and powerfully poetic" (Friedrich, 1986, p. 17).

Questioning the distinction between literal and figurative meaning, Gibbs (1995) uses ideas and research from psychology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and literary theory and argues that mind has a poetic structure. His findings overturn the traditional perspective which holds that thought and language are inherently literal. Describing the traditional view of mind as a "mistake," Gibbs (1995) argues that human cognition is fundamentally shaped by various poetic or figurative processes. The traditional view of the mind, he argues, has "imposed limitations on the scholarly study of mental life in cognitive science and the humanities and on every day folk conceptions of human experience" (Gibbs, 1995). Pinpointing the failure of lexical semantics in its traditional accounts and assumptions, he argues that

> meanings of many polysemous words can be explained in terms of basic metaphors that motivate, among other things, the transfer of English vocabulary from the domain of physical motion and object manipulation and location (e.g. stand in its physical sense) to various social and mental domains (e.g. stand in he took a stand on the matter).
>
> *(Gibbs, 1995)*

In his discussion of poetics, Aristotle refers to all kinds of making in terms of language, both in fiction and poetry. Ricoeur (1991) argues that "through this recovery of the capacity of language to create and re-create, we discover reality itself in the process of being created. So we are connected with this dimension of reality which is unfinished."

Speaking on the role of metaphor and the process of becoming for language, Ricœur (1991) describes the language of poetry and its significant role: "language in the making celebrates reality in the making." Making a distinction between the language of ordinary speech and the language of poetry in dealing with reality, he remarkably presents a very striking characteristic of ordinary language versus the language of poetry: "And the rest of our language in ordinary speech and so on has to do with reality as it is already done, as it is finished, as it is there in the sense of the closedness of what is, with its meaning which is already asserted by the consensus of wise people" (Ricœur, 1991).

The discourse of poetry is an inventive discourse that cannot and does not need to remain within the confirmation and endorsement of ordinary discourse where relation, imputation and assertion need to be made in light of some strictly predefined formulations. The language and discourse of poetry recklessly goes beyond the borders of considerations and prescriptions. It opens new ways of considerations, new ways of looking and new ways of thinking. This is one of the most conspicuous features of the language of poetry: not relying on the existing ways of looking and thinking while introducing new and exquisite ways of reflecting on reality, beings and things. The discourse of ordinary language needs to have the approval of specific forms of presentation, whereas the discourse of poetic language creates and invents new forms based on the production of new configurations.

Structuralism from Russian formalists, the Prague school, and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and Genette made considerable contribution in offering an exact scientific description of the codes and paradigms of language. Creative expressivity and inventive expression of consciousness cannot be codified in that we cannot limit the expressiveness and variety of thinking to several identified ways. This is mainly because of the complexity of human production of new ways of expressing, new ways of looking at things and new ways of thinking about, or on things. Here we see the element of being unanticipated in the heart of the language of poetry; the discourse of poetry, contrary to the discourse of ordinary speech, is not predictable. This lack of predictability is in direct contact with the idiosyncrasy of movedness and connectedness to the open possibilities of the world, continuously and constantly. In other words, the language of poetry, as one example of the non-ordinary discourse, links the perceiver to the open understanding of happenings in an unrestricted way. Let's use an analogy to get the point across more clearly. You are passing by scenery where towering trees and plush greenness have brought an inexpressibly amazing spectacular panorama and as you lark along the rims of the pathway, you also smell the redolence of a breeze gently rippling through

everything under the shimmering sunlight and you also get saliently impressed by the imminently looming vista displaying an esoteric, arcane and recondite dispersion of an exclusively unique shade where the sunlight ceases to flaunt its piercing footprint: an ineffably bedazzling combination of the light with the smoothness of the shade under the trees where the genuflection of the trees' appendages have powerfully enriched the ornament colorfulness. There are different ways you can approach the described presence around you. One is to hastily pass and just consciously get the minimum compulsory sensory stimuli because of being vehemently preoccupied with mundane and quotidian occupiers, from paying a bill and fixing a flat tire to gathering the thoughts on recapitulation of the agenda in a meeting, etc. Quite differently, one may openly experience the presence of what was described as meticulous, perceptive, perspicacious and comprehensive as possible. This open encounter with the reality allows the perceiver to examine the surrounding and its appurtenances ubiquitously. Every breath would be taken in with a penetrating cogitation and every feeling would be associated with a sharp concentration on the analysis of the inward and outward flux of happenings. The observer proactively takes it upon himself/herself to inquire into the process of crystallization of the happenings in his/her sphere of understanding, thus getting the experience intertwined with his/her exteriorization in enunciating the experience. The former is similar to the ordinary discourse and the latter to the non-ordinary discourse such as the poetic discourse. As the analogy may suggest, the first way is constricted in its preventive parameters, i.e., the previous preoccupation with things that stop the open experiencing of the experience to the effect that the preoccupation serves as an impediment since it tends to preserve the already engaging prompts, namely the previously crafted needles of stimulation in the arena of mind, whereas the second encounter tends to explore the new appearance of reality as it spreads itself out in kaleidoscopic facets. It is good, again, here to remember Aristotle's concept of *entelecheia*, the potentiality to see things in terms of potentialities and not in terms of actualities. One may say that the poetic discourse is a discourse that does not shut down any door to look at realities and offers the possibilities of opening infinite windows to look at things. Poetry, therefore, gives rise to the fusion of ideas and perspectives in an explosion-like production of meanings satiated and soaked in inventive encounters with the realities.

What could prevent, in our analogy, the orchestration of a poetic discourse is the excessive preoccupation that is characterized by virtue of the interference of memory. In other words, memory acts like a blocking bunker in the way of the openly inventive investigation by projecting certain elements of engagement and highlighting their priority, precedence and identification, hence displaying mappings which sound of high prominence and attention in comparison with other things. That's why, if the passerby is asked why he/she overlooked and ignored a look into or an attention at the surroundings, he/she may indicate that there were other more important things to attend to! Another factor may be a culture which crops up consciously and unconsciously in inhibiting the promotion of a poetic discourse. People may be so obsessed with special indoctrination and insinuation

that they keep themselves away from looking into realities beyond the ordinary discourse since the ordinary discourse may have got them entangled in particular engagements and concerns so stridently that they summarize, synopsize, condense and encapsulate the whole world into the subject matters of insinuation and intimation. (The role of mass media in instigating, generating and prompting these insinuations needs to be taken into consideration here.)

To look further into the discourse of poetry as an indication of non-ordinary discourse, let's look at the following piece of poetry as the opening lines of "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" from T.S. Eliot:

> Let us go then, you and I,
> When the evening is spread out against the sky
> Like a patient etherized upon a table;

If we look at each separate constituent of this piece, we see lexical signs that have often appeared in ordinary discourse, too. Nonetheless, the integration of all the constitutive parts of this piece in their present configuration has developed, certain aesthetic and conceptual uniqueness that carries along a special impact on the audience producing particular playfulness along with certain thoughtfulness. As the interaction theory of metaphor suggests, a creation of similarity can happen in a metaphor and understanding metaphor does not simply lay emphasis on some preexisting but unnoticed aspects of the meaning or relationship of similarity (Black, 1955, 1962, 1979, 1981).

When looked at separately, the relationship between the evening, sky, and an etherized patient may be too far to be tied to. The mapping of ordinary discourse gives the licensure to pass only certain paths. (Examples: Hey, look at the sky, Good Evening, the patient is in the hospital, this needs to be etherized.) The poet, however, creates and explores new relationships where a novel perspective on things, i.e., the evening and the sky, is presented. This art of establishing and shaping newlywed relationships between or among concepts by depicting and portraying new dimensions of a similarity or illustrating a novel contrast would constitute one of the main characteristics of poetic language and discourse.

Language of poetry, therefore, does not borrow its underlying components from the prescribed fixed sources of enactment the way the ordinary discourse does. Language of poetry conducts a reflection on novel and new-sprung modes of thinking while seeking exquisitely artistic and superb relationships among or inside the myriad of realities.

Ricoeur (1991) discusses the creativity of language in relation to the objective linguistic codes. He claims that:

> My philosophical project is to show how human language is inventive despite the objective limits and codes which govern it, to reveal the diversity and potentiality of language which the erosion of the everyday, conditioned by technocratic and political interests, never ceases to obscure. To

> become aware of the metaphorical and narrative resources of language is to recognize that its flattened or diminished powers can always be rejuvenated for the benefit of all forms of language usage.
>
> *(Ricoeur, 1991, p. 465)*

Examining the meaning of creativity in language and its relationship to the codes, structures, or laws imposed by language, Ricoeur argues that:

> Linguistic creativity constantly strains and stretches the laws and codes of language that regulate it. Roland Barthes described these regulating laws as 'fascist' and urged the writer and critic to work at the limits of language, subverting its constraining laws, in order to make way for the free movement of desire, to make language festive. But if the narrative order of language is replete with codes, it is also capable of creatively violating them. Human creativity is always in some sense a response to a regulating order. The imagination is always working on the basis of already established laws and it is its task to make them function creatively, either by applying them in an original way or by subverting them; or indeed both-what Malraux calls 'regulated deformation'. There is no function of imagination, no imaginary, that is not structuring or structured, that is not said or about—to-be said in language. The task of hermeneutics is to charter the unexplored resources of the to-be-said on the basis of the already said. Imagination never resides on the unsaid.
>
> *(Ricoeur, 1991, pp. 470–471)*

This philosophical presentation of creativity in language can have significant consequences for language learning and language education since it rigorously suggests that the approach towards language can develop a difference in application as well. In other words, one can use the same lexical signs and signifiers of the ordinary language and change them creatively, thus introducing new signifieds on the strength of new signifiers.

We are so drastically attuned to our habits of being soaked in the ordinary discourse and our thoughts are so strictly geared to the lava of ordinary ways of expressivity that we rarely think about being expressive in ways other than the seemingly recognized ways. The point is not to enlarge the magnitude of formalities for saying or to extend the latitude for bombast of saying; the point is the demonstration of the crucial impact of various sayings on the thinking and the introduction of new ways of thinking by virtue of new ways of saying. It is in our languages that we construct the reality of ourselves and everything around us. If this language cannot go beyond what it has been customarily insinuated to do, the reality will not be anything except what it ordinarily means to be, or what it is allowed to be. But if the language can question the existing parameters and paradigms, it will develop new ways of looking and thinking, albeit new paradigms again. The reality, therefore, is not going to be what it used to be.

The non-ordinary discourse of poetry has this capacity to invent, to create and to initiate new ways of looking at the world, new ways of contacting things, and new ways of thinking about the existence not as displayed in the taxonomy of the ordinary discourse but beyond that.

Let's look at the following piece to see how the objectified signs of language can violate the habits of identification as prescribed by the ordinary language:

Gourmet Restaurant

I am sitting in a restaurant
In the city of contemplation
Dining philosophy and psychology
With just a bit of analysis.
I am going to order some poetry
For dessert.
I look at every one.
Some are making a pig of themselves
With positivism,
Others are scarfing out a whole load of behaviorism.
They are gulping down Watson and Skinner.
At the corner, some are avidly having phenomenology with
Isomorphism.
Down across the hall,
Some are mixing Zeigarnick effect
With Horney's basic anxiety.
What a combination!

Oh, I see the waitress carrying a tray
Full of slip of tongues,
Tropism,
Positive transference.
She freely associates with every one.

She is wearing Leibnitz's limen of Consciousness,
You can see her monadology
From behind her skirt.
The way she walks cannot change your perceptual constancies.
The guy on the other side is salting his
Phi phenomenon.
I hear the lady on the left side:
"Waitress, may I have some
Titchener's structuralism?"
"Of course. How would you like that Ma'am?"
"Medium with stimulus error"!
"Are you sure? It is not good for your health."

"Don't care a pin. I'm gonna have a blast."
I overhear them and I am flummoxed.

Oh, I see the sign, Today's Special:
Determinism with reductionism.
A lady is striking a match.
She is puffing out I. A. Richards' tenor.
She is wearing a lipstick of reference-symbol-referent.
Yet you could see Kenneth Burke's abstraction in her countenance
When she smiles.

She is sitting in the smoking isle
Of systematic experimental introspection.
On a big table over there, there are ten men and women ordering
collective unconscious with archetypes of anima and animus on the sides.
They are all wearing suits of personas!
They are going to have personal unconscious for the starter.

Oh, I am parched with thirst.
I need to refill my glass.
I've had Wundt, Piaget, Freud, and Erickson.
I am chewing on Kant's transcendence.
"Waitress. Is there some pure water of cognition?"
I'm afraid we're out of it.
Oh. I am parched with thirst.

I need some fresh air.

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8

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

Ontology discusses existence, being and presence. It offers an existential response to what is and what is not.

Even in the most pregnant pauses where the silence strikingly reigns, language presents itself and its presence is indispensably linked to the formation of thought, expressiveness of intention and delivery of communication. This understanding of language is not limited to the description of language as a system of signs where the codes or signs identify themselves in a system of signs. Rather, this understanding of language goes beyond the identification and establishment of signs and incorporates meaning making and sense making not only in verbal aspect, but in any process of thought formation, from concept making and statement production to the most cryptic inner voices where language and languaging are proactively present. Hence, language, here, can be taken in its broadest sense which includes any sort of signification regardless of its exteriorization as an utterance and or its happening in a nonverbal form.

Language is not only a means for conducting communication and meeting the needs of daily lives, but is a presentation of a being. Language, in this sense, consists in disclosing and unfolding certain manifestations of being. It is a demonstration of one's character in that it presents certain ways of existence, and special ways of being in the world. The unveiling of that with which we live is permitted by language. Language education, in this case, dramatically differs from the consideration of language as a tool, since, in this sense, language education introduces new ways of being in the world. Along with language education in this sense, the ways of being can change and when ways of being change, ways of one's demonstration and one's character can also change. Language cannot be separated from the person in whom language is crystallized. Language consists in a way that human beings encounter the world. Our being is experienced in language.

Language allows us to reveal that with which we live. Thus language education, in this sense, can offer new ways of encountering the world, and new ways of being in the world.

In this sense, language shapes our life. If the representation of language is circumscribed in narrow and parochial ways, it cannot represent anything but a confined package of presentations defined and prescribed by dominant discourses. Movement, in the limited interpretation of language, is permitted as far as the limiting representatives of language endorse. Consequently, obligations are generated from within the same limiting representations as to what should be done and what should not. If understanding towards language changes, the representations of language as well as the presentation of language would emerge in a new perspective which can accordingly offer new horizons and open up new realms of consideration in both private and public education (see for instance, Herda, 1999).

The pervasive influence of language in organizing our experiences, and shaping our being and becoming demonstrates the overarching influence of language in our personhood and selfhood. Language, in this sense, determines what we notice and what we remember. A shift in language in this respect would generate a shift in our definitions, our analyses, our thinking and our behavior. The question of language and language education, therefore, goes back to a question of epistemology and ontology. If our epistemological and our ontological propositions have already blocked our ways and restrained our exegesis of language, our language education is ineluctably bound in the same restrictions. The exteriorization of our thoughts in the context of enunciation and articulation in our languages (the appearance of our thinking in what we say) propounds the dynamics of the mutual relationship between thinking and language in that the expressiveness and presentation of our languages would demonstrate at least our ability to transfer our inner voices. Therefore, what is uttered can be in some form of relationship (not necessarily a cause and effect relationship) with the modes of thinking. Although the question of the indication of thought by language is still a controversial question with polemical responses, our languages open up the ways for exploring our thoughts. Total rupture of language in its fundamentally profound meaning would be tantamount to disconnection and severance of any human activity.

If language is so powerfully delineating our lives and if we are shaped through and by the languages we use and we are told to use, how can language education use language to open up the possibilities for a better life, a better living and a better education? How can language education help us shape our lives through languages we choose to use rather than being shaped by the languages we are subscribed to use? If thinking can be improved through stimulation of our languages to bring new expressivity of what is around us, about us, beside us, for us, etc., what can language education do to improve both language and thinking?

As Ricoeur's discussion of language and discourse (1991) indicates, the manifestation of language in a sentence gives rise to discourse. Thus the sentence can be considered as the focus of creativity where meanings can be born and the

burgeoning meanings open up new worlds. It is in line with these openings that the understanding and thinking can be transposed through a shift from merely focusing on actualities to looking at and in the possibilities and potentialities. Discourses, thus, are events and report of an open process of mediation between mind and the world. It is in this process and through this process that human mind and the world, man and reality are formed and shaped. Expressiveness is inevitably linked to the emergence of discourse to the effect that any appearance of expressivity generates its own discourse. The dialectic of the expressed and the unexpressed exhibit their conspicuity in discourse. One may create infinite creations through the finite means of language.

Ordinary language concentrates on communication, the familiar ways of explanation and description to convey information from one person to the other. The goal of ordinary language, here, is to deliver messages concerning concrete situations being tied up in our daily lives. Ordinary language essentially tends to reduce polysemy, which is the potential creativity contained in the word. In polysemy, words have the capacity to mean more than one thing. Ordinary language relies on univocity and cleverly reducing the ambiguities (Examples: I need a cab. How much does this cost? What time is it?).

The non-ordinary language cultivates polysemy and manifests itself in narrative and poetry and poetic narrative. Language here constitutes a world of its own. Mimesis is not a copying of reality, but a redescription in light of a heuristic fiction that is to the attempt to redescribe things while searching for many possibilities. Poetry, in this sense, reaches the essence of things. Contrary to Western ways of thinking, poetry is not just a means for evoking feelings and emotions but it can present fundamentally philosophical propositions. There are numerous examples in Eastern philosophy that have been composed in the form of poetry. Also, German romantic folklorists were among the first to propose the concept of the universality of poetry and poetic language, a universality in which they included stories (see, Ha'iri, 1992, for instance).

There are solid arguments and demonstrations that indicate rationality is too significant to be identified with a single technology. Poetry and narratives can be taken into account as embodying distinctive forms of language and thought and can demonstrate the reflective forms of discourse. Here language has to be interpreted not only because words are symbols and signs, but also because discourse is fundamentally the interpretation of reality. That means what we utter in one way or the other or what we are subscribed to say defines our realities.

If poetic language can awaken the moments of thoughtfulness and can allow the piercing contemplation, how can language education use the poetic and narrative language to foster creativity of thought and fluency of expressiveness among people, especially language learners? If an image is understood as more than a residue of an impression and if imagination is cherished as the place of nascent meanings and categories, and if imagination is understood not only in terms of receptiveness but also in terms of productivity, then language can be

well connected to this constantly potential effervescent spring, namely, imagination. In other words, if imagination is taken into consideration with its creative capacity, then creative language can lie within the heart of creative imagination. Both narrative and poetic language being capable of intermingling in one another drink from the spring of imagination where the vivaciousness is continuously giving rise to new modes of thought, thus novel forms of discourse. How can this understanding help language educators open the possibility of new discourses for learners whose creativity of thought can be poured into their languages?

People are often unaware of their immediate consciousness and their capacity to express and language the subject matter of this consciousness. How can language education use the immediacy of consciousness and support the expressivity of that immediacy through empowering learners to use openly the possibilities and potentialities of language in shaping their realities better? The question of consciousness becomes significant here since my awareness of my language, of the potentiality and the resourcefulness of my language, of the dialectics of my language and my consciousness, can allow me to see the implications of my language in my life, my being and my choices. So we need to address the issue of consciousness first in order to discuss its implications for language later.

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9

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LANGUAGE OF LOVE

Love abdicates the sovereignty of the self as it disengages one from solipsism, egoism and egotism. Love creates a unique language where the signification is not bound by the utilitarian exchanges and profit-based observation.

The language of love is not travelling through the flea markets of materialism, consumerism and capitalism. Nor does it stop through the meanders of impediments, obstructionism and obfuscation.

Love illuminates the self and selfhood as it bestows upon self a new world of interpretation: togetherness is the panacea of perfection.

Love evokes presence in that multiplicities and fragmentation are replaced by unity and oneness. One cannot love in absentia: one needs to be quintessentially present in order to love. That dissipates absence and divisibility; it opens up the way for the celebration of oneness.

Of all the mysteries that baffle mind and heart, love stands at the top of the list. It serves the apex of becoming, the peak of progression and the apogee of moving.

One may have experienced the delectable taste of the tangible and perceptible flux of pleasure within the finite pleasing realm of joy and jubilance yet never comprehend the exhilarating rapture of the blossoms of love and their sedimentation in their sunrise of arrival.

One gets entangled, overwhelmed and encapsulated in the array of the shimmering lights of love, not by coercive and manipulative fences of parochialism but by the expansive prompts of oneness. This may be similar to a perfunctory form of imprisonment in primordial manifestation of passion or lust-based love but it supersedes any incarceration in the sublime crystallization of transcendental love.

Love begets and engenders as it glows. It reinvents and awakens the moments of belonging. It lingers in the abode of expectations while it flourishes in the heat of consummation. Its belonging consists of both being and longing in that

it possesses the placement of time and location so it is embedded in a temporal status and yet it longs and craves for a not yet arrived stage of becoming.

Language of love may appear as non-sensible, absurd and paradoxical. Its sensibility may not be corroborated through a persuasive resonance with the reciprocal orchestration of business-oriented equations.

Love goes beyond the mundane streets of habituation, acclimatization and accommodation as it introduces a new schema beyond the familiar domain of sensibility.

It disowns, in its sublime presentation, the possessive propensity and the predilection towards power. It infuses the soul with an incessant flux of appeal ability, want and ebullience. It enthuses the heart with a continuous grammar of visualization in which the zeal of will would experience the galaxy of connectedness. Love dispels the blockage of despondency and despair. It denounces the camouflage of disappointment. Love creates hope and hopefulness. It flies above the havoc of desperation and helplessness. It befriends faith and prayer and brings the pearl of emancipation and liberation.

Love is not displayed merely in an outcome but it blooms in a process. It beautifies the emergence of a look, a perspective and a complexion far from the mathematical and linear calculation of a material-stricken mind. It festoons the possibility of a development, a rise of novelty within the manacles of limitations. It creates a window through which the rainbow of meaningfulness would delineate the appearance of a novel horizon not known by the most meticulous telescopic analysis of the rational mind.

One understands love through an ontological engagement. Loving larks in the glory of a praxis; it passes through the rivers of practice. One may know how to love and yet be alien to love. Knowing takes one merely to the path of epistemology where one can sight see the scenery of the glamor and nonetheless be away from the wild meadows of practical engagement.

Words may find themselves incompetent to elucidate the climax of love. In transcendental love where lilacs serve as the eloquent harbinger of love, paraphernalia, power and possessiveness are freely given away for a choice: to love.

When the noon arrives, when the heat comes up, when heaven and earth get baffled and amazed, when the lady watches the last moment of farewell, when the little girl becomes parched with thirst for the last visit to her father, when the looks mobilize all their power to accompany the last steps, when the genuflection of the angels acknowledge their awe to see the epitome of love, one may see the subtle tintinnabulation of love in the oasis of munificence and compassion yet caught in the barren land of estrangement.

Love goes so briskly, so selflessly, so purely and so ardently. It can enjoy and yet it gives away; it can possess and yet it disowns. It articulates the comprehensibility of oneness and the meaningfulness of connectedness. It dissolves pretentiousness and it proves authenticity.

Love is thirsty and yet eschews from monopoly. It loses its hands to prove faithfulness, values and togetherness. Love is not caged and cooped but is liberating and free.

Love purifies and beautifies. It comes as an ocean through which one can embrace the coasts of comfort and tranquility. It may turn out to be a ship via the meanders of tension and conflict. It leads the riders through the horizon of equanimity and composure.

Love is creational; it creates and initiates. It expands the spiritual development in a world stuck with economic development. It brings about a radical transformation of consciousness in the apex of mindfulness. Love testifies the substantiation of mindfulness in the final moments of reverberation. It echoes monotheism in the abyss of nihilism.

Love is circulated through the constant river of tears that accompany the reminiscence of the noon and its glory and glamor. Love is celebrated through the awaiting eyes of the pilgrims who walk down the path of consummation in the hopes of a response. Love is echoed through the cry of the baby who purified love from any ostentatious pretentiousness.

10

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLAYFULNESS OF LANGUAGE

Language is creatively playful as it brings the creative imagination into play.

In, and inside the bushes and wild meadows of imagination, beside the fountain of reflection, off the cliffs of internal skirmishes, by the streaks of conscience and in the light of consciousness, away from the weariness and above the lethargy of lassitude, deep in the horizon of intuition and beyond the margins of banality, up in the pulpit of vigilance, down in the nadir of assurance and maybe upper in the passion of confidence, within the waves of options, through the power of inspiration and by the gift of intuition, at the center of agility, on the moment of alacrity, right about the infusion of dexterity, in the vicinity of sprightliness, during the dispatch of spryness, upon the eruption of celerity, in the time of liveliness, lies the power of creativity.

Right by the overarching mastery of signs, there lies the mystery of symbols where creativity, innovation and novelty unfold their unconscious power.

The following pieces would demonstrate how language can be playfully creative in giving rise to exquisite modes of understanding and perceptiveness:

A Tour to the Flea Market of Signification

I saw a man sitting in the Isle of mysticism
Sipping the chalice of insight and Gnosticism.
He just got back from a tour.
He got soaked in Romanticism, imbued in Structuralism then indulged in Post Structuralism.
He shook hands with Ire, danced with Strauss, and flirted with Fish.
He read through "The Yellow Wall Papers", "Life in the Iron Mills", and "The Awakenings".
He went through the market to purchase a key to unlock the signifiers.
The market was down. It was empty and dull, according to Derrida.

He got lost on the way.
But he came back right away.
He bought a pair of shoes. Shoes of lunacy.
He said "Good bye" to urgency.
And he is dwelling in
immediacy.

A Lyrical Negotiation on the Meta Cognition

If I tell you that
I read you like a
Book,
Would I be allowed to
Call you a textbook?

If I read you and
I agree that you have meanings in
your textbook,
What would you say to he who says you do not have any meaning? That you have neither a diction, nor a conception?

If I see you with all your text,
Within context,
Fully blown,
Highly grown,
How could you say that this is an act of meaninglessness?

If I share my signifiers with yours,
and divide your signified into mine,
Would you then say that this is a construction or a
Deconstruction?

If I see your words,
Worthy, worthwhile,
Do you still deny that
Words are words,
But there is out there a world by far bigger than words?

If I would say that I have keys to your meaning,
Would you not say that you buy those keys?

If I take you with your meaning,
Translate you in to something,
May be "being",
Would you not see that you have some extra meaning,
More than meaning, literal meaning,
Above meaning, beyond meaning,

Now "becoming",
Not just being but becoming.

An Inordinate Feeling

There is a feeling associated by a highly intellectual stimulation coupled with a superordinate rapture replete with a sublime form of consummation, far beyond the sensuous intercourse.

The feeling first swirls around the oceans of mind, travels through every corner of the brain, ripples through the psychosomatic system and erupts in the entire realm of my comprehension, ranging from the primordial senses to the most complicated modes of cerebration, cogitation and rumination.

It just gets myself pulled up to the apex of reflection, the apogee of contemplation, climax of reverberation where I feel all my particles ascend to a position where the nucleus of my being is absorbed in the nectar of a flight immeasurable in size, quantity and pace, inexpressible in ordinary talk where the borders and margins are already set.

This feeling slides, glides and larks any time I write or read what I love to write or what I love to read.

Emerging Era of Absence

In the famine of friendship, in the bruised season of estrangement and alienation, in the imponderable time of separation, in the emerging era of absence, where people are unbelievably addicted to contagious drowsiness, where people look for the blanket of loneliness soaked in the pestiferous torrential rain of fastidious and persnickety obsession of self -annihilation, the fragrant dews of the avenues of watchfulness sing the following song:

We go as far as acacia, along with rabbits of our hearts in a spring day of our soul, we say good morning to the ebullience of blossoms, to the orange flowers of affection and adoration, we bristle with meadows, maturity and preparation, we rise with the waves and dance with the fish. We cultivate in the field of praying, in the pasture of presence, in the lea of intuition.

Who Would Cry for Them?

Thousands of secrets,
Thousands of dreams,
Millions of wishes,
Millions of freaks,
Carry the people of the earth,
The people of the day,
The people of the night.

Who would fathom their hearts?
Overflowing with pain, grief and bait?
Who would try their fate, their calamity?
Their raid?
Who would come and save 'em?
Who would commend their gain?
Their honesty and their pains?
Who would cry for them?
Who would cry with them?
Truly and with a range?

The Play of Existence

I am sitting here on the roof of existence
Watching everywhere with persistence.
Oh, I am so overwhelmed, so inundated,
So submerged.

I see the curtains go away, the foams fade away,
Stars scintillate, pseudo selves run away.
Sagacity penetrates, perspicacity celebrates,
Sapience arrives.

I witness profusion, infusion, copiousness,
Cornucopia of
Light
Illumination,
Luminosity,
Scintillation,
Refulgence.

I see the sunrise of chandeliers,
Progression of beacons,
Festivity of light,
And
Glory of galaxies.

I hear the rhyme of existence,
The reverberation of commendation,
The intonation of glorification,
The resonance of beauty,
The vibration of love.

I touch the prism of light,
The rapture of passion,
The radius of feeling,

The pulse of desire,
The lips of composure.

I smell the fragrance of sublimity,
The redolence of transcendence,
The bouquet of perfection,
The scent of a golden dream.

I taste the vivacity of life,
The livelihood of faith,
The richness of trust.

Oh, I embrace monotheism,
I disavow solipsism,
And
I dance with existence.

Savior

Are you the one
Who sings a song?
Late in the night
When all but God
Are on the run?
Are you the one
With whom the sun
Shares the light?
Are you the one
Who is the one
Close to one?
If you are the one
Whom I recall,
Give me a hand
Before I die.

Days of My Life

Saturday I was just a kid.
Sunday I grew a bit.
Monday I flew away.
Tuesday I was not the one to bear.
Wednesday I plunged in to gem.
Thursday I started to reap.
Friday I was no longer with days.
Tomorrow I will reach heaven.

Explosion of a Thought

The arcane, esoteric, polemical, mystical me obsessed with sesquipedalian manifestations of profound, surreptitious and full-laden desire of plumbing away from the non-sequitur, yearning for antimetabole, paradox, animetha, and epistemic layers of quiddity, brim with grandiloquent, bombastic, magniloquent appeals of reality, being at the mercy of pandemonium, hue and cry, chaos, turmoil, unrest, and escapist proclivity of circle of solipsism, fraught with tivium, resurgence of dualism, diathesis of life, with seeds of secretion, emanating from all channels of neuro physiological and psychological modification, ramification, extension, bifurcation bedizened with trinkets, gaudy appearance, gloating and brassy, is sitting here.

Recall of a Moment

I recall hearing the pulse of existence amidst the suspension of my chronic anxiety fraught with pandemonium and diathesis.

I heard the split of a second, which avidly called for consecration of attention, with all its grace on the brink of the border of nihilism.

I listened to it carefully and notice how delectable would be to have just a simple loaf of bread and appreciate the magnitude of magnificence away from the obsession of self-assertive materialism which savagely and brutally spoliate the appreciation of invaluable moments drowned in the swamps of self-immersion in the unmentionably horrendous alienation of the soul.

In Search of Narratives

This week, I walked through time and places, and bumped into fountainheads of erudition I had never seen in any class of learning.

I came across a watercourse singing like a crooner. I listened to its reverberation, which deciphered: Every drop in a rivulet is like a cause warmly embracing its effect. I learned causality then.

I ran into wallflowers incessantly genuflecting, benevolently sharing their fragrance and lavishly diffusing their inebriating redolence.

I learned magnanimity then.

I drove into sunlight bravely and bounteously beaming on everything and everyone including the bats.

I learned compassion then.

I crashed in to history rife with narratives burgeoning everywhere from Babylon to the White House, from Abbe to Sir, from Pandora to Spice Girls, from Hades to Las Vegas, from Shinar to Seventy-Nine Park Avenue.

I came across people wallowing in their stories, vomiting their narratives, wailing for their anecdotes, exfoliating themselves.

I ran into others glorifying their parables, emblazoning their diaries, wassailing for the book of their narratives.

I got baffled, flummoxed and discombobulated by the flurry of commotion, agitation, exasperation, irritation, exacerbation and aggravation, cryptically moving in the pulse of narratives. I drove into people whose prisons were way bigger than Alcatraz; they were the prisoners of their own prisons, the dungeon of hubris, and ignorance.

The train of politics burning narratives as its fuel to carry on the course shocked me, running over narratives to pass by the goals.

I bumped in to the crowd spellbound and transmogrified by the diabolical despotism disguised in enticing cynosures.

I was about to disintegrate, to smash into pieces by despondency and despair when I bumped in to prophets, the gold, the silver, the immaculate chandeliers, festooning narratives with virtue, piety, purity, and integrity, excellence and worth, gilding the lines of narratives with their enlightening souls.

I came across a lady whose heart was more tender than lilacs, who was born out of fragrance and gave rise to sun light.

I paused for a second and I learned how to write my own narrative.

Hope

Amidst the dark nights of despondency when the nightmares of failure, fiasco, annihilation, devastation, and delirium ferociously echo in the dismal channels of desperation and frustration, when the fulcrum of being is paralyzed by the antagonizing impediments which havoc the mansion of life, hope appears as a panacea which dissipates the deleterious and noxious inundation of erosion of life.

When speculative rationalization incarcerates man's choice of action and declares the nullification of going further, it is hope that emerges and removes all hurdles, and all impossibilities on the strength of what seems to be absurd but is an illuminating perspicacity.

Hope is the key to overcome the insurmountable, the insuperable and the insupportable. Hope speaks everywhere, exists everywhere, in the scintillation of sunlight, in the refulgence of moonlight, in the innocent complexion of children waiting for maturity, in the flight of birds of passage, in the callous hands of breadwinners, in the tintinnabulation of the limpid water going from the bridge of mysticism, in the irresistible smile of girls who know what motherhood means, in the indefatigable passion of boys who wrestle with the time of obedience, in the eager eyes which yearn to consummate.

Hope is the essence of becoming, the substance of moving, and the elixir of revitalization, vivacity and livelihood. Hope is the ineffable perseverance

on tapping the iron bound door of impossibilities, unacceptabilities, and having faith in opening.

Hope, faith and love are all together.

They Call It "Education"

Way down south northwest east in the exhibition of solipsism, there is a pavilion called "subjugating education."

You need to get passes to enter the exhibition, to be called educated.

To get the passes, you need to take off your sense of "I ness," you need to wear the high-heeled shoes of pretension, ostentation and fabrication.

Down across the hall of the exhibition, you see masquerading bogus subservient of subjugation honking the horn of monopolizing regulations to mold you into packages.

They set your clock and wind you tuned to their own calculation of regression-progression. They give you the soporific wake-up call that synchronizes for you what to see and how to see.

Inside the pavilion, you see multitudes of transmogrified sycophants of subjugating education calling for the methodology of diaper.

There are huge pulpits in the pavilion with effigies making faces cachinnating and deriding the authenticity of hearts, teaching you elaborately how to play Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

This is the bitterness in the chamber of subjugating education.

Back Yard

I flip through the pages of the past and I bump in to the backyard of childhood where multitudes of recollections and memoirs uncannily reside. I see the unflinching complexion of a little boy who smoothly and surreptitiously slinks along the backyard hunting for the painters of butterflies' wings, the architecture of the moon, the mason of the sun, and the mentor of the flowers.

I recall the boy's insatiable curiosity in the pathway of the backyard where you can hear and see the throbbing reverberation of lilacs, the genuflection of carnations and the celebrating dance of elms.

Human Science Research Mall

Reporting live from the Human Science Research Mall.

The intuition, the insight and I walk in the middle of packed up lines and bring you this report. Your discretion is advised.

Right at the beginning of this corner, we see the store "symbolic intentions" with the display of American pragmatism, German neo-Kantianism

and German historicism. Some are asking for a double pack and we hear the customer service rep say: "Folks, mellow out. We've got the best for you. Just make sure you got the right brand. Not ethnomethodology."

Next door, you see the hardware stores of hard methods with special coupons on structural functionalism and statistical method.

They give the shoppers a free bottle of cybernetics with the deposit of their wisdom. Our camera man is already taking some shots of a number of people who are plastered and are tossing their cookies right on the foot of their deviation standard.

As we continue our journey in the mall, we drive into a large group asking for a refund from the store "statistical positivism." Some are describing this "a rip off."

Within the huge line of refund seekers, you can see some biting a grounded theory sandwich with the special sauce of qualitative research.

Our cameraman is zooming on a blowout sale "we let you eat till you drop. Get as much as you want. Objectivity, generalizability, reproducibility, and predictability."

Right next to this blowout sale, you see lines after lines waiting for the washrooms.

Oh, here is the security. Some seem to have fainted due to overeating deviating behavior mixed with ethnomethodology, and conversation analysis. The paramedic says: "you got to go drown your sorrows in a vat of ice cream with the flavor of feminism."

Hearing the advice, the fainted ones suddenly get up, scream and run away leaving everybody including our crew with a cold turkey.

Inductive ethnography and anthropology are trashing one another, in front of the bedazzled eyes, seeking the object reality in the pharmaceutical sites.

The interpretive cultural analysis steps in and calls for a thick description as a prescription for all the avid eyes.

The pager in the mall resonates all over:

"Attention, shoppers, there is no more space on the parking lot of objectivism hermeneutics. Please choose the back door."

The kids of humanity are trying to get out of the mall but the flashes of data-oriented methods, certainty and strategies try to push them in giving them the bric-a-brac of recipe book research squeezed in the fragmented envelopes of unreflective theorizing. They receive a linear process or monolithic logic injection if they raise their objection. You can hear them though "What is it that they sell? What is it that we buy?"

We pass the crowd and see a number of people slipping in the hallway of post modernism and social construction due to Sokal Affair.

We continue our report in the midst of hue and cries with caution.

Stay tune for an update.

Answers to My Question

Tired of the chores and humdrum,
I set out to get the answer for the question of what creativity is.

I reached modernism that could hardly move due its hubris.
I asked what is creativity?
Clearing its throat, I was offered several boxes rife with pliers and nails of certitude, determinism and prediction.
On my way out, the boxes tore apart with pliers and nails all over the floor waiting for me to go and pick them up. I took a rain check.

I got to analytic philosophy, asked the same question.
"Well, what do you mean by what creativity is" let me put it on the table of P~Q and tell you how sense making is. If x is an x then your x can't be an x but the x with sense of continuity.

I played truant.

I found psychoanalysis, and repeated my question.
I felt my shoes were inspected, then my shirt, it went below the belt, all as an indication of the search for the answer.
I got out of the inspection which urged me to find the answer between the groin with a little bit of focus on here and there.
I did the inspection. There was no answer though.

I kept on asking, others and others.

I reached post modernism with the same question.
Stuttering along the way, postmodernism trembled and said, "how could you? There is not one answer. There are many answers.
I paused but I carried along again with dissatisfaction."

Suddenly, I saw a shepherd, asked him the question.
He smiled.

Voices

I hear voices.
DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition) knows nothing of such voices.
They are not schizophrenic.
I climb up the mountain of emotions to hear them better.
They resonate like the childhood, like the fountain but you can't see them through electroencephalograph.
They make brilliant sense but they have neither construct validity nor content validity as it pleases A.P.A.

Phonology has not discovered their rhyme or their rhythm yet they are so vibrant.
Morphology knows nothing of their morpheme, their cytology, their histology and their physiognomy. Notwithstanding, they stand in high profile. They run without having percentile scores, standard scores or raw scores. Freud failed to detect them, nor could Lacan grasp them.
These voices, they echo yet they are silent. They boom and they move you. I hear them. They go up the ladder. They take you to a highway not analogous to 101 or I 5.
They are, boisterous, vociferous, rambunctious, and obstreperous yet they sound like velvet, they taste so plushy and they move like silken. They ripple through you with a fluffy, satiny, fleecy, feathery, flocculent and plumed zest, with an aroma beyond the domain-referenced test interpretation, with a piquancy, which dazzles and baffles criterion-referenced testing. No wonder, there is neither syllabus nor any curriculum for them in education. National Assessment of Educational Progress has not yet recognized them.
I hear them though. They carry you to the Disney Land of your childhood, but not with an identical cynosure. Sesame Street has never shown them though they are always in there.
These voices, they don't let you sleep, yet they let you repose.
They inebriate you when you hear them but you remain sober and sound, cool and collected.
They cuddle you like a touch of a palate deep into the ocean of sentiment's outburst. They fondle you like a petal that swirls not only around your subcutaneous hospice but they peddle door to door into your own haven. They are voices but they let you travel through the light beside the light so much so that you nestle in light and open up your heart within the light. Last time I heard them, they showed me fourteen cosmos of lights from the cosmology of light. They took me up the balconies of passion, above the high rise of calenture. I superseded the margins of satiation, the bottom line of saturation and the threshold of procession. I ascended the standard error of measurement and towered the projective techniques and apperception tests.
Oh, I hear them again.
They echo all over, in the geography of being.
Do you hear them too?

Passionate Winking

Discombobulated and deluded in the chamber of inductive and deductive imagination, a moment of illuminative philosophical reflection passionately winked at me bringing an intuition.

My cerebral cortex and my limbic system marshaled their desire and ebullience right in front of the window of intentionality way beyond Husserl's conception of consciousness.

The excitement phase of intriqueness honked the horn of engrossment for the urge to consummation.

The lips of my curiosity pressed the thighs of sagacity away from Strawson's conceptual analysis and Quine's denial of Kant's synthesis.

The kiss of perspicacity smacked so vociferously that it brought the sex flush of my privileged access in the plateau of abundance. The heart rate of my sensation became united with the palpitation of my understanding. They both exceeded transcendental hermeneutics and warmly embraced the Heideggerian one.

The rapture of the intelligibility cuddled the velvet of joy apart from the everyday discourse.

The yearning for embracing the reality bloomed in the havoc of Hume's exegesis and I felt ascended towards the plains of epistemology.

Was this intuition, inspiration, reason, senses, or experience? Maybe none, maybe all. Maybe it was ineffable. But it is incorrigible.

The blooms of my contemplation had their ornate intercourse with the sunlight of enrichment.

The refraction period was quick. No resolution phases whatsoever.

I could see the incessantly smothering kisses of mystical insights coil around my consciousness, of course not in a Freudian sense.

11

LANGER'S LANGUAGE OF POSSIBILITY AND KIERKEGAARD'S LANGUAGE OF PARADOX

Psychologists and philosophers' use of language has not only created a distinct parlance of communication but it has also affected people's life.

When psychology departed from philosophy and claimed a new realm of authority as a discipline it practically disengaged itself from ontological explorations. This, however, did not rule out the potential and ongoing dialogical indebtedness of each discipline. Some, including William James in the past, and some contemporary ones such as Paul Ricoeur, demonstrated the dialogical interactive process of both disciplines.

Kierkegaard is a philosopher who gave rise to a new understanding of philosophy and propounded that philosophy was not to be circumscribed within abstract concepts but needed to open up an accessible touch with practical facets of life. He suggested that philosophy's task would transpire in a thoughtful examination of real lived experiences. Instead of an indulgence in the previously common philosophical practice of abstract-oriented concepts and categories, Kierkegaard embarked on bringing philosophy to the phenomenological realities of every one's life and highlighted how everyone can be in dire need of philosophical reflections. In doing this, Kierkegaard did not abide by the sovereignty of reason as emphasized by the preceding philosophical schools, but illustrated the power and the panacea of passion in changing and transforming minds and hearts.

Kierkegaard identified the greatest malaise of our time in the selflessness of people and elucidated how the dissipation of self has tightened the circles of meaning and contributed to the emergence of sundry psychological malfunction. He deplored the severe engrossment in the self-denying parade of quotidian utilitarian engagements and vociferously called for an authentic return to the sphere of the self where the real security could be found. Kierkegaard considered inwardness as the panacea of recuperating from the barrage of meaninglessness

and explicated the itinerant of the self as the one who would manage to experience the composure and consummation. He suggested that the real sense of aesthetics would unfold itself not in the exterior cynosures of beauty, but in the internal avenues of revitalization where the celebration of the self would be attuned to emergent understanding of the process of life and its associative contextual becoming.

Kierkegaard demonstrated how knowing could be pretentiously entrapping where one would be incarcerated in the dungeon of his/her mindset and assumptions. He elucidated how an unassuming life would be much more liberating than an overwhelming ripple through the unbreakable walls of knowing. Kierkegaard described everyone's unique involvement in filling the jar of life as a great phase of responsibility as he expounded on the necessity of passion for achieving one's authenticity.

Kierkegaard highlights the significance of choice for everyone and argues that people may not experience being free if they don't experience the power of choice in their life, namely, if they do not choose themselves. Choice is a stage that people need to be constantly aware of. It is through finding a direction or a purpose in one's life that one can experience real freedom. Kierkegaard removes the stability of essence and nature for human beings and underscores the power of choice in transforming what one can be and wants to be.

In line with an existential move that calls for moving forward with the blessing of choice, a name in the discipline of psychology appears to delineate numerous common denominators with Kierkegaard. Langer is known as the psychologist who has profusely depicted the grace of mindfulness and its implications in interpersonal and intrapersonal life for the past thirty-five years. Her findings in the field of psychology have instantiated how our life can be devoid of any presence when we experience mindlessness. Langer, through dozens of psychological experiments, has elaborated how mindlessness imposes paralysis of action and gets one stuck in his/her position of assumptions. She indicates how a self without mindfulness would lose his/her potentials as he/she would drift from the process of becoming.

Langer discusses how the power of one's choice would promise the renaissance of self as one openly experiences the horizons of becoming. In doing so, Langer argues, one needs to constantly pinpoint being mindful in the midst of a wide variety of mindlessness-inducing prompts. She demonstrates how openness toward the spectrum and perspectives may help one explore the possibility of understanding different angles and facets that may be neglected when one is entrapped in mindlessness.

Langer's self-renaissance project is tied to the transformative power of language where the stamina of dictions and words are shown to develop various formative beings. She argues how a constrained approach toward the horizons of possibilities would deprive one of welcoming new information. Langer describes the tyranny of the seemingly helpful cognitive schemas as one of the main contributors of

mindlessness. She propounds a sagacious sensitivity toward context where things, events, people, and phenomena can be understood within their contextual terms. An approach devoid of contextual understanding would lead to marginalization of some attributes or negation of otherwise salient features.

Langer depicts the liabilities of knowing and its objective gestures while appreciating the position of not knowing. She underlines the significance of emancipation from the intensity of assumptions and proposes a mindful search for the innovative leaps when one is persistently urged to remain in the familiar reference points. Langer's mindfulness is revolutionary in that it calls for novel experiences of being. She does not consider the transformation of cognitions sufficient for the commencement of authentic changes, but she calls for radical transformation of consciousness.

Langer explicates how our era's mindlessness has provoked counterproductive intra-personal self-talks, misleading health projects, nefarious intercultural models and deleterious educational policies. She argues that most of our learning takes place mindlessly and thus we don't experience the presence of learning.

Langer identifies how mindlessness would solidify the severity of judgmental attitudes whereas mindfulness expands the realm of comfort. Stress is induced in the vicious circles of mindlessness while tranquility is poured out in the presence of mindfulness.

Langer considers attention toward the perspective of the actor as the necessary component of understanding one's core concerns and critiques the psychological approaches that prescribe the sufficiency of the observer's perspective in representing the psychological reality. Langer's mindfulness is a critique of the positivist psychology and its reductionist claims. She pinpoints how labels and words and their extensive cultivation and socialization can foster mindlessness and weaken people's understanding of their choices. She displays examples and cases where mindlessness has led to paralysis of action. She recounts the socially constructed certainty of assumptions and their impeding implications. She argues that we are constrained by the subjugation of our recursive patterns of our mindlessly accepted mindsets where possibilities are narrowly defined.

Kierkegaard and Langer

Kierkegaard's standpoint on philosophy is uniquely interwoven in the play of passion and practice. He disdains the view point on philosophy that is merely engaged in the abstract conversations of the past. In his pseudonymous book "either/or," Kierkegaard (1959) demonstrates how his philosophy is not in pursuit of the same principles of his contemporary philosophers and indicates that

> The philosopher says, "That's the way it has been hitherto." I ask, "what am I to do if I don't want to become a philosopher?" For if I want to do that,

> I see clearly enough that I, like the other philosophers, shall soon get to the point of mediating the past . . . There is no answer to my questions of what I ought to do, for if I was the most gifted philosophical mind that ever lived in the world, there must be one more thing I have to do besides sitting and contemplating the past.
>
> *(p. 175)*

Langer's psychology also begins with a departure from the inadequacies of the pervasive psychological reductionist discourses and the salience of "knowing what is" and its past-oriented predilections. Instead, it focuses on "what can be" being very similar to numerous notions presented by Kierkegaard including the idea of forwarding, choice and inwardness. Langer speaks the language of positivist psychology to corroborate the inadequacy of the empirical psychology. She questions the sovereignty of the empiricism and indicates how the entrapment within the empirically established propositions may lead to acting from a single perspective. Langer (2009) illustrates the implications of questioning the determinacy of "is" for psychological certainty and indicates that

> my research has shown how using a different word, offering a small choice, or making a subtle change in the physical environment can improve our health and well-being. Small changes can make large differences, so we should open ourselves to the impossible and embrace a psychology of possibility.
>
> *(p. 15)*

Langer's psychology of possibility may be discussed in line with Kierkegaard's discussion of subjectivity and objectivity, where Kierkegaard presents subjective truth in relation to an ontological way of living where one lives in truth or truth becomes a way of being as a human being. He distinguishes subjective truth from objective truth where truth is subsumed under one's category of knowing.

In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard (1992) asserts that

> objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said . . . But this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of voice, oral delivery, etc., but it is to be understood as the relation of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said. Objectively, the question is only about categories of thought; subjectively, about inwardness . . . Only in subjectivity is there decision, whereas wanting to become objective is untruth. The passion of the infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor, for its content is precisely itself. In this way the subjective "how" and subjectivity are the truth.
>
> *(p. 203)*

Langer's psychology of possibility calls for Kierkegaard's subjective truth of possibility in that the possibility needs to be ontologically experienced so the phenomenological experience can testify the truth of the experience. For the same reason, Langer's (2009, p. 18) psychology of possibility targets the mindsets and their stability as the commencement of exploring the possibility of change as she iterates that "we imagine the stability of our mindsets to be the stability of the underlying phenomena and so we don't think to consider the alternatives." Langer's focus on possibility goes beyond the epistemological possibility and highlights the significance of ontological possibility. The roadblocks, Langer argues, to understanding ontological possibility happens in the realm of epistemology where the commitment to specific epistemological propositions hamper exploring the avenues of new possibilities. Langer focuses on the paralyzing power of cognitions when they tend to stabilize their certitude in view of their frequency, their repetition, their cultivation, and their socialization. Langer indicates how possibility can be limited and limiting when one is forcibly circumscribed in the prescriptive and proscriptive modes of possibility. The leap from the limiting sense of possibility to the liberating sense of possibility, according to Langer, begins with questioning the province of possibility, namely the mindsets that describe the realm of possibility. Through her experiments, Langer questions the borders of possibility and revisits the quantifiers of propositional possibilities in which certain quantifiers are known to apply for acknowledging certain possibilities. Langer peruses Kierkegaard to elucidate the possibility of transcending the realm of established possibilities.

Kierkegaard discusses possibility as a unique and distinctly human feature which can transpire in different levels of existence and bring about different ways of living. Human beings are the only creatures, in Kierkegaard's viewpoint on possibility, which can go beyond the biologically established configuration and experience possibilities. Each realm of existence unfolds a different aspect of possibility.

The aesthete is indulged in the spectrum of possibilities and playfully experiences possibilities as he/she experiences the joy and pleasures of life, whether physical beauty or intellectual enjoyments. In this stage of being and possibility, the aesthete is merely overwhelmed by a hedonistic predisposition toward possibilities and his/her life would be devoid of any meaning. His/her freedom is ontologically concealed to oblivion to the effect that he/she solely thinks of possibilities and their infinite, unconstrained, and unlimited expansion.

In the ethical stage of possibilities, the ethical person takes responsibility and acknowledges the power of freedom and decision making. The ethical person, according to Kierkegaard, understands the limitations of possibilities as he/she experiences a moral way of living. This stage of possibility can be induced by either an inner or external sense of values. It can be epitomized in one's obedience to his/her own inner voice, in the exterior manifestations of law-abiding attitudes or in the accumulative plethora of prescriptive codes, conventions and values. As the person experiences this realm of possibility

namely the ethical domain, he/she experiences his/her action, decision making and freedom, and thus he/she ascertains the power of responsibility to proceed with an action. Furthermore, he/she learns to be more in touch with his/her inner self as he/she experiences the undertaking of a moral action. On the other hand, the ethical realm of possibility highlights the limitations and constrictions that are associated with a moral undertaking as one, for instance, accepts the limitations that are interwoven with having a job. The ethical sphere, as a level of possibility, may lead to despondency and despair as it is embedded within a vulnerable system that is subjected to failure. It is intrinsically subjected to human errors.

The third level of possibility, according to Kierkegaard, happens in the religious sphere where passion, inwardness, truth, fullness and power demonstrate themselves. The religious stage is a stage where one is deeply engaged with the inner life, a possibility which does not occur for the aesthete nor for the ethical. The religious realm of possibility characterizes the most passionate mode of human possibility. The religious sphere of possibility portrays the relationship with God and acknowledgment of eternity. It illustrates the infinite possibilities and its widening horizons. The religious sphere reveals the profound layer of spirituality where one practically experiences being an itinerant of the inner life with passion and faith. The religious sphere is imbued in the personal testimony of the presence of God. The religious sphere relates one to one's infinite potentiality. According to Kierkegaard, the religious sphere provides the possibility where becoming a self becomes possible where one needs to be related to oneself, and more important than that, one needs to be related to God, that is, the power that creates and constitutes the self.

It is important to note that these levels of possibilities, in Kierkegaard's view point, are not explicating the ways of believing or knowing, and they are not describing the cognitive and epistemological framework of someone, but they are presenting how one is living, thus they are ontologically defining one's stages of being.

This may lead us to explore the role of self in Langer's (2005, p. 21) psychology of possibility where she discusses how "a self that is absorbed in itself may be a self that is cut off from itself." Langer's portrayal of such a self demonstrates an implicit link to Kierkegaard's spheres of possibilities where the experience of self can be stopped when there is no connection to the sphere of possibilities where the self can be fostered or revitalized. Langer (2005, p. 21) implicates this when she indicates that "my work has led me to conclude that the loneliness, boredom, and feelings of inadequacy people experience are usually the results of a lack of connection with themselves."

Kierkegaard's aesthete sphere of possibility can be of great significance in clarifying Langer's notion of a self that is disconnected to itself. The aesthete lacks a self since he/she is devoid of an experience of a choice, of awareness of a commitment and of a decision to make.

Self, in Kierkegaard's perspective, is what one does, of what one undertakes. It is about accomplishing a task. We may see this notion of accomplishment of a task in Heidegger's concept of "authenticity" as distinct from "inauthenticity" where the self unfolds itself through the choices one makes or fails to make and thus loses its authenticity. Langer opens up the possibility of understanding how choices can elevate the sense of self as they highlight the observational role of self in creating, managing, and reinventing numerous choices.

It seems that Langer (2005, p. 27) is serving as heir of Kierkegaard when she discusses the role of choices for the self and suggests that "that is the essence of a personal renaissance, to learn to act and engage with ourselves mindfully, creatively, actively, and happily."

Contrary to the atheistic existentialism of Sartre and Camus, Kierkegaard considers Langerian renaissance of self through a connection to spirit as he elucidates that

> a human being is a spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self.
>
> *(Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 43)*

Kierkegaard laments the selflessness of the modern age and deplores the impediments that get in the way of people's actualization of the self. Kierkegaard argues that dissipation of self contributes to our despair and despondency as it hampers our being fully human.

Similar to Kierkegaard's attack on the modern age's selflessness, Langer's psychology of possibility rails against the mindlessness of our age and rages against its implications in a wide variety of domains. Langer (1975, 2009; Langer et al., 1985) argues that mindlessness curtails our possibilities as it works against our creativity.

Mindlessness, according to Langer, paralyzes our power of choices and imposes passive and automatic behaviors. Through our mindlessness, we depreciate the value of our being a human as we lose our sense of control over what we do and how we do. In line with Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Langer uses the term "authentic selves" and considers mindlessness the roadblocks that prevent us from experiencing the genuine and authentic self.

Langer's use of possibility bears close resemblance to what Aristotle pointed out in his *Poetics*, that the function of poetry is to represent what might be, rather than what has been. Kierkegaard presents possibility in the same line in his early writings and demonstrates how possibilities are going to be infinite in the realm

of spirituality and the impossibility of possibility can fade away when the inwardness opens up the room for multitudes of possibilities, albeit impossible in a world governed by reason and analytical reasoning.

Kierkegaard's critique of Hegelian philosophy and its focus on rationalism propounds the significance of passion instead of reason with passion opening up the avenues of possibilities. The power of passion and its creational possibilities is characterized in the internal quest for spiritual connectedness and inwardness as Kierkegaard exemplifies Abraham as the hero of faith and possibilities.

Langer conducts a similar critique of the positivist psychology and its authoritative claims for owning the truth. Langer's psychology of possibility enumerates the failures and flaws of the positivist-driven psychology and elaborates how mindlessness-driven psychology can turn out to be imposing in predictions and assessments. In stipulating the ramification of the critique against the positivist system, Langer (1997) argues that

> the very notion of intelligence may be clouded by a myth: the belief that being intelligent means knowing what is out there. Many theories of intelligence assume that there is an absolute reality out there, and the more intelligent the person, the greater his or her awareness of this reality. Great intelligence, in this view, implies an optimal fit between individual and environment. An alternative view, which is at the base of mindful research, is that individuals may always define their relation to their environment in several ways, essentially creating the reality that is out there. What is out there is shaped by how we view it.
>
> *(p. 100)*

Langer's forty-year-long research discloses the price that we have paid for the tyrannical mindlessness of positivist psychology and its unquestionable interventions in defining what is true. Her critique of objectivity depicts the implications of our deep-seated submission to the ruled-governed world of scientism and indicates how the objective-laden psychology has failed to explore the contexts and their role in meaning making.

Langer (1989, 2009) discusses how the position of knowing in the framework of objectivity has ignored realities of contexts in sundry facets of human life. Langer (2005) suggests that we should be better off if we proceed with the position of not knowing and indicates that

> Science, which prides itself on its objectivity, usually hides its choices from us even as it reports its findings. Many design choices that go into even our most rigorous scientific studies affect their outcomes. Greater awareness of these choices would make the findings less absolute and more useful to us. In fact, scientific research is reported in journals as probability statements,

> although textbooks, and popular magazines often report the same results as absolute facts. This change is done to make the science easier for the nonscientists to understand. But what it does, instead, is deceive us by promoting an illusion of stability. That illusion is fostered by taking people out of the equation-what choices the researcher made in sitting up the experiment, on whom it was tested, and under what circumstances.
>
> *(p. 106)*

On the implications of the dominant Western perspective in psychology, Wessells (1999), indicates that

> In emergency situations, psychologists hired by NGOs or UN agencies often play a lead role in defining the situation, identifying the psychological dimensions of the problems, and suggesting interventions. Viewed as experts, they tacitly carry the imprimatur of Western science and Western psychology, regarded globally as embodying the highest standards of research, education, training, and practice. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the situation invite a tyranny of Western expertise. The multitude of problems involved usually stems not from any conspiracy or conscious intent but rather from hidden power dynamics and the tacit assumption that Western knowledge trumps local knowledge.
>
> *(pp. 274–275)*

Langer's emphasis on psychology's epistemological crises of objectivity and its dehumanizing implications seems to establish her being an heir to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard's challenge of Hegelian rationality and the objectivity of Hegelians such as Martensen calls for revamping the foundations of knowing and knowledge as it does reveal the circumscribing pillars of objectivity in the discourse of rationality. In "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," Kierkegaard's pseudonymous Johannes Climacus argues that objectivity cannot give rise to inwardness. Kierkegaard claims that just as lack of objective truth can lead to madness, the "absence of inwardness is madness" too. Climacus illustrates a patient who has just escaped from a mental hospital and is worried about his recognition. He is worried that right after recognition, he will be sent back to the hospital so he thinks to himself:

> "What you need to do, then, is to convince everyone completely, by the objective truth of what you say, that all is well as far as your sanity is concerned." As he is walking along and pondering this, he sees a skittle ball lying on the ground. He picks it up and puts it in the tail of his coat. At every step he takes, this ball bumps him, if you please, on his bottom, and every time it bumps him he says, "Boom! The earth is round!" He arrives in the capital city and immediately visits one of his friends. He wants to

> convince him that he is not crazy and therefore walks back and forth, saying continually "Boom! The earth is round!"
>
> *(Kierkegaard, p. 195)*

Kierkegaard considers the phenomenological perspicacity and wisdom of one's life in one's mindful engagement and awareness of his/her life. The madman in the example corroborates his insanity although he highlights the objectivity of a truth that is ineluctably unquestionable for everyone. The madman's objectivity, however, is devoid of any reflexivity: namely, he cannot reflect on himself. Logical positivism in Langer's perspective and logical calculations in Kierkegaard's viewpoint are similar to the mad man in Kierkegaard's above-mentioned example in that they both enunciate the truth while being mindless about the context in which the truth is embedded.

For Langer, mainstream psychology has been mainly obsessed with the legitimacy of the observer's perspective, known as the expert's perspective, and has marginalized and neglected the actor's perspective. The legitimacy of the expert's perspective, according to Langer, is largely due to psychology's ownership of objectivity. The possession of objectivity and its accessibility for positivist psychology is explained by virtue of the rigorous methodologies implemented in psychology.

Langer's critique of the monopoly of the perspective in the eyes of the observer (namely, the expert) produces sundry implications for numerous domains of human psychology. Langer (1975, 2009) claims that the actor's perspective can open up a new world of possibilities, a world which can be easily concealed to oblivion through the hegemony of the observer's perspective.

Kierkegaard (1992) explicated the importance of mindfulness toward the actor's perspective in a wide variety of contexts. He demonstrates how the superiority within the observer's perspective can be detrimental in communicating the truth and suggests that

> Take the case of a man who is passionately angry, and let us assume that he is really in the wrong. Unless you can begin with him by making it seem that it were he who had to instruct you, and unless you can do it in such a way that the angry man, who was too impatient to listen to a word of yours, is glad to discover in you a complacent and attentive listener—if you cannot do that, you cannot help him at all. Or take the case of a lover who has been unhappy in love, and suppose that the way he yields to his passions is really unreasonable, impious, unchristian. In case you cannot begin with him in such a way that he finds genuine relief in talking to you about his suffering and is able to enrich his mind with the poetical interpretations you suggest for it, notwithstanding you have no share in this passion and want it to free him from it—if you cannot do that, then you cannot help

> him at all; he shuts himself away from you, he retires within himself . . . and then you just talk at him.
>
> *(p. 45)*

Langer's presentation of mindfulness can be elucidated with a profound understanding of the process of inwardness in Kierkegaard's view point. Kierkegaard, as mentioned earlier, contends that the biggest ailment and pathology of the modern age can be attributed to selflessness. Heidegger (1995) speaks of such selflessness when he discusses "self-forming emptiness" (p. 126). Heidegger (1995, p. 127) suggests that our mindlessness about the emptiness of the self is so pervasive that the emptiness becomes "peculiarly inconspicuous." In other words, we don't see its obviousness as we are subjected to the mindlessness of the emptiness' obviousness.

Cushman (1990), reiterates the ramifications and corollaries of mindlessness toward self-emptiness and selflessness when he indicates that a selfless person and an empty self is the one

> [who] seeks the experience of being continually filled up by consuming goods, calories, experiences, politicians, romantic partners, and empathic therapists in an attempt to combat the growing alienation and fragmentation of its era. [It] is dependent on the continual consumption of nonessential and quickly obsolete items or experiences accomplished through the dual creation of easy credit and a gnawing sense of emptiness in the self.
>
> *(p. 601)*

Langer's discussion of the implications of mindfulness (p. 24) also suggests that with an increase of a creative mindfulness, one can get proactively engaged in a search for "the inviolable self." Langer (1975, 2009; Langer, Bashner, & Chanowitz, 1985) develops a relationship between mindlessness and being scattered in multiple domains of self-negating pretentiousness. Our mindlessness is rearing absence from our fullness as it detaches us from our self-reflection.

Mindlessness, in this sense, is a state of being fraught with gigantic engagements of Kierkegaardian selflessness, whereas mindfulness presents a fundamentally different form of being in which one is connected to self.

Kierkegaard uses "paradox" "to suggest a language and a sphere that is not comprehensible through the conventional reasoning." When one faces walls, Kierkegaard suggests, one is forced to accept the limitation and attests to the impossibility of going beyond the walls. The language of faith, love and prayer would open possibilities according to Kierkegaard as it supersedes the paradigmatic circumscription and offers novel horizons of exploration.

This looks like absurd as it is not translated through the previously accepted language of the identified mindsets and it serves as a paradox since it stands against the ratiocination in the context of cognitively composed schemas.

Langer discusses the psychology of possibility in line with the same spirit as she removes the limiting layers that prescribe certain modes of thinking. Langer considers mindfulness as the key to creativity and novelty (Langer, 2009).

In promoting the language of Kierkegaardian Paradox, Langer concentrates on the ineluctability of identified schemas in the domain of human cognition for understanding new categories and argues that the paradigmatic and syntagmatic implications of the identified categories would prescribe specific contemplative predispositions with special commitments.

The range and magnitude of the identified schemas, both in concepts and propositions, would suggest both descriptive and prescriptive moves that ultimately present a stable version for the so-called reality. The reality is thus understandable within the sphere of the pre-identified commitments. Through a focus on the search for noticing the infinite flow of novelty, Langer invites the observer to fight for "otherwise" in the midst of the familiar.

Langer (1997) becomes united with Kierkegaard as she highlights the essence of effective teaching in the process of a disengagement from solipsism. A mindful teacher, according to Langer, is the one who constantly questions the position of knowing and tries to look into the perspective of the learner not only from the cognitive but the social and emotional perspective. This understanding of the context helps both educators and learners to become prepared for understanding their reference points in a broader perspective. It seems that Langer has been proactively inspired by what Kierkegaard when he indicated that

> No, to be a teacher in the right sense is to be a learner. Instruction begins when you, the teacher, learn from the learner, put yourself in his place so that you may understand what he understands and in the way he understands it.
>
> *(Kierkegaard in Bretall, 1946, p. 335)*

It is interesting to see that both Kierkegaard and Langer use narratives to present their psychological and philosophical demonstrations. Kierkegaard tells the story of a lily "more beautifully clothed than Solomon in all his glory," who was "joyful and free of care all the day long" (Kierkegaard, 1998a, b). The lily, Kierkegaard narrates, is influenced by a "naughty little bird" that induces comparison and reports on the beautiful flowers in other places where the birds come up with the best songs ever. The lily begins to loathe itself and thus allows the bird to take it away to those glorious places. The lily is thus detached from the soil it belongs to and goes with the bird. On the way, the lily perishes and dies. According to Kierkegaard, the lily is the demonstration of human beings and the little naughty bird represents the comparison that entangles human beings. The soil also displays the roots and connectedness. Langer presents experiments and cases that indicate how the malaise of comparison may prevent one from exploring the genuine and authentic modes of living and expressiveness.

Langer (2009) demonstrates how an entanglement in the comparison-oriented attitude would impose a detachment from process and would ignore the authenticity of one's province of choices. Authenticity, Langer argues, unfolds itself in light of discovering the pearl of choices and that happens in the apex of mindfulness.

Langer blames schools' use of absolute language and mindless evaluative stance for virtually all of the ills we experience personally, professionally, interpersonally and globally.

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12

FATHOMING THE GLOBAL WISDOM OF EDUCATION

Educational systems carry along their own specific language of epistemology where the lines on what to know, how to know and where to search for knowing are delineated. Within any pedagogical approach, there lies a language that organizes, prescribes and regulates educational behavior.

Deconstructing Global Education

Global education is a term with complimentary associations. Its acclamation has been coupled with its claims of enlightenment, illumination, improvement, progress, cultural awareness, appreciation of diversity, human rights awareness, global knowledge and global change (see for instance, Hanvey, 1976; Anderson, 1979; Merryfield, 1997; Tucker, 2009). Respect for others, listening to other voices, appreciation of cultural diversity, openness towards learning from other cultures, recognizing the rights for other groups and people who may have been marginalized, underrepresented or misrepresented come at the forefront of the pro-global education campaign (see for instance, Coombs, 1989; Case, 1993).

While global education can offer promising chapters in affecting the quality of life of both educators and the educated, it needs to be mindfully deconstructed in order to present practical solutions for global challenges. In line with this deconstruction, certain layers appear to be of first and foremost excavation.

The Global Education Reactivity

The roots of global education are mainly embedded within the political conditions after World War II. These conditions seem to have contributed to the

emergence of a global thinking about a number of issues, including education. The United States' membership in UNESCO, the approval of the Fulbright Act with a focus on the exchange of students around the world, passing the National Defense Education Act in the United States and its call for funding foreign languages and studies on foreign cultures as a response to the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik, and the first man-made space satellite are all examples of conditions which gave rise to thinking about global education. Organizations such as the American Forum for Global Education, Education for a World in Change and the Study Commission on Global Education have accordingly appeared in the contextual flow of the political conditions (Tucker, 2009). Understanding the underlying political factors and components of global education would elucidate that global education did not emerge as an independent philosophical enterprise within the Westernized discourse of education. Global education did not present itself as a utopian constituent of a worldview on human beings where education had to be a significant pillar of recognition. Global education, thus, was not created within an ontological system of a worldview that encouraged and promoted education as a value system. The "ought" of global education, in other words, did not extract its implications from the "is" of a philosophical project with a mission for human beings; it came mainly as a response or a reaction to conditions and situational analyses that induced thinking globally about education. Underneath this reaction, there were sedimentations of fear, hysteria of the cold war, the anxiety of losing the competitive game and the fervor for superiority. The global education discourse was, therefore, not a creative and proactive discourse of its own within the Westernized worldview on education. This is not to downgrade the positive effects of global education but to illustrate the necessity of reflecting on the possibility of thinking independently about global education. An independent project on global education needs to address the following questions: A) Is global education inherently defined in the etiological patterns of utilitarianism or is it embedded within a spiritual and transcendental mission? The implications of each would bring about practical involvements and sensitive engagements with opposing and paradoxical programs. Think about a global education program with a utilitarian focus to understand the children of the war-torn situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. A global education in pursuit of clandestinely defined profits at a local level, albeit a global local, would fail. On numerous manifestation of this failure, Spariosu (2004) writes

> Our global pundits, whether on the right or the left, seem to connect human progress primarily with material development. Most worldwide statistics and indicators are economic in nature, measuring human happiness by what an individual or a social group has, rather than by what they are. Thus, we have presently divided the world into "developed," underdeveloped," and

> "developing" societies. But if we truly wish to change our global paradigms, then we need to change the focus of our world wide efforts from social and economic development to human self-development. From the standpoint of the latter, there are no developed or underdeveloped societies, but only developing ones. It is this kind of development that in the end will help us solve our practical problems, including world hunger, poverty, and violence, and will turn the earth into a welcoming and nurturing home for all of its inhabitants, human and nonhuman.
>
> *(p. 5)*

B) How does global education define human beings? Can we really do global education without spelling out very clearly what we mean by being and becoming a human? Does global education serve as a program for humanity or is it a prescriptive program which endorses certain privileged groups? If the former tends to be the case, what are the underlying constituents of a project on humanity? If the latter turns out to be the goal, what are the sources of legitimacy? Is the global connection elicited from common human bonds or is it taken from the interests of special groups?

If global education tends to proceed with an evolutionary Darwinian viewpoint and its definition of human beings, it cannot down play the acknowledgement that certain groups should perish since they cannot cope with the changes. Global education, therefore, is to engage in a profound ontological and epistemological deconstruction: what is knowing and what is the meaning of being? What is learning about? Is learning a process of producing automatons or is it a process of liberation? How do knowing and being interact with one another? Where does humanity stand in the project? What does a student in North America need to know about his/her being and its connection to other beings? Is he/she considered a knower only if he/she has access to certain modes of knowing? What if the circle of knowing excludes certain ways of knowing and encourages special ways of knowing? How does the definition of humanity affect the search for knowing? Is the sphere of being bound by the empirically established categories and propositions? If yes, how does that sphere include and exclude the claims of global education and global project? If the children in Islamabad, Tehran, Cairo and Bangladesh are exposed to presentations that give credit to non-empirical and non-positivist observations, does that make sense to a global education that has nullified non-empirical observations? How can a child in North America get a sense of education of, let's say, Afghan children if the North American child is only exposed to pervasive Westernized discourses? If the documentaries that report the status of education cite the Taliban as the representation of Islam and the Taliban's emphasis on preventing females from attending schools, how does that image correspond to the world of Islam where Muslims quoting the prophet Mohammad claim that seeking to know and learning would be incumbent upon

both males and females? If the community of learners is infused with numerous forms of politically based information, does that promote a true global education?

C) How does global education address the gaps between signs and meanings? A sign is a combination of both signifier and signified.

The signifier is an image or a sound which refers to a concept. The signified is the concept to which the signifier is referring to.

Let's say that I ask you any of the following questions: How is your mom doing? How is your mother doing? How is your ma doing? How is your mommy doing? I have used different signs with some similarities and some differences. Nonetheless, the meaning of a mother is going to be different for the recipients of the message. If you have experienced a very emotional attachment to your mother, the meaning would be way different for you in comparison with someone who can think of his/her mother only as the one who carried him/her for about a year. Global education is brimming with signs. The meanings, however, need to be explored and examined, not through the lenses of the core references, but through the marginal, associative, affective and emotional reference points. To exemplify, the Iranian-based curriculum on both the elementary and the secondary level has a huge emphasis on metacognition in classes such as language arts and social studies. For an educator not familiar with the cultural styles and cognitive styles behind those metacognition prompts, the curriculum may appear to be esoteric, insensible and unrelated. Studies by Osunde, Tlou, and Brown (1996) indicate that lack of accessibility towards the deep layers of understanding others from a different culture would bring about clichés and stereotyped knowing that work against the true nature of a global education. In their study, they focused on how preservice social studies teachers perceived Africa. In their study of one hundred preservice teachers from the United States, Osunde et al. (1996) found that the majority of the concepts associated with Africa were nothing but tigers, disease, jungles, poor, deserts and superstition. Osunde et al. (1996) demonstrate how the American preservice teachers' exposure to signs (as indicated above) prevent them from understanding the deep layers of meaning making about Africa. They indicate that

> Even though preservice teachers are exposed to an increasing amount of information on Africa through their college courses and seminars and even though the media now presents news on Africa with more frequency, the results of our data analysis showed that a majority of the preservice social studies teachers had the same misconceptions about Africa that their grandparents and parents had several decades ago.
>
> *(p. 120, cited in Tucker, 2009)*

It is in line with this attempt that Spariosu (2004) focuses on ways and strategies that can bring about a "global mindset" for fostering a true global education. He brings numerous examples from Rumi, Abu Sa'id, Shabestari

and others as "an expression of the same nonlinear, irenic way of thinking in the Islamic tradition" to elucidate the significance of thinking that lies outside the Western civilization (Spariosu, 2009, p. 133). His arguments on establishing a real engagement with a concentration on multilateral teamwork, intercultural and transdisciplinary dialogue would facilitate the process of identifying non-Western educational approaches. These approaches may be easily concealed to oblivion because of the pervasive discourses within the Western educational system.

A global education that is entrenched within one single perspective would lead to a mindlessness that ignores and discounts other perspectives. Langer (1997) encourages a mindful disengagement from remaining in a single perspective and exploring alternative ways of looking and says:

> In a mindful state, we implicitly recognize that no one perspective optimally explains a situation. Therefore, we do not seek to select the one response that corresponds to the situation, but we recognize that there is more than one perspective on the information given and we choose from among these. *(p. 108)*

Global Education's Claim of Authority and Ownership

Deep within the underlying elements of global education, its conceptualization, planning, policies and proposals, there lies a claim of authority and ownership. To put it differently, global education is strongly embedded within the assumptions of power and authority in that education needs to be done globally but by virtue of a leadership that not only gives direction to how and what of the movement but also decides on the sources which endorse or refute the legitimacy of inclusion, sensibility and expressiveness of others. The discourse of power, itself, emanates from a potpourri of political and economic factors with a strong propensity towards superiority. The establishment of the claim of authority and ownership can play a huge destructive role in the true nature of global education as it imposes narrow-mindedness and parochialism in a wide variety of levels; it sanctions against inclusionality, it impedes the process of a real understanding and it censures a profound deconstruction of the politically and economically established assumptions. Huntington's assumptions, for instance, have widened the gap between the West and the East. Global education's hubris with the ownership takes an expansionist view that marginalizes learning and dialogue about others and projects a series of assumptions and perceptions upon the world.

Building upon Willinsky (1998), Merryfield (2009) illustrates how imperialism and imperialist ways of thinking can influence global education with specific political and economic ambitions. She reminds us how the discourse of power

within the imperialist design of education can highlight the grandeur of one thing and downgrade the other thing. On this analysis, Merryfield (2009) writes:

> Whether the dichotomous terms are The Orient/The occident, First World/Third World, free/communist, or industrialized/developing nations, there is an "us"—usually the white middle-class descendants of Western Europeans who are said to have developed democracy and today make the world safe—and "them," the Others who are divided from real Americans by their culture, skin color, language, politics, or other differences.
>
> *(p. 219)*

The claim for ownership and authority for global education is associated with the emergence of a privileged status with certain goals. If the etiological definition of the global education is summed up in reductionism, materialism, a positivist and linear way of thinking about the subject matter of global education, namely human beings, the privilege will be designated and assigned to the voices that would substantiate the utilitarian project. How can global education offer an in-depth understanding of intercultural relationships if it is encapsulated and circumscribed by a culture of reductionism? If voices need to be expressed on the strength of global education's discourse of sensibility, how can global education provide a practically opulent dialogue among cultures?

The claim of ownership and authority is largely indebted to the technological advancement in numerous stages, the natural sciences' salient leaps of progress and the rapid growth of information and communication technology. This can have several adverse effects in the way of a proactive global education: 1) It can generate a huge emphasis on accessing the technique at the peril of ignoring the ethical values. The notion that an increase of computers in classrooms would give rise to a growth in understanding is an example of such an emphasis. 2) It can impose a machine-oriented perspective on human beings. This perspective would lead to a metaphor where the subject matter of global education, namely human beings, would be equal to automatons. You may cry beside a computer, tell the funniest jokes, read the most beautiful poems, show the scenes of human massacre or explicate the values of devotion and benevolence, what does the computer do? A machine-oriented perspective would have no room for promoting global responsibility. 3) Global education, in its present form, can easily neglect and ignore voices that fall outside the discourses of linear and positivist thinking. I shall explain one such example of negligence or ignorance in the context of discussions on global education. Huntington (1996) tries to indicate that Islam is inherently tied to violence and violent actions are ineluctably linked to Islamic perspective. With a very basic understanding of Islamic worldview, one can easily identify the frivolousness of Huntington's statements. Examining the Islamic perspective on the rights of human beings and the significance of a comprehensive respect towards Human rights, Jafari, an Iranian contemporary philosopher and

scholar of Islam cites Imam Ali of Muslims with the following decrees on the rights of animals:

> "Do not keep the animals and their children separate from one another."
>
> "Make sure that you keep your nails short upon milking lest the animals may feel annoyed."
>
> "If you happen to take the animals out for grazing, make sure that you walk them through the beautiful meadows if there are any."
>
> "Rest assured that enough milk is left for the animal when milking."
>
> "God will damn the one who uses profane language while addressing any animal."
>
> "The governor can punish anyone who does not take care of his/her animal."
>
> *(Jafari, 2006, pp. 159–162)*

Jafari (2006) then asks how a worldview that is so sensitive towards the rights of animals can go indifferent when dealing with the human rights and global education. He brings numerous examples within the Islamic tradition to argue that Islam displays an essentially vital sensitivity towards the rights of any living creature with the maximum possible rights for any human being. Huntington's allegations are strongly refuted even in the West by those with a very basic understanding about Islam. On "the invidiousness of Huntington's arguments," Spariosu (2004) writes:

> The traditional greeting among Muslims is "Peace be with you" (Al-Salam Alei-kum) or that Sufi teachings do not condone violence and conflict any more than their Buddhist, Taoist, or Christian counterparts do. For example, the prophet Muhammad says: "If a man gives up quarreling when he is in the wrong, a house will be built for him in Paradise. But if a man gives up a conflict even when he is in the right, a house will be built for him in the loftiest of Paradise" (Frager & Fadiman, 1997, p. 84). If anything, Huntington's and Payne's arguments highlight the ignorance of even-well trained Westerners about other cultures and religions (not to mention their own) and the urgent need for educating the world's youth about each other's—and their own—cultural traditions.
>
> *(p. 51)*

Hakimi (2009), another Iranian philosopher and scholar of Islam, presents an in-depth analysis of the word "Islam" and prophet Muhammad on the strength of a series of evidence within Islamic tradition and argues that prophet Muhammad serves as the source of mercy, peace and compassion for the whole universe. In citing numerous evidence, he recounts the story of prophet Muhammad who comes under the frequent daily attack of an assailant who even throws the bladder

of a sheep to the prophet. The prophet pays a visit to the man once he receives the news of his illness. Having read the above examples, one may reflect on how a learner in North America may be subscribed to a single perspective that would be drastically different from the original culture.

Global education needs to disclaim its belonging to merely Westernized discourse of power and its politically established agenda. It needs to extend the possibility of connection to the peripheral and the marginal voices, to the visible and the invisible players, to the represented, underrepresented and misrepresented. Global education needs to offer the possibility of a collaboration among the world's people so they construct knowledge through their contribution and participation, not that they be given the knowledge through the privileged. Global education needs to disavow its belonging to political agendas that move in line with the interest of some political leaders. In the words of Spariosu (2004), "so, it is neither Islam nor the West that are a problem for each other, but certain political leaders and their advisers" (p. 52). Spariosu (2004) considers the practical key to the promotion of global education as the implementation of major reforms within higher education system particularly in the universities. He argues that educational institutions overwhelmed by red tape and bureaucratic systems would act as obstacles in the way of true global education. Such institutions, he further claims, develop entanglements in the face of real participative measures and global education.

He argues that

> In attempting to reorient the university toward global education, let alone global intelligence, we come up against what seem to be insurmountable obstacles, because the very academic place that has traditionally been designed to address important social and human problems seems now to compound, rather than to alleviate, such problems. As we have seen, many of our educational institutions have simply become reflections of global predicaments, instead of active leaders out of such predicaments. For instance, at most U.S. universities, current administrators, despite paying lip service to the "internationalization of the curriculum," often perceive study abroad and experiential education as expensive extras that interrupt students' normal campus activities. To make matters worse, the academic credit systems that are currently in place at most North American Universities are highly protectionist. Through time- and energy-consuming bureaucratic red tape, they make it deliberately difficult for students to move across disciplines and institutions of higher learning both in the United States and overseas.
>
> *(Spariosu, 2004, p. 200)*

Said's *Orientalism* (1978), *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and *Covering Islam* (1997) demonstrate how Western education is entangled with a hegemonic discourse that gives superiority, authority and ownership to certain groups, namely

Europeans. Said (1978) argues that colonizers considered themselves as not only the possessors of knowledge, expertise and education but also the source of privileges that bestowed them with the right to define others. He indicates that the education driven by colonization and oppressors controlled the construction of the interaction among identity, power, language, education and knowing. Such an education, Said argues, imposed certain prescriptions against the oppressed and the exploited.

Said's arguments in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) depict how the discourse of oppression and power clandestinely and extensively infiltrated the realm of not only the cognition but also emotions and behavior: the oppressed had to see the world through the glasses of the oppressors and those colonized had to abide by the mindset and the culture of the colonizers, the exploited had to choose the choice of words of the exploiters, the deprived had to express themselves in accordance with the standards set by the oppressors. The oppressors had the privilege of defining the right and the wrong: they had the ownership of everything.

The sedimentation of the imperialist way of thinking allows the Western global education a claim that can justify a quintessential supervision for decision making, diagnosis and intervention in the realm of education. The entrapment of global education within the ideologically and economically driven globalization would hinder the process of global education as a movement that can promote global citizenship.

Freire's *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998a) and *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1998b) critically delineate the dangers of an economically driven global education and encourage awareness towards a real collaboration among the educators and learners so they can critically examine the creation and construction of knowledge. Such construction of knowledge, Freire argues, needs to be liberated from the subjugation of those who grandiloquently consider themselves as the owner of knowing. For global education to be globally effective, it needs to revisit the plethora of forces that have explicated the claim and totalitarian tyranny of global education. This can produce huge implications for addressing the situations and conditions of those who are not affiliated to the privileged voices. An authentic global education needs to allow everyone to critically elucidate and analyze the input and output of the so-called global education establishments and organizations. Such an analytical approach would involve not only the interests of the citizens of wealthy countries that happen to be the members of the organizations, but also the interests of the non-members that can contribute to a global education for achieving a globally sustainable peace and development.

In line with this revisiting, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the UN's Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and so many other organizations and programs can be encouraged to explore the possibility of a shift of attention from the political

leaders' presumptions of education to a comprehensive inclusion of others who may have been fully concealed to oblivion through the ownership of global education. The shift can bring to light the multiplicities and fragments that have been put aside in the galloping trend of the reductionist materialism of global education. The shift can also illustrate the significance of an engagement with the practical intercultural strategies that help the implementation of an effective global education management program.

Global Education and Global Citizenship

If global education is incarcerated within the power of politics and its ramifications, how can it foster global citizenship? In order for global education to harbor global citizenship, global education needs to be emancipated from the manacles of politically based parochialism that circumscribe the open and comprehensive activities of global education. Global citizenship requires an involvement and an active participation of every one in a global level; it necessitates an active engagement on the part of everyone. How can a participative involvement transpire if the discourse of power has already established contingencies that hamper the presence of others who do not move in line with the rules of the games within the hegemonic discourse of power and its utilitarian domination?

Questioning and critiquing the paradigms that define global action and infuse globalization, Gills (2002) indicates that

> There has been much discussion of the so-called non-state actors and the rise and importance of nongovernmental organizations and other international societal factors in recent years of globalization. Yet we can observe for ourselves how it is still the most powerful governments of the world that determine the primary course of action and define the parameters of mainstream discussion whenever there is a crisis. Thus, the embedded power structure of the world order has been highlighted even in the so-called era of globalization. Nevertheless, if we look deeper, we can see things differently, and we may realize the potential for positive change. Rather than accepting the still reigning paradigm of (past) international relations, with its enduring feature of governance by a few great powers based on their ability to use military force, we must urgently look for ways to turn to a positive alternative.
>
> *(p. 159)*

If globalization is politically tied to global education with a focus on particular voices, how can it truly listen to other voices? Global education inspired by the political globalization would develop a monological and not a dialogical relationship where citizens receive prescription before they can get any diagnosis.

Challenging such a globalization and its outcry for subjugation, Spariosu (2004) mindfully examines Huntington's perniciously destructive analysis and states that

> If Huntington's history teaches us anything, it is that power has often fared best under various disguises, rather than through raw display, that is, that soft power can often be harder than hard power. This truth should be painfully obvious to those U.S. foreign policy makers who advocate preemptive strikes as a way of preventing terrorist and other military activities on the part of so-called rogue nations and political groups, inimical to the United States and its closest allies. Such displays of raw power have lead, for example, to the current debacle in the Middle East.
>
> *(p. 55)*

The concept of citizenship, *ipso facto*, is a Western-oriented concept with its roots in liberalism, the classical ideas of democracy and participation in the "polis" of ancient Greece, and an entitlement within the autonomous cities of northern Italy (Turner, 1993). If global education's global citizenship is positioned within the circumscribing discourse of the West, how can it bring an involvement from everyone? Furthermore, if global education fails to study the global education experience of other countries, how can it enter a global dialogue to invite everyone's contribution?

Global education's present literature is rife with works within the Western discourse of education and hardly has serious inclusion of any works from the other parts of the world. Interestingly and ironically enough, Hakimi (2004) and Jafari (2006) present evidence that indicate the engagements of some of the Muslim scholars with both global education and internationalization of education. They argue that Islamic worldview does not belong to geography or a place and therefore addresses the common ties among human beings in explicating a message that is not bound by one nation or a group. Both Hakimi (2002) and Jafari (2006) claim that an Islamic ontology is in pursuit of bringing education for everyone in the world as it has a special focus on human beings' togetherness. Hakimi (2002) cites Imam Ali saying that there is not even one single action, neither minor nor major whereupon one is in dire need of understanding and awareness. He proposes an Islamic global perspective on education where everyone feels connected and tied to the others in the world and this connection can be further strengthened through a mindful involvement for implementing peace and mercy not only in small and interconnected communicates but also in larger worldwide networks.

The present literature on global education seldom reflects any of such propositions as the assumptions promoted by Huntington and Lewis bring forth the fear and negativity and not hope and optimism. In delineating this fear, Said (2003) writes

> As I suggest, European interest in Islam derived not from curiosity but from fear of a monotheistic, culturally and militarily formidable competitor to

> Christianity. The earliest European scholars of Islam, as numerous historians have shown, were medieval polemicists writing to ward off the threat to Muslim hordes and apostasy. In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has persisted to the present day, both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Islam which is viewed as belonging to a part of the world—the Orient—counterposed imaginatively, geographically, and historically against Europe and the West.
>
> *(p. 344)*

Global education needs to choose a different language, a different discourse and new approach towards examining, discussing and presenting issues in the global world. It needs to openly listen to others without imposing a selective process for listening. In doing this, the discourse of superiority needs to be replaced with a shift in listening, thinking and analyzing. Global education's mindset needs to be liberated from the yoke of the poisonous emotions and feelings which dictate coercive and manipulative decision makings.

In explaining the flux of such implications, Said (2003) indicates:

> There has been so massive and calculatedly aggressive attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women's rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment and democracy are by no means simple and agreed upon concepts that one either does or does not find, like Easter eggs in the living-room. The breathtaking insouciance of jejune publicists who speak in the name of foreign policy and who have no living notion (or any knowledge at all) of the language of what real people actually speak has fabricated an arid landscape ready for American power to construct there an ersatz model of free market "democracy," without even a trace of doubt that such projects don't exist outside of Swift's Academy of Lagado.
>
> *(p. xiv)*

For global education to take a new stance, it needs to revisit the definition of human beings and the common denominators of being a human being. The current language of violence as conspicuously exhibited by mass media needs to be fundamentally transformed into a language of peace not just on perfunctory levels but in profound demonstrations of peaceful structures. The current news coverage is drastically deleterious, violent and destructive. What do citizens of the world learn when they are extensively and frequently exposed to annihilating fashions of conflicts, skirmishes and encounters? If global education tacitly gets stratified within the discourse of antagonism, how can global education serve as a source for composure? If the culture of violence and threat serves to be persistently viable and pervasive, how can global education promise the possibility of

celebrating global citizenship where empathy and comfort stand at the threshold of its commencement? How can global education offer the panacea of solidarity and togetherness when the citizens of the world feel inextricably enslaved by a seemingly insurmountable culture of alienation and separation? As the etymology of both whole and health suggest, the detachment from the whole works against the process of the health. A fragmented global education with the political egoism and egotism would block the exploratory journey of learning from the whole where each part needs to be fully recognized as a complementary phase of the project and not in contraposition to the others.

Global education needs to be connected to a global wisdom where the heart and mind walk arm in arm and not against one another, where the roots are allowed to stand out right by the appearances, where multiplicity of thinking can open up the possibility of consensus. Global education inspired by a global wisdom looks for human freedom from the modern slavery that is not unlike the old slavery in nature. Global education driven by a global wisdom calls on cultures to borrow from one another, to share their experienced individuality, to get united for the implementation of affecting the quality of life beyond the quotidian stratum of consumerism and materialism. Global education intertwined with a global wisdom would substantiate the pearl of living together through peace and understanding away from manufacturing solipsism. The first move towards this possibility begins with the courage to challenge the insinuations which defy and denounce the wisdom that would reveal the nakedness of global education: a mischievous kid may help us see the captivity of the crowd and their infatuation with the surface.

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